




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Plato. Philebus

THE PHILEBUS

66

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES.

BY

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OXFORD:

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

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THE PHILIPPS



WITH

A REVISION OF THE TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES

BY

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P5
1860
cop 3

OXFORD

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1914

P R E F A C E.

NO edition of the works of Plato quite calculated to meet the wants of the student has as yet appeared. This deficiency it is proposed to supply by the joint labours of some members of the University of Oxford. The present edition of the *Philebus* is therefore to be regarded as one of a series.

The whole series is intended to follow a uniform plan: as, however, each dialogue will be entrusted to a single editor, differences of individual taste or opinion may possibly appear in the execution.

An introduction, indicating the general scope and character of each dialogue, will be prefixed.

Many difficulties in the interpretation of Plato vanish before an insight into the arrangement of parts, or plan of structure, of a dialogue. This arrangement, though always artistic, is often intricate. A running analysis will, therefore, be given in the margin, sufficient, it is hoped, to furnish a clue to the course of the argument through its occasional mazes.

As scholars are generally agreed to refer to the edition of Stephanus in their references to the writings of Plato, the corresponding pages of that edition will be indicated in the margin.

The conceptions unfolded or made the subject of passing allusion in the *Philebus* have been chiefly elucidated in the notes by a comparison of Plato's with previous or subsequent speculations. Where it was necessary to examine any point at greater length, longer notes, or rather essays, have been appended at the end of the volume.

An English translation, intended to be sufficiently close to perform the office of a philological commentary, is published separately for the use of the English reader, or of such students as may require any further assistance in comprehending the original.

INTRODUCTION.

THOUGH Socrates directed speculation to moral problems, he did not himself construct any definite moral creed. After his death two opposite ethical schools arose. The form that the fundamental problem of morality assumed was: What is the Highest Good, or, the End of life? This the Megarians maintained to be Knowledge, the Cyrenaics Pleasure. In the PHILEBUS these rival doctrines are proposed and examined, and contrasted with Plato's own more comprehensive theory.

It is first inquired whether either Pleasure or Knowledge is the Absolute Good, and fit to be proposed as the End of life.

This question is soon determined. Our preconception of the Highest Good involves three characters. It must be Desirable, Adequate, and Perfect. Neither Pleasure nor Knowledge satisfies these conditions. They are each of them but partial Ends, and a combination of them is clearly a more Perfect Good.

A second problem is next proposed: Which of the two, Pleasure or Knowledge, approaches more nearly to whatever is the Perfect Good.

This problem, like the former, is easily determined by the consideration of three characters assumed to belong to the Perfect Good. These are Truth, Measure, and Beauty, and it is decided with-

out much difficulty that these conditions are satisfied in a higher degree by Knowledge than by Pleasure. This is the whole substance of the dialogue if we only consider the inquiries originally proposed.

Another question, however, though not expressly stated, receives at least a partial solution: What is the exact composition of that Highest Good of which Pleasure and Knowledge are but fractional ingredients? and what kinds of Pleasure and Knowledge are its components?

This question is approached more methodically than the others. At the commencement of the dialogue it is stated, with the solemnity befitting the inauguration of a new Method, that no question can be treated Scientifically without Generalization and Division. To answer, then, the question just proposed we must ascertain the Genera and Species of Pleasure and Knowledge. Accordingly both Pleasures and Sciences are Classified, and this broad distinction is found to run through the species of both, that some are Pure, others Mixed. It is first agreed that the Purest portions of each have the best title to be considered as components of the Highest Good. Besides these, however, all the Mixed kinds of Knowledge, and, even of the Pleasures Mixed with Pain, those that are necessary to life and in allegiance to the virtues, are admitted as elements. The Greatest, however, and the Vicious Pleasures are pronounced to be the Greatest, are thus excluded. So the third ethical problem is solved.

But it is the characteristic of Plato's philosophic

treatment of any subject that it presents the three branches of speculation, Ethical, Logical, Physical inquiries in intimate and organic combination.

The Ethical element we have found in the subject of the problems.

The Dialectical element forms the vestibule of the dialogue, where the doctrine of Method is enunciated in somewhat mystic tones, but with unrivalled impressiveness. The Dialectical Method is afterwards partly exemplified in the Classification of Pleasure and Knowledge.

The Physical or Metaphysical element is introduced by a further application of the Method, the reference of Pleasure and Knowledge to higher Genera. This involves a systematic exposition, with more or less elucidation, of the four great Principles, the Limit, the Infinite, the Product, and the Cause: a list that resumes the highest philosophic abstractions of Plato's predecessors, and was not much varied in subsequent Greek philosophy.

The final comparison, too, of Pleasure and Knowledge assumes a Metaphysical character, as it determines not only their position in respect of the Ethical Good, but, partially at least, in relation to this catholic system of Principles. The highest place in this more general arrangement of things placed in their order of excellence, belongs to nothing within the worldly sphere, but to the Absolute Cause, the Divinity, the Eternal Good and Measure of all perfection. Second is the Perfect Derivative Good, Physical or Moral, the latter of which, the highest End of created life, was the subject of the Ethical problems. The third rank


belongs to the highest kind of Knowledge, Wisdom, or Reason in its apprehension of the highest truth. The fourth rank is assigned to the lower kinds of Knowledge, the Scientific comprehension of truths of a less exalted order. The fifth to the Pure Pleasures. The sixth to such of those Mixed with Pains as are necessary to man's physical existence, and sanctioned by the moral law.

From the wealth of thought which Plato has lavished on this, as indeed on every other subject that he handled, it has been disputed what is the leading idea of the *Philebus*.

It is obvious that the fundamental problem is Ethical, the character of the highest attainable Good. The most distinctive feature of the dialogue, however, is perhaps, not the subject, but the mode of handling the question, the instrument employed for its solution, Classification and Division of the Pleasures and Sciences. That Plato intended to direct the attention to this, we may infer from the emphatic manner in which this is indicated as the true philosophic Method at the commencement of the dialogue. This Classification then, eclipsed as it became in the execution by more striking features, seems to have been the germinal idea of the *Philebus*. It is the portion earliest in development, about which the other members of the organism grow and cluster; the mass in the picture which, though somewhat pale in colour, dominates the composition, as the centre to which the other masses converge or from which they radiate. It is the key applied to determine, partly at least, the elements in the Platonic definition of the Highest Good, or what we

have called, the third Ethical problem. And this again is introduced by a collision of the narrower views of the Cyrenaic and Megarian schools; a collision which assumes the form of the first and second Ethical problems. And the treatment is so broad as to involve a sketch, sufficiently definite to disclose Pythagorean features, of the outlines of a Metaphysical system.

To inquire into the chronology of the *Philebus*, and its connexion with the other dialogues, belongs to a more general consideration of the consecution and relation of Plato's writings. We may observe here that the maturity of views presented by the *Philebus* proves that it is among the latest. Speculations on the End of life, on the Method of Science, on the laws of the Universe, in which we may trace the impulsion of Socrates, of the Megarians, and of the Pythagoreans, are all fused into one philosophic system, and presented in an harmonious artistic form. And, as has been observed, this triple thread of speculation, Ethical, Logical, and Physical, is the badge of Plato's most perfect dialogues. In this respect the *Philebus* may claim to be classed with the *Republic* and *Timæus*. Of this trilogy, however, it is doubtless the least. This is probably due to the subordination in Plato's mind of Ethical to Political philosophy. At all events there is not so full a presentation of Ethical ideas in the *Philebus*, as of Political in the *Republic*, or of Physical in the *Timæus*.



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LONDON : FRANCIS MACPHERSON, King William Street.

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ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

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ed. Steph.
p. 11.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ, ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

ΟΡΑ δὴ, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῶν⁵
b ἀμφισβητεῖν, εἰ μὴ σοι κατὰ νοῦν ἢ λεγόμενος.
βούλει συγκεφαλαιώσμεθα ἑκάτερον ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ

A. Two problems are proposed :

(1) Is Pleasure or Knowledge the Highest Good ?

4. λόγον...δέχεσθαι] This phrase became a sort of technical term of Dialectic. It appears to have been a custom for one disputant to hand on a thesis to another, who had to defend it, not on his own principles, but on those of the disputant whom he succeeded. ἂν δ' ἑτέρου δόξαν διαφυλάττη ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, δηλον ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου διάνοιαν ἀποβλέποντα θετέον ἕκαστα καὶ ἀρνητέον. Ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ παρ' ἀλλήλων δεχόμενοι τὰς θέσεις" στοχάζονται γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἴποι ὁ θέμενος. Aristot. Topic. 8, 5. "If the Respondent is defending the opinion of another person, of course he must be guided by the views of that person in the premisses he concedes or denies to the Opponent. And in practice even those who follow another in the defence of a thesis observe this rule, for they are guided by what they

imagine its original advocate would have said.

9. Instead of ἀγαθόν we should have expected ἄριστον, or τὸ ἀγαθόν. That a Greek might overlook the difference of meaning produced by the article we learn from Aristotle, who thinks it necessary to remind us of the distinction : ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ὁμοίως θετέον τοὺς ὅρους. Anal. Prior. I. 40. "To say that Pleasure is a Good and to say that it is The Good are two different propositions, and so must the terms be into which we resolve them." The Stoics, however, would have defended the expression in the text, as they made all Good homogeneous and equal in degree, and recognized no difference between Good and Best or The Good. This view they seem to have

χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ p. 11.
 ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ'
 ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν
 καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ξυγ-
 5 γενῇ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε
 ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λόγῳ γίνεσθαι ξύμπασιν, ὅσα περ e
 αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν· δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν
 ὠφελιμώτατον ἀπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσί τε καὶ
 ἐσομένοις. Μὴ οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὃ Φίληβε,
 10 ἐκότεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώ-
 ταρχε, λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ
 15 καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τάληθές πη
 περανθῆναι;

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

d

II. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα
 20 καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

(2) If some
 other Good
 excels both
 Pleasure
 and Know-

adopted from the Megaric school, whose ethical doctrine is represented by Socrates at the opening of the dialogue. We read in Diogenes Laertius, οὗτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. 11. 106. "Euclid of Megara said Good was one thing with many names, Wisdom, God, Reason, and the like." The Cyrenaic school, who identified Good with Pleasure, and allowed of no difference between Pleasures, probably also

would use Good as synonymous with The Good. Possibly, therefore, in omitting the article in the present passage Plato has followed a mode of speaking habitual to the two schools whose opinions are contrasted in the present dialogue with his own.

8. ὠφελιμώτατον] i. e. not only Better in comparison with Pleasure, but absolutely Best, or the Sovereign Good. This latter proposition is afterwards abandoned.

p. 11. ΣΩ. Ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ δια-
θεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀν-
θρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἀρ' οὐχ
οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ
τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ;
μὴ οὐκ, ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ξυγγενής,¹⁰
e ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφοτέροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως
p. 12. βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε φρονήσῃ, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν
ἡδονήν, ἢ δὲ ἡττᾶται; ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά¹⁵
φατε, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Φιλήβω; τί φής;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾷν ἡδονὴν δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει·
σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.²⁰

ΠΡΩ. Παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ
ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ
τοῦναντίον.

b ΦΙ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ
μαρτύρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.²⁵

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρ-

3. εὐδαίμονα] i. e. the ques-
tion relates to the theory of
Happiness: an intimation that
the ensuing dialogue is of an
Ethical character.

11. τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως]
"That perfectly has this power
(of producing happiness)."

20. αὐτὸς γνώσει] "must de-
cide, determine, for yourself:"
"must take your own course."
So in the Gorgias, with the
same expression of impatience:
τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν
λόγον καταλύομεν; —αὐτὸς γνώσει.
Gorgias, p. 505 C.

τυρες ἂν εἶμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἂ λέγεις. Ἀλλὰ δὴ p. 12.
τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ
Φιλίβου ἐκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα πε-
ραίνειν.

B. What is
the right
method
of in-
quiry?

Pleasure
is not uni-
form, but
multiform.

5 ΠΙ. ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν
ὁδε Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστα-
τον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἡδονὴν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αἰὲ πρὸς τὰ c
10 τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ
πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδί-
την, ὅπη ἐκείνη φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ
ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπ'
ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμείσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν
15 ἦντινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως
ἀπλῶς, ἐν τι, μορφᾶς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καί
τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ, ἡδεσθαι
μὲν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἡδεσθαι δὲ d
καὶ τὸν σωφρονούντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἡδεσθαι
20 δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπί-
δων μεστόν, ἡδεσθαι δ' αὖ τὸν φρονούντα αὐτῷ τῷ
φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκατέρας πῶς ἂν
τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαί-
νοιτο ἐνδίκως;

25 ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες,

15. ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς]
"to judge primâ facie from the
singleness of her name." The
meaning of the phrase appears
from Demosth. Lept., quoted
by Stahlbaum: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ-
τως μὲν ἀκοῦσαι λόγον τινὰ ἔχον·
εἰ δὲ τις ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσειε, ψεῦδος
ἂν ὄν φανείη. A parallel passage

in the Symposium shows that
οὕτως ἀπλῶς must be taken to-
gether: οὐ καλῶς μοι δοκεῖ προ-
βεβλήσθαι ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, τὸ ἀπλῶς
οὕτω παρηγγελῆθαι ἐγκωμιάζειν ἔ-
ρωτα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἣν ὁ ἔρως, κα-
λῶς ἂν εἶχε, νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
εἰς. p. 180 C.

p. 12. αὐται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναν-
ετίαι. πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν
εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρώμα, ὃ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατὰ
γε αὐτὸ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν διοίσει, τὸ χρώμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό-
γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γινώσκουμεν ὥς πρὸς
τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὃν τυγχάνει· καὶ
δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταυτόν· γένει μὲν ἐστὶ
πᾶν ἓν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντι-

p. 13. ὠτάτα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητα ἔχοντα μυρίαν 10
που τυγχάνει. καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερα οὕτως ἔχονθ' εὐρήσο-
μεν, ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα
τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἐν ποιοῦντι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας
ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὐρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάβει τὸν λόγον; 15

ΣΩ. Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἐτέ-

12. λόγῳ] "mode, method, of reasoning," i. e. only regarding the generic element in pleasures. Λόγος is sometimes used for the form, principle, or artifice of an argument, or objection to an argument, abstracted from the particular matter. In this sense all arguments that are the application of the same logical canon, that fall under the same head or locus communis, are one and the same λόγος. Immediately below λόγον seems to mean thesis or original proposition (that all Pleasures are Good). It may however have the same sense as before: "proof," "argument," "syllogism," or rather, "defence" or "enstasis," (that Pleasures may have a common property, Good, as they have a common genus, Pleasure.) The

Metaphysical principle upon which this Logical method is based is presently discussed, and is also called λόγος. See p. 14 c.

17. Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἐτέρφ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι] "because the predicate (ὄνομα) you apply to them, dissimilar as they are, is distinct (ἐτερον) from the subject." If Pleasures are opposite species of one genus, we can say all Pleasures are Pleasure, i. e. predicate one genus of all of them; but we have a slight presumption against any other general proposition of the form all Pleasures are X; because if X is connected with the specific difference of one Pleasure it will be excluded by the specific difference of another. The question accordingly will be, in the language of Logicians, whether

ρω, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντα εἶναι p. 13.
 τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος
 οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ· κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ b
 ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὥς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως [πάντα] σὺ προσ-
 5 αγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι τῷ
 λόγῳ, εἰ τίς σε προσαναγκάζει. τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτον
 ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας
 ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἶει γάρ τινα
 10 συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, εἴτα
 ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς c
 ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας ἐτέρας αὐτῶν κακὰς;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλή-
 λαις εἶναι καὶ τινας ἐναντίας.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὐτι καθ' ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ
 Πρώταρχε. οὐδ' ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ
 πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα
 ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισό-
 20 μεθα δὲ καὶ ἐρουῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων φανλότατοί τε d
 καὶ περὶ λόγους ἅμα νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σὲ μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν
 τολμῶ λέγειν ὥς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιο-
 25 τάτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον, ἔξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν,

X is the specific property of one special Pleasure or the generic property of all Pleasures. Protarchus of course must maintain that Goodness is connected with the generic element in Pleasures. In inviting Protarchus to point out this, Socrates, to try his acuteness, attempts what was afterwards

called the fallacy Plurimum Interrogationum, i. e. so frames his question that Protarchus cannot answer it simply without conceding the point in debate.

19. πεισόμεθα] A happy emendation of Badham for the πειρασόμεθα of the Zurich edition. The Bodleian MS. gives πειρόμεθα.

p. 13. καὶ φανούμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχῆσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουόμεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἀνιόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἴσως ἂν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.

ε ΠΡΩ. Λέγε πῶς;

5

IV. ΣΩ. Ἐμὲ θες ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.

Science also is not uniform, but multi-form.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθόν, διε- 10 ρωτώμενος ὃ τί ποτέ ἐστι τὰγαθόν, ἅρ' οὐ ταῦτον πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλαί τε αἱ ξυνάπασαι ἐπιστήμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις. εἰ δὲ καὶ 15

p. 14. ἐναντία πη γίνονται τινες, ἄρα ἄξιός ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεῖς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαῖν ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κἄπειθ' ἡμῶν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἰχοίτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωζοίμεθα ἐπὶ τινος ἀλογίας; 20

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι. τό γε μὴν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλὰ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλὰ δὲ ἐπιστήμαι καὶ διάφοροι.

20. ἀλογίας] The "breach of the laws of disputation" which Socrates here deprecates, i. e. refusing to admit an evident truth, bore in the Dialectical code the name of Δυσκολία. εἰ οὖν μήτε ἀντεπιχειρεῖν ἔχων μήτε ἐνιστάσθαι οὐ τίθησι, δηλον ὅτι δυσκοilaίνει. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἐν λόγοις δυσκολία ἀπόκρισις παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους συλλογισμοῦ

φθαρτική. Arist. Topic. 8. 7. "A Respondent who refuses to admit an Opponent's premiss, though he can neither meet it by an adverse Syllogism nor by an adverse Instance, incurs the reproach of Perversity. For Perversity in Dialectic is an answer preventing an adverse syllogism by any but these two methods."

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τοῦ p. 14.
ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, b
κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμέν ἄν πῃ ἐλεγ-
χομένῳ μηνύσωσι, πότερον ἡδονὴν τάγαθόν δεῖ λέ-
5 γειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ [τι] τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι. νῦν γὰρ
οὐ δῆπου πρὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως
ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἂ σύ,
τῷ δ' ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

Unity and
Multipli-
city are
sometimes
found to
coincide,
and their
coinci-
dence has
been made
the subject
of certain
celebrated
paradoxes:
and one
case of it
occasions
the funda-
mental
problem of
the philo-
sophy of
Ideas.

10 V. ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δι' c
ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα
ἐκουσί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.

15 ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως
πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν. ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ
τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβη-
τῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὅποτερον οὖν τιθεμένῳ.

20 ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρ-
χον, ἓνα γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς
ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέ- d
μενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα
μυρία;

25 ΣΩ. Σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκας τὰ δεδημευ-
μένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, συγκε-
χωρημένα δὲ ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἡδῇ, μὴ
δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἄπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια

3. ἐλεγχομένῳ (sub. τῷ ἀγαθῷ)
was probably altered by the
transcriber into ἐλεγχόμενοι, the
reading of the MSS. and re-
tained in the Zurich edition,

on account of the plural μηνύ-
σωσι which follows.

20. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, &c.] See
Appendix A.

p. 14. καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβάνοντων
 e γίνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ
 μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα
 τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ κατα-
 γελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἐν ὡς 5
 πολλά ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἐν μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις,
 ἃ μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν
 τοῦτον λόγον;

p. 15. ΣΩ. Ὅποτεν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων 10
 τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀρτίως
 ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν,
 ὅπερ εἴπομεν νῦν δὴ, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγ-
 χειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἓνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ
 βοῦν ἓνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν, περὶ τοῦ- 15
 των τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλὴ σπουδὴ
 μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίνεται.

b ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονά-

10. Ὅποτεν ὦ παῖ, κ. τ. λ.] The Zenonian identity of unity and multiplicity is involved in all Proposition, whether scientific or unscientific, and is the identification of the one individual Subject with its many Predicates. That which forms the motto of Plato's dialectic implies Classification, that is to say, the commencement of science, and is the identity of the one Species with the many Individuals which it comprehends. In Zeno's view Socrates is one as a subject, and at the same time many things—Wise, Brave, Athenian, &c.—in respect of his attributes. In Plato's view

Socrates, Callias, Coriscus are many as individuals, and at the same time one in respect of Man, their common species. In Zeno's paradox the unity is the individual, Protarchus; in Plato's, Protarchus the individual is part of the multiplicity, and the unity is Man, the universal. Ἐνα ἄνθρωπον therefore is opposed to ἓνα Πρώταρχον above. Διαίρεσις, logical division, the cause of multiplicity, is the opposite of συναγωγή, generalization, the process which terminates in unity.

18. Πρῶτον μὲν... γίνεσθαι] This embarrassing passage is satisfactorily explained by Bad-

δας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύ- p. 15.
 τας, μίαν ἐκάστην οὐσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε
 γένεσιν μήτε ὀλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι
 βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τοῖς γιγνο-
 5 μένοισι αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἶτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ
 γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς· ὃ δὴ
 πάντων ἀδυνατότατον φαίνοιτ' ἄν, ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἅμα
 ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ περὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὧ Πρώ- c
 10 ταρχε, ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἷτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα
 καὶ εὐπορίας ἂν αὖ καλῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐν
 τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγ-
 χωρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δ' ἴσως
 κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εἰ κεί-
 μενον.

VI. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξεται d
 20 πολλῆς οὐσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα
 μάχης; ἄρ' ἐνθένδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταῦτόν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων

The disco-
 very of
 Unity in
 Multi-
 plicity, and
 Multi-
 plicity in
 Unity, and
 the reduc-
 tion of Mul-
 tiplicity to
 Number, is
 the true
 process of
 Science.

ham. There are not three pro-
 blems proposed, as might ap-
 pear at first sight, but only
 two. Ὅμως refers to nothing
 in its own clause but to the
 next, and gives μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο
 the force of, and yet. The first
 problem, then, is, Have the ideas
 a real existence? The second,
 How are we to reconcile their
 unity with their apparent divi-
 sion or multiplication in the

world of sense?

17. μὴ κινεῖν Φίληβον εἰ κεί-
 μενον] is an allusion to the pro-
 verb μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εἰ κείμενον,
 and below, πάντα κινεῖ λόγον,
 "leaves not a syllogism un-
 turned," is an allusion to the
 phrase πάντα κινεῖν λίθον.

23. ταῦτόν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ
 λόγων γιγνόμενα] "dialectical
 identifications of Unity and
 Plurality:" "conversions by lo-

- p. 15. γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντα καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αἰὲ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηται ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιούτον, ὥς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ⁵
- e γευσάμενος ἐκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἥσθεις ὥς τινα σοφίας εὐρηκῶς θησαυρόν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἄσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἓν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα¹⁰ καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δ' αἰὲ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἅν τε νεώτερος ἅν τε πρεσβύτερος ἅν τε ἡλιξ ὧν τυγχάνη,
- p. 16. φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκούοντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενός¹⁵ ἂν φείσαιο, εἴπερ μόνον ἐρμηνεῖα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλήθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου ξυνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῆς; ὅμως δέ, μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι²⁰ καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην παραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο

gic of Unity into Plurality, and Plurality into Unity." Perhaps ὑπὸ λόγων alludes to the "magic words" by which the sorcerers of epic fable effect their transformations. As Plato has already dismissed the Eleatics and Megarici, he seems here to be ridiculing his own disciples for trifling with his Dialectical paradox.

4. τῶν λόγων... πάθος] "an incident of reason." Plato explains in the Sophista that Zeno's paradox is an incident of all reasoning: his own being based on the relation of Universal to Particular belongs chiefly to scientific reasoning. See Appendix A.

22. εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν] as if it were an ἀλάστωρ.

καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ p. 16.
σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὃ παῖδες, ὥς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσ-
αγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ'
5 ἂν γένοιτο, ἣς ἐγὼ ἐραστῆς μὲν εἰμι αἰεί, πολλάκις δέ
με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὕτη; λέγέσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. ὁ ἦν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν, χρῆσθαι c
δὲ παγχάλεπον. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα
10 ἀνευρέθη πώποτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερά γέγονε. σκόπει
δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσεις, ὥς γε κατα-
φαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διὰ τινος Προμη-
15 θέως ἅμα φανοτάτῃ τινὶ πυρί. καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί,
κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην
φήμην παρέδωκαν, ὥς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν
ὄντων τῶν αἰεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν
ἐν αὐτοῖς ξύμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων
10 οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς d
ἐκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν.
εἰ οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί,
σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ
τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχρι περ ἂν

16. ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες] a fragment of the Niobe of
what this means appears from Æschylus :

Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι,
οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγὺς, ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον
Διὸς πατρὸς βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,
κοῦπῳ σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἶμα δαιμόνων.

24. τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον] This ἐκείνων (τῶν ἰδεῶν) ἐκάστη (ἀριθ-
is ungrammatical. The sense μόν) or, τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ (τῷ ἀριθμῷ
requires something like τὸν ἐν ἀριθμῶν) ἕκαστον.

- p. 16. τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι
μόνον ἴδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπόσα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου
ιδεάν πρὸς τὸ πλήθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν
e ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου
τε καὶ τοῦ ἐνός· τότε δὴ δεῖ τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν
πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἑᾶν. οἱ μὲν
οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν σκοπεῖν
καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν
p. 17. ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, καὶ πολλὰ
θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ 10
τὸ ἐν ἄπειρα εὐθύς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει· οἷς
διακεχώρισται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐρισ-
τικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

VII. ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μὲν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ
σου μανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δέομαι ἃ λέγεις 15
ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Σαφές μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς
γράμμασιν ὃ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸ ἐν τούτοις
b οἷσπερ καὶ πεπαίδενσαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν [ἡμῖν] ἐστὶ πού μία διὰ τοῦ στό-
ματος ἰοῦσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὖ πλήθει, πάντων τε καὶ
ἐκάστου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὲν ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἐτέρῳ γε τούτων ἐσμέν πῶ σοφοί, 25

9. ἐν μὲν ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι] ἐν καὶ
πολλὰ seems equivalent to ἐν ἐπὶ
πολλῶν, and to express a single
idea, "the Manifold One." See
below, περὶ παντὸς ἐνός καὶ πολ-
λῶν. To generalize too rapidly
is to suppose what is hetero-
geneous to be homogeneous ; to
generalize too slowly to suppose

what is homogeneous to be he-
terogeneous.

25. Καὶ οὐδ' ἐν ἐτέρῳ γε τούτων
ἔσμεν] So the Bodleian MS.
For the use of ἐν compare ἐν
τούτῳ (τῷ παιδείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης
πως ἔχειν) ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν.
Gorgias, p. 470. The Zurich
editors read καὶ οὐδὲν, κ. τ. λ.

The theory
of Music
furnishes
an example
how Scien-
tific know-
ledge im-
plies a cer-
tain power
of Nume-
ration, and
a gradual
progress by
successive
Division
from Unity
through
definite
Number to
Infinity.

οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἀπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὐθ' ὅτι τὸ ἐν· ἀλλ' p. 17.
ὅτι πόσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα· τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γραμμα-
τικὸν ἕκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τυγχάνει ποιοῦν,
τουτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν πού κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ ἡ
μία ἐν αὐτῇ.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν, βαρὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμό-
τονον. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐπω σοφὸς ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν
15 εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὥς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς
ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιος ἔσει.

9. μία ἐν αὐτῇ] This seems corrupt. The context requires something equivalent to καὶ ἀπειρος αὐτῇ πλήθει.

12. Pitch (τάσις) is the degree of acuteness or gravity of a sound. Perhaps to make ὀξύ and βαρὺ correspond to ὁμότονον, "of the same pitch," we should translate them as if they were comparatives, as Acuter and Graver. Interval (διάστημα) is the distance between two sounds of different pitch. Ὅροι seems to mean the extreme limits of pitch within which the whole scale of sounds is included. Τόνος, tone, is an interval of a certain length, that through which the voice is naturally raised at one effort. Σύστημα, system, e. g. the Tetrachord or Octachord, is a series or scale of sounds separated from one

another by various intervals. The Genus of a system depends on the magnitude of the intervals between the sounds, e. g. in the Diatonic genus the three intervals between the sounds of the Tetrachord were a semitone, a tone, a tone. In the Chromatic a semitone, a semitone, a tone and a half: in the Enharmonic a quartertone, a quartertone, a double tone. The Species of a genus is the order in which these intervals occur: e. g. in the Diatonic genus of the Tetrachord the order might be semitone, tone, tone: or tone, semitone, tone: or tone, tone, semitone. The Species were also called Modes, or Harmonies, and were named Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Ionic, &c. Plato here uses System as equivalent to Species.

p. 17. ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὴν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα
 ὅποσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξύτητός τε πέρι
 d καὶ βαρύτητος, καὶ ὅποια, καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τῶν διαστη-
 μάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν, ἃ
 5 κατιδόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέδωσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐπομένοις
 ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἁρμονίας, ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖ
 τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα, πάθη, γιγνόμενα, ἃ
 δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα δεῖν αὖ φασὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ
 μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ
 παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν· ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτά τε
 e λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν
 ὄντων ἐν ὅτιοῦν ταύτῃ σκοπούμενος ἔλῃς, οὕτως
 ἔμφρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας. τὸ δ' ἄπειρόν σε ἐκάστων
 καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πλήθος ἄπειρον ἐκάστοτε ποιεῖ τοῦ
 15 φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐναρίθμον, ἅτ' οὐκ
 εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἀπιδόντα.

VIII. ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ
 νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

p. 18. ΦΙ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποτε
 πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε
 βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς μέντοι ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
 ἠρώτηκε Φίληβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ. 25

ΣΩ. Δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ
 αὐτῶν τούτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὅτιοῦν εἴ τίς ποτε

The Alphabet furnishes an example of a progress by successive Generalization, from Infinity through definite Number to Unity.

8. ἐνόντα, πάθη, γιγνόμενα] An καὶ γιγνόμενα.
 asyndeton. The Zurich editors 16. οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐναρίθ-
 read without interpunctuation : μιον] An allusion to an oracle
 ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα. Perhaps given to the Megarians :
 the true reading is, ἐνόντα μᾶθῃς

ὑμεῖς δ' ὦ Μεγαρεῖς οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι
 οὔτε δυωδέκατοι, οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὐτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.

λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ p. 18.
 βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινα ἀριθμὸν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ-
 ναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμ-
 βάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν b
 5 πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ
 πάντων εἰς ἓν. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ νῦν
 λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις
 10 θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὥς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ
 Θεὺς τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὅς πρῶτος τὰ
 φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἐν ὄντα ἀλλὰ
 πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, φθόγγου δὲ
 μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δὲ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι· c
 15 τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγό-
 μενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τὰ τε ἄφθογγα
 καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ
 τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν

4. μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν.] "Ἐχοντα is equivalent to βλέποντα, and the construction is μὴ ἔχοντα ἐ. τ. ἐ. ἐ. ἀ. ἐ. ἀ. ἀ. τ. κ. π. ἐ. τ. "looking not at first for unity, but for some number, detect each separate multitude, (i. e. each unit of this number.)" Thus in the Alphabetic generalization, the number of species is (say) 24, and each of these 24 is a multitude or infinity of individual sounds.

9. Plato makes a similar division of the Letters in the Cratylus: ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω δεῖ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ φωνήεντα διελέσθαι ἔπειτα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ εἶδη τὰ τε ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα· οὕτως

γάρ που λέγουσιν οἱ δεινοὶ περὶ τούτων· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα, p. 421 C. In the Theaetetus he uses ψόφος for φθόγγος. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ σῆμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον οἷον συριπτούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων, p. 203 B. What Plato calls ἄφωνα, later Grammarians called σύμφωνα (consonants) reserving the name ἄφωνα (mutes) to those which he calls ἄφωνα καὶ ἄφθογγα, (π, β, φ, κ, γ, χ, τ, δ, θ.) What he calls μέσα, or, φωνήεντα μὲν οὐ, οὐ μέντοι γε ἄφθογγα, they called ἡμίφωνα, (semivowels, i. e. the liquids λ, μ, ν, ρ, and the sibilant σ.)

p. 18. λαβὼν ἐνὶ τε ἐκάστῳ καὶ ζύμπασι στοιχείων ἐπωνόμασε. καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἓνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἔιν πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμμα-
d τικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπὼν.

ΦΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον· τὸ δ' αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.

5. μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπὼν] "assuming there was only one over them he called it by name the Grammatical art." Voltaire complains that no language has a single term to denote the theory of the Alphabet. In Plato's time we see it was called γραμματική. In the time of Aristotle γραμματική signified the art of Reading and Writing: ἔτι, εἰ πρὸς πλείω λεγομένου τοῦ ὀριζομένου μὴ πρὸς πάντα ἀπέδωκεν· οἷον εἰ τὴν γραμματικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ γράφειν τὸ ὑπαγορευθέν· προσδείται γάρ, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦ γράφειν ἢ τοῦ ἀναγνῶναι ὁ ἀποδοὺς ὄρισται· ὥστ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἄμφω ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, ἐπεὶ πλείους οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁρισμοὺς εἶναι, Topic. 6, 5. "A definition is incorrect if the thing defined relates to several points, and only some of them are mentioned: e.g. if a man defines Grammar to be the art of Writing from dictation; for 'and of Reading' requires to be added. For he no more defines it who calls it the art of Writing, than he who calls it the art of Reading. Therefore neither of the two have defined it, but he who mentions both.

For the same thing cannot have more than one definition." When however the professors of the art of Reading and Writing began to teach the rules of speaking and composing correctly, the name Grammar was consecrated to this latter part of their instruction, thus acquiring its modern signification, while the art of Reading and Writing was designated by the humbler title of Grammatistica. When afterwards the Grammatistæ began to teach the rules of Grammar, the Grammatici undertook the interpretation and criticism of the classical literature, and thus Grammatica came to denote a higher kind of science than we now ascribe to the mere Grammarian.

8. The impatience of Logical discussions expressed by Philobus is not without its significance. Aristippus, whose views he represents, rejected Logic and Physics from Philosophy: δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τινὰς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἡθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 7, 11.

ΣΩ. Μὼν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτ' p. 18.
ἐστίν ;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ
Πρώταρχος.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γε ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε,
ὡς φῆς, πάλαι ; e

ΦΙ. Πῶς ;

IX. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς
ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὑπότερον αὐτοῖν αἰρετέον ;

ΦΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔν γε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναί φαμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαι-
τεῖ, πῶς ἐστίν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ p. 19.
15 ἄπειρα εὐθύς, ἀλλὰ τινὰ ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἐκάτερον ἔμπροσ-
θεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέναι ;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε,
οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς
ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν
20 ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ
ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ
μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν
τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δ' οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ
μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι· σκόπει δὴ τί δράσομεν. b
25 εἶδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης,
εἴτ' ἐστίν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὅποσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια· τῆς τ'
αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ
δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ
30 ταῦτοῦ δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος
ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε
γένοιτο ἄξιος.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. c

Applying
this me-
thod to the
solution of
the present 10
questions,
we ought to
begin by in-
quiring
how many
and what
are the
various spe-
cies of Plea-
sure and
Science.
The first
problem is
restated.

p. 19. ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γινγνώσκειν τῷ σώ-
 φρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν
 αὐτὸν αὐτόν. τί δὴ μοι τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν, ἐγώ
 σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὃ Σώ-
 κρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι 5
 τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ
 εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ'
 ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὥς οὐ
 ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν, ἃ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς
 d ἀναμιμνήσκομεν ἐκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵν' ἐν μνήμῃ 10
 παρακείμενα ἐκάτερα βασανίζηται. φῆς δ' ὥς ἔοικε σὺ
 τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὐ
 τὰ τούτων συγγενῇ, ἃ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα.
 τούτων δὴ μετ' ἀμφισβητήσεως ἐκατέρων λεχθέντων 15
 ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἠπειλήσαμεν ὥς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν
 οἴκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν
 γένηταί τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὴ συνεχώρησας καὶ
 ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαυτόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν,
 e καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσις 20
 οὐκ ἔστι. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον
 ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

p. 20. ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν
 μὴ δυνάμεθ' ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δι- 25
 δόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν
 τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς
 ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον· ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύου
 δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτός, πότερον ἡδονῆς εἶδη σοι καὶ
 ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐατέον, εἴ πῃ καθ' ἕτερόν 30
 τινα τρόπον οἷός τ' εἴ καὶ βούλει δηλώσαι πῶς ἄλλως
 τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ

τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ^{p. 20.}
 ῥηθὲν λύει πάντα φόβον ἐκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δὲ αὖ
 τοῖς μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;

It may be solved, however, without employing the scientific method, by the consideration that the Highest Good has three attributes: it is Perfect, Sufficient, and Desirable: and that nei-

5 Χ. ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ
 ἢ καὶ ἐρηγορῶς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρο-
 νήσεως, ὥς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστὶ τὰγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο
 τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν. καὶ
 τοιοῦτό γε ἂν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται
 10 μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταῦτον
 αὐτῇ γίγναιτο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐ-
 δὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. προῖον δ' ἔτι
 15 σαφέστερον δεῖξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραυε.

1. τὸν ἐμέ] Plato is fond of joining the article to a pronoun as if it were a noun, e. g. ἔδοξέ που, φησι, τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, καὶ ὅς εἶπε, τὸν ἐαυτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμνῶς. Phædrus. The effect can hardly be reproduced in another language. In the present instance Socrates speaks of himself as a third person: "An intimidated individual here need no longer fear any danger."

5. λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ] The conceptions of the highest Good, and other anticipations of reason that cannot be drawn from experience, Plato sometimes, as in the present passage, in accordance with his doctrine of preexistence and innate ideas, treats as reminiscences (ἀνάμνησις). At other times he speaks of them as prophecies or divinations, e. g. (τὰγαθὸν) δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπαντα

ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀπορούσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρῆσασθαι μονίμῳ. Repub. p. 515, c. See also p. 44, c and 67, e of this dialogue. Even Aristotle sometimes makes the divinations of the heart or feelings (μαντεῖαι) grounds of ethical and theological reasoning, e. g. τὰγαθὸν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσασφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Eth. Nich. 1, 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ μαντεῖᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν θεῶν μόνως ἂν ἔχοιμεν οὕτως ὁμολογουμένως ἀποφαίνεσθαι συμφώνους λόγους. De Cælo, 2, 1. This μαντεῖα was that the Gods live a blessed life not devoid of wise repose, ζῶν ἄλνπον καὶ μακαρίαν· not ἀσχολον καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένην ῥαστώνης ἔμφρονος. How this appeal to μαντεῖαι can be reconciled with Anal. Post. 2, 19, which seems to refer all knowledge to sensation, becomes a question.

p. 20. ΣΩ. Σμίκρ' ἅττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογη-
σόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον
ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι;

d ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τάγαθόν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο δια-
φέρειν τῶν ὄντων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μήν, ὥς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαῖο-
τατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὥς πᾶν τὸ γιγνώσκον αὐτὸ θη-
ρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτή-

ther Plea-
sure nor
Know-
ledge, if is-
olated, sa-
tisfies
these con-
ditions ;
5 so that the
life that
combines
them both
is more
Perfect
than the
life that
consists of
10 either
alone.

12. ἐλεῖν] This verb implies
αἰρετόν, which is presently used
to denote the third preconcep-
tion. The three ideas τέλειον, ἱκα-
νόν (= αὐταρκες, see section 42)
αἰρετόν, are nearly the same, and
only one of them, αἰρετόν, is
used as the middle term of the
syllogism that excludes Pleasure
and Wisdom from the rank of
supreme Good. Τέλειον, αὐταρ-
κες, αἰρετώτατον, are three terms
selected by Aristotle at the
commencement of his ethical
inquiry to characterize the
highest Good.

(1) Τέλειον he thus defines ;
τελειώτερον δε λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ
διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἑτέρου καὶ τὸ μηδέ-
ποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετόν τῶν καὶ καθ'
αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν καὶ ἀ-
πλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰ-
ρετόν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο.
Eth. Nich. 1, 7. "What is de-
sired for itself is more final
than what is desired as a means,
and what is never desired as a
means than what is desired
both as a means and as an end.
That is absolutely final which is
always desired as an end and
never as a means." Perhaps,

however, Plato uses τέλειον in
the ordinary sense of Perfect
rather than in the more tech-
nical sense of Final.

(2) Τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθμεν ὁ
μονούμενον αἰρετόν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον
καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεᾶ. Ibid. "That
is Selfsufficing which by itself
alone makes life desirable and
free from want."

(3) Ἐτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην
(τὸν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι) μὴ
συναριθμουμένην· συναριθμουμένην
δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ
ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ibid. [μὴ
συναριθμουμένην = μονουμένην, or,
in the language of the Philebus,
χωρίς, or ἄμικτον οὖσαν] "Happi-
ness is most to be chosen of all
single goods : still more to be
chosen, of course, when in com-
bination with even the least
other good." [Aristotle, unlike
the Stoics, made human happi-
ness affected to a certain extent
by good and ill fortune, and
consequently a variable quan-
tity. When therefore, in con-
sequence of the frowns of for-
tune, it is at its minimum, or
at any degree short of its max-
imum, of course it is susceptible

σασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν p. 20.
ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τὸν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ
5 τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρὶς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες;

ΣΩ. Μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτε
ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον
αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ γαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδέσθαι.
10 δεόμενον δ' ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι
τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν.

p. 21.

of augmentation from a return of her favour.] *Αἰρετόν*, we have seen, enters into the definition both of the Final and of the Sufficing; but it also has a distinctive technical meaning which may be easily overlooked. In its distinctive sense it expresses what is relatively, rather than what is absolutely, good: what is indispensable at the moment, under the circumstances, or to the individual, rather than what is abstractedly desirable. In the following passage it is opposed to τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας· τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίω, ἐνιότε δὲ καὶ αἰρετώτερα... ἐνιότε δὲ τὰ βελτίω οὐχὶ καὶ αἰρετώτερα, τὸ γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν βέλτιον τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἰρετώτερον τῷ ἐνδεεῖ τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τὸ δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἔστιν ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τινὰ προσπαρασκευάζηται τῶν καλῶν. σχεδὸν δὲ ἴσως αἰρετώτερον τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ ἐκ περιουσίας. Arist. Top. 3, 2. "Superfluities are better and sometimes more to be chosen than necessities. For what is better is not always to be preferred. So philosophic thought is better than money making but not more to be chosen by a man in want of the

necessaries of life. Superfluities are graces of life over and above and additional to its necessities, and generally the necessary is more to be chosen, though the superfluous is better." We must not however suppose that τὸ αἰρετόν always means material goods; for in the next passage τὰ αἰρετά, as implied in αἰρεῖσθαι, are opposed to τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, i. e. material prosperity: ὁ ἄδικος περὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία· ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ τινὶ δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶ· οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώκουσι, δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. Eth. Nich. 5, 1. "The goods at which the unjust grasp are those in fortune's power, which though always absolutely good (good, that is, to those who have the virtue to make the right use of them) are not always good relatively to the individual. Men pray for these and choose these, though they ought not, but ought to pray that what is absolutely good may be good relatively to them, and choose the relatively good."

p. 21. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Δέξαιτο ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαν-
τα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ
τοῦτ' ἔχοις παντελῶς ;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογί-
b ζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μὴ
δέοι' ἄν τι ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί ; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν που τὸ χαί-
ρειν ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν αἰεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγί-
σταις ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ²⁰
δόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό,
εἰ ἢ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ πού σε ἀγνοεῖν,
κενόν γε ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

c ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον²⁵
ἀνάγκη δήπου μὴδ' ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνήσθαι, τῆς
τ' ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μὴδ'
ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτη-
μένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ
δὲ στερόμενον μὴδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαίρη-³⁰

13. μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι] This is Badham's emendation of μὴδὲ
δρᾶν τι, the reading of the MSS.

σεις δυνατόν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου p. 21.
 βίον ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετ' d
 ὀστρεῖνων ἐμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ
 παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλως πως διανοηθῆναι ;

5 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν αἰρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος ;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακίζόμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ

The second 10 μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.

problem is
 restated :
 Is Pleasure
 or Know-
 ledge more
 nearly al-
 lied to the
 principle of
 Goodness
 in the Per-
 fect life ?

XI. ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις ;

e

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν
 καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων
 κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμι-
 15 κρὸν, μηδ' αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάν-
 των τῶν τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τού-
 των αἰρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλω μή ποτε, ὥς ἐγῴμαι, φανῇ. p. 22.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὁ ξυναμφότερος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμ-
 20 φοῖν συμμιχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως ;

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἰρήσεται πρότερον
 ἢ ἐκείνων ὅποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε, οὐχ ὁ
 25 μὲν ὁ δ' οὔ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅ τι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμ-
 βαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προυτέθη- b
 σαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δ' οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδὲ αἰρετὸς οὐτ'
 30 ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ζώων οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὥς
 οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τὰγαθόν ; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ

p. 22. τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις αἰρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως αἰεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἤρειθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἰρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

5

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

c ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τὴν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταῦτόν καὶ τάγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρησθαί μοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι 10 τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἔξει που ταῦτ' ἐγκλήματα.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἂν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὃ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι

3. ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος] A wrong choice may be regarded as involuntary when it proceeds from the blindness (ἀγνοία) of a depraved will (πονηρία) or the violence (ἀνάγκη) of passions overpowering the control of reason (ἀκрасία). To apply the term ἀκούσιον (involuntary) to this class of actions is a peculiarity of Plato.

7. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν] Aristotle alludes to this argument in the following terms: πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἐτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιοῦτόν γε λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τάγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι μετὰ φρονήσεως τὸν ἡδὺν βίον ἢ χωρὶς· εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρείττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τάγαθόν, οὐδένο γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τάγαθόν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, Eth. Nich. 10. 2. "Every Good is better in combination with others than alone, which indeed is the very argument by which Plato proves Pleasure not to be the highest Good. For the Pleasant life is more desirable with Wisdom

than without. But, if the combination is better, Pleasure is not The Good, for no addition can improve The Good." It may be observed that the proposition, οὐδένο προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τάγαθόν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, is not to be found in the Philibus, and does not even belong to the train of thought in which the argument proceeds. For the preconception which forms the middle term whereby Socrates proves Pleasure not to be The Good is αἰρετόν: τέλειον was prepared for use but was not actually used. The proposition given by Aristotle could only have been a premiss, if τέλειον had been the middle term. Perhaps, however, it is implied in section 37, where the argument is recapitulated.

12. οὐ μέντοι τὸν γε ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν] The explanation of this short allusion to the result of much speculation can be merely sketched in the brief space of a note. Plato generally distinguishes Reason from the Ideas or eter-

τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' p. 22.
ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν

nal Realities which it apprehends, and which in the Phædrus are represented as objects of beatific contemplation to the Gods. As the Supreme Good is an Idea, how can it, as is intimated in this passage, be identical with Reason? The answer is that there are two kinds even of the divine Reason, one distinct from, the other identical with, eternal Being. We read in the Sophista: τί δέ, πρὸς Διός, ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθισόμεθα τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρῆναι ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἅγιον νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς εἶναι; Δεινὸν μὲν' ἂν λόγον συγχοροῖμεν, p. 248 E. "Shall we be easily convinced that the Absolute Being has neither motion, nor life, nor soul, nor wisdom, but stands, majestic and holy as it is, reasonless and motionless? It cannot be thought." As there is no ground to suppose that Aristotle differed from Plato as to the relation of the divine and human Reason, and as the statements of the former are more explicit, we will avail ourselves of them to solve the difficulty we have proposed. One Reason is Passive, the other Active, and the latter is identical with eternal Being. The Passive Reason is so called not as being devoid of activity or spontaneous power, but as being, like physical causes, a secondary force, dependent for its powers on the Active Reason. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δέ ὁ πάντα

δυνάμει ἔκεινα) ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἷτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἶον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν ὡς ἔξισ τις, οἶον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα, De Anima, 3. 5. "As in the rest of nature we everywhere find in every class both a material, which is the class potentially, and a causative and creative agent, which is the class creatively, related to the former as art to what it works upon, so in the mental world analogous elements must exist; the Psychological Reason is manifested by becoming all things, the other by creating them, being itself an actuality, analogous to light in its conversion of potential colours into actual colours." The Passive intellect he calls in another passage more expressly the Psychological intellect. Ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς, λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν, ib. 3. 4. "The Psychological intellect, I mean the thinking and apprehending power of the Soul, is nothing actually till it thinks." We see then that Aristotle would have objected to the expression of the Sophista so far as it attributes Movement (κίνησις) and Soul to the Absolute, as there is an element higher than the Soul and Psychological Reason. It is this latter that we must ascribe to the gods of the Phædrus and

p. 22. κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πῶ ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ
 δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρή περὶ τί δράσομεν.
 τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιώμεθ' ἂν
 ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δ' ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ
 οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν 5
 εἶη, τάχα δ' ἂν αἰτιὸν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν
 εἶναι. τούτου δὴ περὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον
 διαμαχοίμην ἂν, ὥς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὃ τί
 ποτ' ἔστι τούτο ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἰρετὸς
 ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ ξυγγε- 10
 ο νέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
 λόγον οὐτ' ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδ' αὖ τῶν δευτερείων
 ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο. πορρώτέρῳ δέ
 ἐστι τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς
 τὰ νῦν.

15

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν
 ἡδονὴ σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπερεὶ πληγείσα ὑπὸ τῶν
 νῦν δὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων περὶ μαχομένη

p. 23. κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὥς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὥς ἐμφρόνως
 οὐκ ἀντεποικεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἔπαθεν 20

Timæus. Of the Active intellect he thus speaks : ἔστι τοίνυν τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, αἰδῖον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐσα. κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὁρεκτόν. καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον. τούτων δὲ τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά...βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν, ὁρεγόμεθα δὲ ὅτι δοκεῖ. νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται...ὥστε ταῦτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν, Met. I I, 7. "There is an immovable source of motion, eternal, substantive, actual. This is the way the objects of Volition and Reason move, which are ultimately the same, namely, the absolute Beauty. The will is moved by

the (Passive) Reason ; the (Passive) Reason is moved by the object of Reason ; the object of Reason is the (Active) Reason." Thus, as Socrates suggests in the Philebus, Reason in the sense of the νοητόν, or the νοῦς ποιητικός, may be identified with the ὄν καλόν, or Supreme Good. However, after this passing allusion to his philosophic doctrine, Plato in the remainder of the dialogue treats of the Reason in its usual sense of the Psychical, Subjective, Passive, or Human intellect.

ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντά- p. 23.
 πασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίῃ πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς
 ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτ' ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο
 καλή.

5 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν εἶν ἥδη καὶ μὴ
 τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ
 ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν; b

10 ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ' ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὥς
 οὐδεὶς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει, πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπε-
 ξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαβαὶ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου
 τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ράδιον πάνυ τι νῦν. καὶ
 15 γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα
 ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν
 ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἓν καὶ ταῦτά. οὐκ-
 οὔν χρὴ;

17. ἐστι δ' ἴσως ἓν καὶ ταῦτά]
 As "weapons serviceable in both contests" Socrates seems to refer to the proposition that all being is a union of Unity and Multiplicity as well as to the method of generalization and division. We may observe (1) that though this proposition and this method have been mentioned, they were really not the weapons by which the former contest was decided, for that was settled by reference to our preconceptions of The Good. (2) Though Plato invites us to connect the Unity and Infinity of the beginning of the dialogue with the Limit and Infinite that he is going to introduce, and though perhaps they are

really connected, yet they are certainly distinct, and must not be immediately identified. They are attributes of different subjects. For the sake of distinction we may call the infinity of Particulars as opposed to the unity of the Genus a Logical infinity; and the lawlessness of Matter as opposed to the circumscription of the Form, a Physical infinity, though it extends also to the æsthetic and moral worlds and to every sphere of Being. The Logical infinity is only found within a genus, and belongs to the individuals which it comprehends: the Physical infinity is found in an individual, and belongs to the material elements of which

p. 23. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

c XII. ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι
πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλά- 5
βωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ' ὅ τι, φράζοις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἅττα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δείξει 10
τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

In order to solve this problem by the method that has been delineated, four Unities, or highest genera, are assumed: namely, Infinity, Limit, Product, and Cause: and Infinity is defined.

it is composed. The Physical infinity, as we shall presently see, may be treated as a Logical unity, or summum genus, comprehending a multiplicity of individual infinities.

5. πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα κ.τ.λ.] This division of Things is really a division of First Principles: ὁμοίως δὲ ζητοῦσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστὶ ζητοῦσι πρώτων, ταῦτα πότερον ἐν ἡ πολλά, καὶ, εἰ πολλά, εἰ πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα· ὥστε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ στοιχείον ζητοῦσι πότερον ἐν ἡ πολλά, Phys. Ausc. 1, 2. "It is a similar problem to inquire into the number of Things. Are the primal Elements, it is really asked, one or more, and if more than one, finite or infinite? So that it is the Principle and Element which is the subject of inquiry."

10. τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δείξει τῶν ὄντων τὸ δὲ πέρας] For an examination of the meaning of ἄπειρον see Appendix B. The result of this examination is briefly as follows: independently of its analysis into ὕλη

and στήρσις, (τὸ ἄπειρον and ἡ ἀπειρία) ἄπειρον has two or even three meanings that require to be carefully distinguished.

(1) Its obvious and ordinary meaning, which it would have first suggested to any Greek, is Infinity, i. e. quantity without end: the negation of all quantitative limit. To make τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἥττον imply this, we must supply a very considerable ellipsis: that which is greater or less (than any finite quantity; or, than any quantity however great or small that can be named or conceived). But, if we except Infinity of number, Infinity of space, or Immensity, and Infinity of time, or Eternity, the existence of Infinity in the world of nature in this sense is perhaps untenable; and this meaning of ἄπειρον, though essential to the early philosophies to which nature is the immeasurable and unfathomable, perhaps does not belong to later speculation.

(2.) A more Platonic meaning of ἄπειρον, and perfectly war-

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

p. 23.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοις ἔν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δ' ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἱκανῶς κατ' εἶδη d
5 διυστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φῆς, ὦ γαθέ;

ΣΩ. Τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνος.

ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν
10 αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον
τοῦτο.

ΠΡΩ. Μὴν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτον προσδεήσει διά-
κρισὶν τινος δυναμένου;

ranted by its etymology, is, the Indefinite or Indeterminate. Indeterminateness is the negation, not of *all* determination, [Infinity] but, of a *single* determination. The Indeterminate is that which admits of a plurality or multiplicity of determinations, or even an infinity, between, however, certain definite limits. Τὸ μάλλον and τὸ ἥττον can express this, i. e. excess or defect above or below a certain single finite quantity, multiplicity of gradation, or divisibility of extension, without any violent ellipsis. This is the ἄπειρον that we find in nature. There are many gradations of colour; but we cannot get beyond pure blue, pure red, pure yellow. Nothing is whiter than pure white, nor blacker than pure black. There are many gradations in the pitch of sounds, but a few octaves bring us to the extremes.

(3) Why does Indeterminateness, as we find it does in the

Philebus, imply Imperfection? Because, if we assume with Plato that Perfection is a Mean, i. e. some single quantitative determination, even if some one gradation of the ἄπειρον coincides with this, all the remainder must be either excessive or defective. Τὸ ἄπειρον in this sense is that which violates a Standard: that which falls on this side or that side of the line traced by the Right: the elements, or their state, before they are arranged by the organizing Law, or after they have broken from its control. The Limit (πέρας) of which it is the violation, is τὸ μέτρον, Due Measure, Due Proportion, the condition of goodness and beauty. Τὸ μάλλον and τὸ ἥττον now signify Exorbitance and Inadequacy, and may be translated, the Too Much, and the Too Little.

12. Μὴν οὖν σοι κ. τ. λ.] The readiness with which Protarchus proposes to add to the list of principles an agent of decom-

p. 23. ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἐὰν
 e δέ τι δέη, συγγνώσει πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμ-
 πτον [βίον].

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελό- 5
 μενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα πολλὰ ἐκάτερον
 p. 24. ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἐν πάλιν
 ἐκάτερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῇ ποτὲ ἦν αὐτῶν ἐν
 καὶ πολλὰ ἐκάτερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, 10
 τάχ' ἄν ἐποίμην.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο, ἃ προτίθεται, ταὐτ'
 εἶναι ἅπερ νῦν δὴ, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρασ ἔχον.

position, besides the agent of combination, may be attributed to his familiarity with the poem of Empedocles, where all pheno-

mena are explained by two antagonistic forces, Love, the cause of union, and Hate, the cause of separation :

καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα,
 ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ διχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

Socrates rejects it as unnecessary, because the Cause (*αἰτία*) of which he speaks is not a blind elementary principle with a single necessary operation, but of an intelligent, artistic, nature, and therefore possesses both powers, that of separation as well as that of combination. In the Timæus Causation (*αἰτία*) is only ascribed to rational agents.

5. Πρῶτον μὲν κ. τ. λ.] The reason of this separation first of three, then of two, from the list of principles seems to be this : the Cause is especially characterized by its ultimate unity, and therefore is not divided into species. The Limit again has but few divisions as compared with the other two, the

Infinite and the Generated class. It therefore is principally the latter that need division and generalization. Accordingly τὸ πέρασ ἔχον will denote not τὸ πέρασ, but τὸ μικτόν; for it is said to have many species (πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον), which suits the μικτόν, (τὸ πλῆθος σε ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως), but not the πέρασ, (τό γε πέρασ οὐ πολλὰ εἶχεν.) The only objection is, that τῶν πέρασ ἐχόντων is presently used in a different sense, as equivalent to τῶν περάτων. See below: τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρασ ἐχόντων συμμικθέντων: and, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρασ ἐχόντων ἔθετο. In § 6, however, πέρασ ἐχόντων was used of τὰ μικτά.

ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλὰ ἐστὶ πειράσομαι p. 24.
φράζειν· τὸ δὲ πέρασ ἔχον ἡμᾶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ· χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφισβη-
5 τήσιμον ὃ κελεύω σε σκοπεῖν, ὅμως δὲ σκόπει. θερ-
μοτέρου καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέρι πρῶτον ὅρα πέρασ εἶ-
ποτέ τι νοήσῃς ἄν, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ἐν
αὐτοῖς οἰκούντε τοῖς γένεσιν, ἕωςπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον,
τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτρεψαίτην γίγνεσθαι· γενομένης γὰρ b
10 τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὸ τέτελευτήκατον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ δέ γε, φαμέν, ἐν τε τῷ θερμότερῳ καὶ τῷ
ψυχροτέρῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ἐνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

15 ΣΩ. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος
ἔχειν· ἀτελῇ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γί-
γνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ γε, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, ὑπέλαβες,
20 καὶ ἀνέμνησας ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο ὃ σὺ νῦν c
ἐφθέγξω καὶ τό γε ἡρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχeton
τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνῆτον, οὐκ
ἐᾶτον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' αἰὲ σφοδρότερον
ἡσυχαιτέρου καὶ τουναντίον ἐκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποι-
25 οῦντε τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ
ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δὴ, μὴ ἀφανί-
σαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' ἐάσαντε αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον
ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα d
ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν
30 χώρας ἐν ἣ ἐνῆν. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρό-
τερον εἶτην ἂν λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ
οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον αἰὲ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον

p. 24. ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο.
κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ
θερμότερον καὶ τὸναντίον ἅμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ
εἶπες, οὐ ράδια ταῦτα ξυνέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰσαυθὺς τε 5
e καὶ αὐθὺς ἴσως λεχθέντα τὸν τε ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν
ἐρωτώμενον ἱκανῶς ἂν συμφωνοῦντας ἀποφήνειεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω
ποιεῖν· νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ
τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες 10
μηκύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ
ἥττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα
p. 25. καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου 15
γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι, κατὰ τὸν
ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ὃν ἔφαμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ
διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν
ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τινα φύσιν, εἰ μένησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

20

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ
ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ
ισότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τί
περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέ-
b τρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρασ ἀπολογιζόμενοι 25
καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο, ἢ πῶς σὺ φῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XIII. ΣΩ. Εἴεν· τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τού-
του ἀμφοῖν τίνα ἰδέαν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

Limit and
Product
are defined.

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

30

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἃν πέρ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπή-
κοος γίγνεται τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Εὔχου δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν p. 25.
φίλος ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο ; καὶ τινι τεκμηρίῳ χρῆ ; c

5 ΣΩ. Φράσω δῆλον ὅτι. σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον
τῷ λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Δέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δὴ πού τι καὶ
ψυχρότερον. ἦ γάρ ;

10 ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς
καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερον,
καὶ μείζον καὶ σμικρότερον, καὶ ὅποσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν
τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν εἰς ἐν
15 φύσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις ; d

ΣΩ. Ναί. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ
ταῦτα τὴν αὖ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν ;

20 ΣΩ. Ἦν καὶ νῦν δὴ δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ
ἀπείρου συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἓν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περα-
τοειδούς συναγαγεῖν, οὐ συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ
νῦν ταῦτὸν δράσει· τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων
καταφανὲς κακείνη γενήσεται.

25 ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὅποση παύει
πρὸς ἄλληλα τάναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα e
δὲ καὶ σύμφωνα ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν ἀπεργάζεται.

27. The idea of *συμμετρία* is well developed by Paley under the name of Relation : "When several different parts contribute to one effect ; or, which is the same thing, when an ef-

fect is produced by the joint action of different instruments ; the fitness of such parts or instruments to one another, for the purpose of producing, by their united action, the effect,

p. 25. ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μὴ γνύσι ταῦτα, γενέσεις τινὰς ἀφ' ἐκάστων συμβαίνειν.

is what I call Relation : and wherever this is observed in the works of nature or of man, it appears to me to carry along with it decisive evidence of understanding, intelligence, art."

—*Natural Theology*, chap. 15.

The word *συμμετρία* will express those Correlations that belong to the category of Quantity : e. g., "Throughout the universe there is a wonderful *proportioning* of one thing to another ; the size of animals, of the human animal especially, when considered with respect to other animals, or to the plants which grow around him, is such as a regard to his convenience would have pointed out. A giant or a pigmy could not have milked goats, reaped corn, or mowed grass ; we may add, could not have rode a horse, trained a vine, shorn a sheep, with the same bodily ease as we do, if at all. A pigmy would have been lost among rushes, or carried off by birds of prey," *ib.* chap. 17.

Τὸ σύμμετρον is defined by τὸ μέσον in the following passage, where the perfection of natural and artificial products is said to depend on the due proportion (*συμμετρία*) of their efficient and material causes : οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δεῖ *συμμετρίας πρὸς ἀλλήλα· πάντα γὰρ τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ τέχνην ἢ φύσιν λόγῳ τινὶ ἔστι· τὸ δὲ θερμὸν λίαν* μέν κρατοῦν ξηραίνει τὰ ὑγρά, πολὺ δὲ ἐλλείπον οὐ συνίστησιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ πρὸς τὸ δημιουργοῦμενον ἔχειν τὸν τοῦ μέσου λόγον. *De Gen. An.* 4. 2. "The forces of the efficient and material causes should be proportionate. For the

goodness of every product of Art or Nature depends on a ratio between these terms. Too powerful a heat solidifies entirely where too weak a heat produces no condensation. The efficient therefore ought to bear a Mean proportion to the material on which it operates." *Συμμετρία*, like *μεσότης*, is opposed to excess and defect.

Ἡ δὲ θερμότης ἐνυπάρχει τοσαύτην καὶ τοιαύτην ἔχουσα τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὅση σύμμετρος εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, καθ' ὅσον δ' ἂν ἐλλείπη ἢ ὑπερβάλλῃ ἢ χεῖρον ποιῇ ἢ ἀνάπῃρον τὸ γινόμενον. *ib.* 2. 6.

"The heat is provided by nature in quality and quantity duly proportioned to the organs that have to be formed. Excess or defect mars the product or makes a monstrous birth." *Γίνεται δ' ἀτέλεια δι' ἐνδειαν τοῦ φυσικοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἀσυμμετρίαν πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ πεπαινόμενον.* *Meteor.*

3. 3. "The fruit is imperfectly matured from the deficiency of the natural heat and its want of proportion to the juices to be ripened." The moral mean is always determined by some given term to which our act or emotion stands in relation : it is therefore always a symmetry or proportion. It seems therefore to have been chiefly a desire to have a term distinctive of his own philosophy that made Aristotle prefer *μεσότης* to the more concrete and intelligible *συμμετρία* in his definitions of moral and physical goodness.

1. *μὴ γνύσι*. So Klitsch reads for *μὴ γνύς*, which is retained by the Zurich editors.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ φαίνομαι.

p. 25.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις ἢ τούτων ὀρθῇ κοινω-
νία τὴν ὑγείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

p. 26.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ ὀξείᾳ καὶ βαρεῇ καὶ ταχεῇ καὶ βραδεῇ,
ἀπείροις οὖσιν, ἅρ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτ' ἅμα
πέρας τε ἀπειργάσατο καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν τελεώ-
τατα ξυνεστήσατο;

10 ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγε-
νόμενα τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δὲ
ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὦραί τε καὶ ὅσα καλὰ ἢ
πάντα ἡμῖν γέγονε, τῶν τε ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας
ἐχόντων συμμιχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον
20 μεθ' ὑγείας κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμ-
πολλα ἕτερα καὶ πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ πον καὶ ξύμ-
πασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὕτη κατιδοῦσα ἢ θεός, ὃ
καλὸν Φίληβε, πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὐδὲν οὔτε πλησμο-
νῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἐχόντων

12. τὸ μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο] The Aristotelian analysis of τὸ ἄπειρον into Matter (ὕλη) and Privation (στέρησις) is here necessary to prevent confusion. How can the ἄπειρον be an element in all things that exist if it is destroyed before they come into being? The answer is, that the word ἄπειρον denotes two objects, the Elements or Matter, and the nega-

tion of Law, or Privation. The Privation is the true opposite of Limit. Matter is not the opposite of either Limit or Privation, but is indifferently receptive of either. It is the Privation or disorder that is exterminated; the Matter remains as an element of the Cosmos.

19. νόμον καὶ τάξιν] This is the reading of the Bodleian MS.

p. 26.
c ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φῆς αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ-
ναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. Σοὶ δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτα εἶρηκα, εἰ ξυν- 5
νοεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἐν μὲν γάρ μοι
δοκεῖς τὸ ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἐν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρασ
ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. τρίτον δὲ οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει
φράζειν. 10

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πληθὸς σε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐξέπληξε
τῆς τοῦ τρίτου γενέσεως. καί τοι πολλά γε καὶ τὸ
d ἄπειρον παρέσχετο γένη, ὅμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα
τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου γένει ἐν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρασ οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ'
ἐδυσκολαίνομεν ὥς οὐκ ἦν ἐν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν 15

Badham inserts ἐχόντων after
αὐτοῖς and omits it after πέρασ.
Other MSS. read πέρασ ἔχοντ'
ἔθετο.

19. τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν τὸ τού-
των ἔκγονον ἅπαν] In the Timæus
we have the Limit, Product (γε-
γεινημένη οὐσία) and Infinite, un-
der the names of παράδειγμα,
μίμημα, and ὑποδοχή. Τότε μὲν
γὰρ δύο εἶδη διειλόμεθα, νῦν δὲ
τρίτον ἄλλο γένος ἡμῖν δηλωτέον.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ δύο ἱκανὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τοῖς
ἐμπροσθεν λεχθείσιν, ἐν μὲν ὡς
παρδείγματος εἶδος ὑποτεθέν, νοη-
τὸν καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν, μίμημα
δὲ παρδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν
ἔχον καὶ ὁρατὸν, τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν
οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομίσαντες τὰ δύο

ἔξειν ἱκανῶς, νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν
εἰσαναγκάζειν χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν
εἶδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι·
τίνα οὖν ἔχον δύναμιν κατὰ φύσιν
αὐτὸ ὑποληπτέον; τοιάνδε μάλιστα,
πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὸ
οἶον τιθήνην. p. 48 E. "We first
divided things into two classes,
now we must point out a third.
Two were enough on the former
occasion; first a pattern, the
object of reason and possessed
of eternal being; second a copy
of the pattern, generated and
the object of sense. No third
was then added because we
thought that two would suf-
fice, but now the investigation
forces us to try to show a sort

τοῦτο τιθέντα τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν εἰς p. 26.
οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειργασμένων
μέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

5 XIV. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι ε
τότε ἔφαμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτέον. κοινὴ δ' ἡ σκέψις·
ὄρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γιγνώ-
μενα διὰ τινα αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι.

of thing hard to explain and dim. What is its natural function? This : of all generation to be the receptacle and nurse." Afterwards the term ἔκγονον, as in the present passage, is applied to the sensible world. Ἐν δ' οὖν τῷ πάροντι χρή γένη διανοσθῆναι τριττὰ, τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον, τὸ δ' ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον. καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρὶ, τὸ δ' ὅθεν πατρὶ, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκόνω. p. 50 c. "Now we must assume three classes, first a product, next a material, thirdly an archetype in whose image the product is ; and we may liken the recipient material to a mother, the archetypal cause to a father, and the intermediate nature to their progeny."

1. γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν] We should have expected γεγεννημένην οὐσίαν which occurs afterwards. The expression however is not accidental, nor merely an inaccuracy, but is a mode of speaking of temporal or phenomenal existence borrowed from the Megarians, an idealistic school, congenial to Plato. Their controversy with Democritus and the Materialists is alluded to in the Sophista. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα

εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, γένεσιν αὐτ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσι... Γένεσιν τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν χωρὶς παν διελόμενοι λέγετε ; —ναί.—καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. p. 246 B. "Their opponents defend themselves with very cautious tactics from a sort of invisible citadel, contending that real Being is certain conceived and bodiless Ideas, and breaking to pieces by their logic the Body and so called reality of the others, instead of Being, they call it a rapid stream of Becoming... You distinguish Being and Becoming? —Yes.—And you say we apprehend Becoming with the body by the faculty of sensation, Being with the soul by the faculty of Reason, and that the one is unchanging, the other unresting."

7. πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τινα αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι] Plato confines Causation to intelligent, voluntary agents. Blind, elementary,

Nature of
the fourth
class or
Cause.
The most
excellent
human life

p. 26. ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς τούτου γί-
γνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιούντος φύσις οὐδὲν πλὴν
ὀνόματι τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ αἴ-
τιον ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον εἶν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως.

p. 27. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γιγνό-
μενον οὐδὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δῆ, δια-
φέρον εὐρήσομεν. ἡ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡγείται μὲν τὸ ποιοῦν αἰὶ κατὰ φύ-
σιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἀκολουθεῖ γιγνόμενον ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ
δουλεῖον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία.

is com-
posed of
various in-
gredients,
and there-
fore is a
member of
the third
or Compo-
site class.

10

15

material principles he calls συν-
αἷτια. Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντ' ἐστὶ τῶν συν-
αιτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετοῦσι χρῆται
τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν
ιδεῖαν ἀποτελῶν· δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὸ
τῶν πλείστων οὐ συναίτια ἀλλ' αἷτια
εἶναι τῶν πάντων, ψύχοντα καὶ θερ-
μαίνοντα πηγνύντα τε καὶ διαχέοντα
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἀπεργαζόμενα, λόγον
δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ νοῦν εἰς οὐδὲν δυνατὰ
ἔχειν ἐστί... τὸν δὲ νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστή-
μης ἐραστὴν ἀνάγκη τὰς τῆς ἔμφρο-
νος φύσεως αἰτίας πρώτας μεταδιώ-
κειν, ὅσαι δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων μὲν κινουμέ-
νων ἕτερα δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινούντων
γίγνονται, δευτέρας. ποιητέον δὲ κατὰ
ταῦτα καὶ ἡμῖν· λεκτέα μὲν ἀμφοτέρα
τὰ τῶν αἰτίων γένη, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα μετὰ
νοῦ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν δημιουργοὶ καὶ
ὅσαι μονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχόν
ἄτακτον ἐκάστοτε ἐξεργάζονται. Ti-
mæus, p. 46 c. "These are the
Necessary Conditions (second-
ary causes) that minister to the
divine power when it produces

the Best that is possible under
given circumstances. Most peo-
ple think them to be not Con-
ditions but Causes, heating and
cooling, contracting and ex-
panding, and the like, without
plan or reason... Whosoever
loves reason and knowledge
must first investigate the ra-
tional causes, afterwards the
necessary chain of those that
are both cause and effect. So
we must do now. We must
indicate both kinds of cause
but distinguish the intelligent
cause of what is fair and good
from the unintelligent and plan-
less." When the Efficient cause
is assumed to be intelligent, of
course it is intimately connected
with what Aristotle called the
Final cause. For an intelli-
gence always acts with the de-
sign of accomplishing some
End.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν ;

p. 27.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται
πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγομεν ἢ
τέταρτον, τὴν αἰτίαν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδη-
λωμένον ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως μὴν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων,
10 ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμή-
σασθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον

13. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω] The best comment on this list will be a comparison with the four principles or four methods of explanation that Aristotle considers to exhaust every problem. "Ενα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται ἡ ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη· οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡμετέρας· οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἢ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ ; φαμέν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. Phys. Aus. 2. 3. "One kind of Cause is the Material

of which a thing is made ; in which sense brass is cause of a statue, or silver of a cup, or the genera of brass and silver. Another is the Form and pattern, or definition, and its genera ; in which sense the double number of vibrations in an equal time is the cause of an octave, and, generically, number or the elements of the definition. Another is the Origin of motion or rest ; in which sense the planner is the cause of an action, the father of the child, the producer of the product, and the changer of the change. Another is the End or motive ; in which sense health is the cause of a man's walking. Why does he walk ? For the sake of health, we answer ; and consider we have assigned the cause." The three first of these are clearly identical with three on Plato's list. The μικτόν may seem to be rather Aristotle's σύνολον or ὁ σύν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημ-

p. 27. δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενη-
μένην οὐσίαν· τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως
c τετάρτην λέγων ἄρα πλημμελοῖν ἂν τι ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος ; s
καὶ τί ποτε βουλευθέντες εἰς ταῦτα ἀφικόμεθα ; ἄρ' οὐ
τόδε ἦν ; δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνεται
ἂν ἢ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν ;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτω διειλόμεθα, 10

μένος λόγος. Metaph. 6. 15. (the concretion of matter and form,) that is, the καθ' ἑαυτὸν or Individual of the sensible world, than the τέλος or Final cause. The living and acting Individual, however, is the Final cause of the elementary matter and the efficient processes. The close connexion of the End with an intelligent Efficient cause was perhaps the reason why Plato does not mention it here more distinctly as a separate principle, for he has fully developed the conception in the Phaedo. Indeed the whole of the Philebus, as discussing the highest Good, may be regarded as an investigation of the Final cause of human life. In the Timæus it is contrasted with the Material cause in nearly the same manner as we saw the Efficient cause contrasted in the preceding note. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τότε ταύτῃ πεφυκότα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁ τοῦ καλλίστου τε καὶ ἀρίστου δημιουργοῦ ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρελάβανεν ἥνικα τὸν αὐτάρκη τε καὶ τὸν τελεώτατον θεὸν ἐγέννα, χρώμενος μὲν ταῖς περὶ

ταῦτα αἰτίαις ὑπηρετούσαις, τὸ δὲ εὐ τεκταινόμενος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐτός. διὰ δὲ χρὴ δύ' αἰτίας εἶδη διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ θείον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θείον ἐν ᾧ πανσι ζῆτεῖν κτήσεως ἕνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίου καθ' ὅσον ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνων χάριν, λογιζομένους ὥς ἄνευ τούτων οὐ δυνατὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἐφ' οἷς σπουδάζομεν μόνον κανανοεῖν οὐδ' αὖ λαβεῖν οὐδ' ἄλλως πῶς μετασχεῖν. p. 68 E. "The artist of the best and fairest work pressed into service all these elements with their necessary laws at his creation of the absolute and most perfect God, using their subservient agencies but himself contriving the good. Wherefore two kinds of cause are to be distinguished, the Necessary (Material) and the Divine (Final), and we must seek the divine cause in order to attain to happiness so far as our nature allows ; and the necessary cause as a means ; regarding it as indispensable towards contemplating, grasping, or in any other way attaining, that other object that we prize."

κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρῶτον p. 27.
 πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμφισβητή-
 σαμεν ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

5 ΣΩ. Ἴθι δῆ, νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν d
 βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὁρῶμέν που τίς
 τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποίου γένους ;

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου,
 οἶμαι, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸς ἐκείνος,
 ἀλλὰ ξυμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δε-
 δεμένων, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος
 15 ἐκείνου γίγνοιτ' ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

Pleasure
 belongs to
 the class of
 Infinites.

XV. ΣΩ. Εἶεν. Τί δὲ ὁ σός, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς e
 καὶ ἄμικτος ὧν ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος
 ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο ; ὧδε δ' ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν
 20 ἀποφύνασθαι.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχεται, ἢ τῶν τὸ
 μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον δεχομένων ἐστόν ;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 25 ἡδονὴ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγχανε πεφυ-
 κὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἂν, ὦ Φίληβε, λύπη πᾶν κακόν· ὥστ' p. 28.
 ἄλλο τι νῦν σκεπτέον ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὃ
 παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦτο δὴ
 30 σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονὸς ἔστω. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ
 ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ

p. 28. Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοί-
μεν ; οὐ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος
κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

b ΦΙ. Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γάρ σύ, ὦ ἐταῖρε, τὴν σαυτοῦ· τὸ δ' 5
ἐρωτώμενον ὅμως ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτῷ
πειστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προήρησαι
λέγειν ; 10

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορῶ, καὶ
δέομαί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προ-
φήτην, ἵνα μηδὲν ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξα-
μαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.

c ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν 15
οὐδὲν ἐπιτάττεις. ἀλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε
Φίληβος, σεμνύνων ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν
καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὁποίου γένους εἶεν ;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥάδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν 20
οἱ σοφοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύνοντες, ὥς νοὺς ἐστὶ
βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέ-
γουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν
αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.

d ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπο- 25
λογιζόμενος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς οὐκ ἀπεχθησόμενος.

XVI. ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δέ πως ὧδε
ἐπανερωτῶντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ 30
τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον ἐπιτροπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ
ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχε. ἢ τάναν-

Reason is
akin to the
Spirit that
animates
the Uni-
verse, and
belongs to
family of
Cause.

τία καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον νοῦν καὶ φρό- p. 28.
νησὶν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὃ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες. ο
ὁ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις, οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναί μοι φαί-
5 νεται· τὸ δὲ νοῦν πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ
τῆς ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ
ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ
ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι οὐδ' ἂν δο-
ξάσαιμι.

10 ΣΩ. Βούλει δὴτά τι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ὁμο-
λογούμενον ξυμφήσωμεν, ὥς ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ p. 29.
μόνον οἰώμεθα δεῖν τὰλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ συγκινδυνεύωμεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου,
ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῇ ταῦτα μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως
15 ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;

ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν
λόγον ἄθρει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

20 ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων
τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορώμεν που,
καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ οἱ χειμαζόμενοί φασιν, ἐνόντα ἐν τῇ b
συστάσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα· χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπ'
25 ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβὲ
τὸ τοιόνδε.

3. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] The same
phrase occurs in the epistles of
Plato. "Χυτερον δὲ καὶ ἀκούω γε-
γραφέναι αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν τότε ἤκουσε,
συνθέντα ὡς αὐτοῦ τέχνην, οὐδὲν
τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούει. p. 341 B.

It therefore seems to mean,
"We will not merely re-echo
what others have said :"—"We
will not rest on authority :"—
"Without iteration :"—"On
our own responsibility."

p. 29. ΠΡΩ Ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σμικρόν τε τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινές ὃν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἐνὶ δὲ λαβῶν περὶ πάντων νόει ταυτόν. οἷον πῦρ μὲν 5 ἔστι που παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

c ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σμικρόν μὲν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενές καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντί πλήθει τε θαυμαστόν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ 10 οὔσῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα ἀληθές ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντός πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός, ἢ τούναντίον ὑπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ 15 τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἅπαντ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.

d ΣΩ. Ὅρθως· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἶμαι, περί τε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπρο- 20 σθεν, οὕτως ἀποκρινεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἂν ποτε φανείῃ;

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδ' ὅστισούν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐξῆς ἔπου. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νῦν δὴ λε- 25 χθέντα ἄρ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκεείμενα ἰδόντες ἐπωνομάσαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

e ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦδε ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν. διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, 30 σύνθετον ὃν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως p. 29.
τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο τρέφεται
τε καὶ ὅσα νῦν δι' περὶ αὐτῶν εἵπομεν, εἴληφέ τε καὶ
ἴσχει;

5 ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἕτερον, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον
ἐρωτήσεως.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδε ἄρα ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς; p. 30.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἂρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν
10 ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὃ φίλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, ἔπερ μὴ
τό γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὃν ἐτύγχανε, ταῦτά
γε ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

15 ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὥς οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὃ Σώ-
κρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γε, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τὰ
τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα, πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ
τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅσιν τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτο ἐν b
20 μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχὴν τε παρέχον καὶ σωμασκίαν

20. ψυχὴν τε παρέχον] In the
Timæus the Soul is composed
of three elements corresponding
to the πέρας, ἄπειρον, and μικτόν
of the Philebus. Τῆς ἀμερίστου
καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐχούσης οὐσίας
καὶ τῆς αὐτῇ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνο-
μένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἁμφοῖν ἐν
μέσῳ συνεκράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς
τε ταύτου φύσεως αὐτῇ περὶ καὶ τῆς
θατέρας, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα συνέστησεν
ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμερούς αὐτῶν καὶ
τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. καὶ
τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκράσατο
εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέραν
φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτον
συναρμόττων βίῃ. μὲν γὰρ δὲ μετὰ

τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος
ἐν, πάλιν τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας
προσῆκεν διένειμε. p. 34 C. "Be-
tween Indivisible and immut-
able substance and what is Di-
visible among bodies the divine
power made a third kind of sub-
stance composed of Identity and
Diversity and set it between the
Indivisible and the Divisible.
He then took the three and
moulded them into one, forcing
reluctant Diversity into har-
mony with Identity. And when
he had mixed them with the
other substance and wrought
the three into one he divided

p. 30. ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος ἱατρικὴν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθέν καὶ ἀκούμενον πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι, τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τούτων ὄντων ἐν ὄλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τούτοις δ' οὐκ ἄρα⁵ μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν.

the whole into such parts as behoved." Here the Indivisible, Divisible and Compound clearly correspond to the *πέρας*, *ἄπειρον* and *μικτόν* of the *Philebus*; though it is not quite clear whether the elements of the Compound substance, Identity and Diversity, should be regarded as the same with the Indivisible and Divisible. Whether these elements of the Soul, the Indivisible and Divisible, or Identity and Diversity, are the same with the elements of the Material world, the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus*, or with the elements of the Ideal world, the One and the Infinite Dyad, of which we hear elsewhere, Plato does not intimate. If we trust Aristotle, they are to be regarded as the same; for he even assigns as a reason why they must be the same the necessity that a cognizant power should be identical with the objects of cognition. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεισθαι γὰρ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. *De Anima*, I. 2. "So Plato in the *Timæus* composes the soul of the elements because the cognizant faculty must resemble the objects of cognition, and these are composed of the elements."

5. ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐκ ἄρα μεμηχανῆσθαι... φύσιν] It is difficult to trace the reasoning in this passage. Plato perhaps is intentionally obscure because he meant to excite a curiosity, the satisfaction of which he reserved for another dialogue. However, even with the clue furnished by the *Timæus* it is not easy to thread our way.

μεμηχανῆσθαι is active and emphatic: "is an intelligent designer:"—"has contrived in the form of Art—in the guise of an Artist."

τὴν τῶν καλλίστων... φύσιν, governed by μεμηχανῆσθαι, is not the Soul, for that is first introduced presently, but the Cosmos or visible World. Thus μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν may be paraphrased in the words of the next sentence, κεκοσμηκέναι τε καὶ συντεταχέναι ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφίαν καὶ νοῦν λεγόμενον δικαιοτάτ' ἄν.

The result of the whole passage is that the Human Reason, as derived from the Soul of the Universe, is akin to that supramundane Cause to which the Soul of the Universe is akin. There is an obscurity in the train of thought, because it seems all along assumed [τοῦτο (τὸ αἴτιον) ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν... πᾶσαν

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι.

P. 30.
c

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ τοῦτο μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἐπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὥς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἅπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ πολὺ καὶ πέρασ ἱκανόν, καὶ τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φάυλη, κοσμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτούς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆνας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιοτάτ' ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Δικαιοτάτα δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε
10 γενοίσθην.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά,
15 καθ' ὃ φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι] that the Human Reason belongs to the Causative class, so that we seem to have made no advance when we make the proposition stated above. An advance, however, has been made, as the Cause is invested with a new and grander character so soon as it appears as the origin of the Soul of the Universe.

In the words *μεμηχανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμιωτάτων φύσιν*, the supramundane Cause is said to perform what is immediately the function of Zeus, or the Soul of the World. Similarly above (*ἐν δὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλα ξυντιθέν καὶ ἀκούμενον... σοφίαν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι*) artificial constructions and reparations are attributed to the Cause which are properly the functions of the Human Soul when created by the Cause. This confusion of the physical agent with the extramundane

Cause to which it owes its being is characteristic of the Ideal theory which leaves undetermined the amount of identity between the Idea and that which derives its existence from the Idea.

9. Σοφία μὴν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην] From this and a similar passage in the *Timæus* it might be inferred that Plato denies the existence of Reason apart from the Soul. *Λογισάμενος οὖν εὗρισκεν (ὁ θεός) ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατῶν οὐδὲν ἀνόητον τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος ὅλον ὅλου κάλλιον ἔσεσθαι ποτ' ἔργον, νοῦν δ' αὖ χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀδυνάτον παραγενέσθαι τῷ.* p. 30 A. It may be observed however in both these passages that the terms employed (*γενοίσθην, παραγενέσθαι τῷ*) exclude from consideration the Eternal Reason, or extramundane Cause.

p. 30. ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μή τι μάτην
δόξης, ὃ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν
πάσαι ἀποφηναμένοις ὡς αἰ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει
ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γε ἐμῇ ζητήσῃ πεπορικῶς ἀπόκρισιν,
e ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ γενούσσης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος
τῶν τεττάρων, ὧν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ. ἔχεις γὰρ δῆπου
νῦν ἡμῶν ἤδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν. 10

ΠΡΩ. Ἐχω καὶ μάλα ἱκανῶς· καί τοί με ἀποκρι-
νάμενος ἔλαθες.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς
γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. 15

p. 31. ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ νοῦς, ὃ ἐταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ
καὶ τίνα ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν
τὰ νῦν δεδήλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡδονῆς γε ὡσαύτως πάσαι τὸ γένος 20
ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνώμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι
νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν συγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ
γένους, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτῇ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν 25
μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος
μηδὲ ἔξουτός ποτε γένους.

b ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

XVII. ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τέ 30
ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος, γίγνεσθον,

9. τῶν τεττάρων, ὧν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν
τούτῳ] For this, which is unin-
telligible, Stallbaum proposes:

τῶν τεττάρων δ' ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τούτῳ.
ὧν is omitted in the best MSS.

D. Divi-
sion of (a)
Pleasure,
and (b)
Science,
into va-
rious

kinds or classes.

(a) Pleasures may be divided into two great classes, the Mixed and the Unmixed. The former are subdivided into three subordinate kinds.

One kind of Mixed Pleasure is the Restoration of violated Limit to its ascendancy in the animal world.

ὁπόταν γίγνησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς· πρῶτον τὴν ἡδονήν· p. 31.
ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσταμεν, οὕτω
καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λύπης δ' αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἡδονὴν
οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα ἱκανῶς βασανίσαι.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτῃ χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτῃ πο-
ρευώμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέ-
σεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

10 ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένει ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη
τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δέ γε, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομί-
μνησκε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δη-
λοῦν.

15 ΣΩ. Ἔσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὃ θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττά-
ρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρας ἔλεγες; ἐν
20 ᾧ καὶ ὑγίειαν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δὲ ὅ τι μάλιστ' d
ἦδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν

22. τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυομένης, &c.] This definition of Pleasure may be illustrated by what is said on the same subject in the *Timæus*. Τὸ δὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὧδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίαιον γιγνόμενον ἀθρόον παρ' ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλγευνόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φύσιν ἀπὸν πάλιν ἀθρόον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ ἡρέμα καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τούτοις ἐναντίως. τὸ δὲ μετ' εὐτελείας γιγνόμενον ἅπαν αἰσθητὸν μὲν ὅτι μά-

λιστα, λυπῆς δὲ καὶ ἡδονῆς οὐ μέ-
εχον, οἷον τὰ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῇν
παθήματα, ἡ δὴ σῶμα ἐν τοῖς πρόσ-
θεν ἐρρήθη καθ' ἡμέραν συμφυῆς
ἡμῶν γίγνεσθαι. ταύτῃ γὰρ τομαὶ
μὲν καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα πά-
σχει λύπας οὐκ ἐμποιοῦσιν οὐδὲ
ἡδονὰς πάλιν ἐπὶ ταῦτον ἀπιούσης
εἶδος, μέγισται δὲ αἰσθήσεις καὶ
σαφέσταται καθ' ὅτι τ' ἂν πάθῃ καὶ
ᾧσιν ἂν αὐτὴ πῃ προσβαλοῦσα
ἐφάπτηται. βία γὰρ τὸ πᾶν οὐκ
ἐνὶ τῇ διακρίσει τε αὐτῆς καὶ συγ-

p. 31. ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἅμα λύσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλ-
γηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

κρίσει. τὰ δὲ ἐκ μειζόνων μερῶν σώματα μόγις εἰκοντα τῷ δρῶντι, διαδίδοντα δὲ εἰς ὅλον τὰς κινήσεις, ἡδονὰς ἴσχει καὶ λύπας, ἀλλοτριούμενα μὲν λύπας, καθιστάμενα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἡδονάς· ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἴληφε τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἀθρόας καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα, κενώσεως μὲν ἀναισθητα πληρώσεως δὲ αἰσθητικὰ γινόμενα, λύπας μὲν οὐ παρέχει τῷ θνητῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μεγίστας δὲ ἡδονάς· ἔστι δ' ἔν-
δηλα περὶ τὰς εὐωδίας. ὅσα δὲ ἀπαλλοτριοῦται μὲν ἀθρόα, κατὰ σμικρὰ δὲ μόγις τε εἰς ταῦτόν πάλιν ἑαυτοῖς καθίσταται, τοῦναντίον τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν πάντα ἀποδίδωσι· ταῦτα δ' αὖ περὶ τὰς καύσεις καὶ τομὰς τοῦ σώματος γινόμενά ἐστι κατὰδῃλα. p. 64 C. "Pleasure and Pain are thus to be explained. A violent and sudden derangement of nature is painful, and a sudden return to the natural state is pleasant. A gentle and gradual affection is not attended with sensation; the opposite is. A rapid and facile affection is attended with keen sensation, but not with pleasure or pain. This is instanced in vision which we said was our incorporation by day with external nature. For the incision and combustion and other concomitant affections cause no pain, nor the re-establishment of the natural state pleasure, but the strongest and clearest perception of the objects touching or touched by the visual organ, because there is no violence in the concomitant compositions and decompositions. But the organs of grosser texture by resisting the action

of the sensible object, and disseminating the shock far and wide, produce pleasure and pain, the latter from the disturbance, the former from the reascendency of the natural state. When the decrements and deperition of the organ are gradual, and its renovation sudden and by great increments, it will be insensible to the process of inanition but sensible of the renovation, and impart to the mortal part of the soul no pains but much pleasure. This is instanced in fragrant smells. But when an organ is deranged suddenly and returns to its former condition gradually and slowly, it presents the opposite phenomena. This is instanced in burns and wounds." The particular senses are afterwards examined in detail, and the pleasant to Taste is thus defined: ξύμπασι δὲ τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα εἰρημένοις πάθος ἐναντίον ἀπ' ἐναντίας ἐστὶ προφάσεως, ὅπῃ ταν ἢ τῶν εἰσιόντων ξύστασις ἐν ὑγροῖς οἰκεία τῇ τῆς γλώττης ἔξει πεφυκυῖα λει-
αίῃ μὲν ἐπαλείφουσα τὰ τραχυ-
θέντα, τὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ξυνεστῶτα ἢ κεχυμένα τὰ μὲν ξυνάγη τὰ δὲ χαλᾷ καὶ πάνθ' ὅτι μάλιστα ἰδρῆν κατὰ φύσιν, ἡδὺ καὶ προσφιλὲς παντὶ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἵαμα τῶν βιαιῶν παθημάτων γιγνόμενον κέ-
κληται γλυκύ. p. 66 B. "There is an opposite feeling produced by an opposite cause. When the entering liquids are congenial to the constitution of the tongue, and smooth with oily influence its corrugations, and separate what has been unnaturally joined, or join what has been unnaturally se-

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ λέγεις εἰκός.

p. 31.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὲ ἀρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἀπιούσης ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅ τι τάχιστα ρηθῆναι.

5 ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανεστέρον δὲ ἔτι ταῦτα ταῦτα πειρώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δημόσια που καὶ περιφανῇ ῥᾶ-
στον συννοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

10 ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

15 ΣΩ. Δίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύνα-
μις ἡδονή. διάκρισις δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ
φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη; κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ
πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψύξις ἡδονή.

20 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

parated, and re-establish the normal disposition of the organ, this medicinal counteraction of violent affections is always pleasant and welcome, and is called by the name of Sweetness." Similarly what is pleasant to the other senses is shown to attend the restoration of φύσις or τὸ μέτριον, which are equivalent to τὸ πέρας, and are different names for the normal condition of the sensitive organ.

12. ἔδωδὴ δὲ πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν ἡδονή] The inaccuracy of this expression is pointed out by Aristotle: Καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν· ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι πάθη· εἰ

δή ἐστὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἦδοιτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή· ἀλλὰ γιγνομένη μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἦδοιτο ἂν τις καὶ τεμνόμενος λυπόιτο. Eth. Nic. 10.

3. "They say Pain is the want of the normal quantity of elements, and Pleasure the supply. But these are bodily affections. If then Pleasure is the completion of the normal quantity, the recipient of the completion, that is, the Body, will be the recipient of Pleasure; which all deny. Replenishment, then, is not Pleasure, though it may be an antecedent condition of Pleasure, as incision is of Pain."

p. 32. ΣΩ. Καὶ ῥίγους ἢ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζώου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δ' εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιονόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἰ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὅς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ
 b τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμφυχον γεγονὸς 5 εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν. 10

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐκατέροις ;

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

11. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἶδος, τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς] This definition only professes to apply to one kind of Pleasure. In the Republic however an equivalent definition is extended to all kinds of Pleasure, including intellectual. Οὐκ οὖν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν γένη τῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν ἦττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει ;—πολύ γε.—Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἶε οὕτως ;—ἐγώ γε.—Οὐκ οὖν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον, καὶ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὄν, ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν ἦττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἦττον ὄν ;—πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;—εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσσηκόντων ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν ποιῶ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεί, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἦττον μεταλαμβάνον ἦττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ ἀπιστοτέρας ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἦττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμβάνοι, 9. p. 585. “Has not the aliment of the body compared with the

aliment of the soul less truth and reality? By far. And has not the body itself compared with the soul likewise? It has. Is not that which more real things fill and which itself is more real, more really filled than that which less real things fill, and which itself is less real? It must be. If therefore to be filled with things requisite for our nature is pleasant, that which is more really filled, and with more real things will more really and truly cause us to be delighted with true pleasure, and that which is filled by less real things will be less really and substantially filled, and receive less solid and true Pleasure.” If we did not suppose the definition had been thus extended, we could hardly understand statements like the following: ὅλως οὐκ ἀγαθὸν φασὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσι, Eth. Nic. 7, 11.

A second kind is the Expectancy of this restoration. The neutral state, or the absence of both Pleasure and Pain, may attend a life of pure Knowledge, and is perhaps a diviner condition than that of these kinds of Pleasure.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς p. 32.

κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν c
πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρράλεον, τὸ δὲ
πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης
ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς
διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατὰ
γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσι τε ἑκατέροις γιγνο-
10 μένοις, ὥς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμίκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς,
ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον
ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τῶν d
προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ,
καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις,
15 τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὥς
ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅτε φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπο-
ρευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

20 ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε ξυνίδωμεν, ὥς εἴπερ
ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν e
ἀλγηδῶν, ἀνασωζομένων δὲ ἡδονῇ, τῶν μήτε διαφ-
θειρομένων μήτε ἀνασωζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι,
τίνα ποτὲ ἔξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἐκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζώοις,
25 ὅταν οὕτως ἴσχη· σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν
εἰπέ· ἄρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ
ζῶον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι, μήτε ἡδεσθαι, μήτε μέγα
μήτε σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

30 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἢ τοιαύτη διά-
θεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρά τὴν τοῦ p. 33.
λυπουμενου;

p. 33. ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνησθαι πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν μεμνησθαι ταύτην ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἢ μή. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐλομένῳ βίον οἶσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

b ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο
c μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰσαυθις ἐπισκεψώμεθα, εἰς πρὸς λόγον
τι ἦ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, εἰς πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

16. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον] The Peripatetics differed from Plato on this point. We read in the Nicomachean Ethics: εἰ τοῦ ἢ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἴη αἰεὶ ἢ αὐτὴ πράξις ἡδίστη ἔσται, διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλὴν χαίρει ἡδονήν, 7, 14. "A being whose nature is not complex will always take the greatest pleasure in the same activity. Therefore the Divinity has the fruition of an incomplete and unchanging pleasure." In the Metaphysics human

Pleasure is said to be a reflex of the Divine activity: ἐκ ταύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτῆται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν οἷα τε ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν... ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἢ ἐνέργεια τούτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον, 11, 7. "Such then is the principle on which hang the heavens and earth. Its life is like the best of ours momentarily. Pleasure is its activity, and hence consciousness, sensation, intellection, are the highest Pleasures."

The second
kind of
Pleasure
involves
Memory.

XIX. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν p. 33.
ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης
πάν ἐστὶ γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

5 ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστι, πρότερον
ἀναληπτέον. καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἰσ-
θησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ
τρόπον φανερά πη γενήσεσθαι. d

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φῆς;

10 ΣΩ. Θεὸς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθη-
μάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβευνύμενα πρὶν
ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῇ ἐκείνην ἔασαντα, τὰ
δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα
ἰδίον τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρῳ.

15 ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα εἰάν τὴν
ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν μὴ
λανθάνειν, ἀρ' ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

20 ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς
λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν. ἔστι γὰρ λήθη
μνήμης ἕξοδος· ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὐπω γέ-
γονε· τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πῶ γίγνε-
σθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. ἢ γάρ;

25 ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅταν
ἀπαθῆς αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος,
30 ἣν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς, ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

p. 34.

24. πω] So Stallbaum reads instead of πως which is retained
in the Zurich edition.

p. 34. ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἰσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' αὖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς αὖν τις λέγοι κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν. 10

b ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἄρ' οὐ διαφέρουσιν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τόδε;

15

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

12. Μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἄρ' οὐ διαφέρουσιν λέγομεν] The two cases of Reminiscence that follow are not very distinctly contrasted. In the Phædo, however, we have the same division: εἴαν τις τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γινῶ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' ἄλλη, ἄρ' οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη οὐ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἔλαβεν;—πῶς λέγεις;—οἶον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας—πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταὶ ὅταν ἴδωσι λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι πάσχουσι τοῦτο, ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὐ ἦν ἡ λύρα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις... μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκείνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ

ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπιλέληστο. "When the sight or hearing, or any other sensation of an object, besides giving a perception of that, awakens the thought of something else which is the object of a different perception, is not the thought of the second object a reminiscence? Explain your meaning. Are not a man and a lyre objects of different perceptions? True. When a lover sees the lyre or garment, or any thing else that the person he loves is wont to use, this happens: he no sooner sees the lyre than his fancy presents to him the form of the person to whom it belonged, and this is Reminiscence... Particularly if the object which thus recurs is one which time or inattention had effaced from memory." See Appendix C.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἂ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε πάθη ἢ p. 34.
 ψυχῇ, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅ τι
 μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνη τότε ἀναμνησέσθαι που
 λέγομεν. ἢ γάρ;

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτε
 αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος αὐτὴς ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ
 πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις c
 καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῳς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν χάριν ἅπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἵνα δὴ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώμα-
 τος ὅ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμα
 15 ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω
 ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι.

XX. ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἥδη
 τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

It accom-
 panies De-
 sire which
 is a mental
 affection
 involving
 the Me-
 mory of the
 Opposite of
 a certain
 bodily af-
 fection.

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν
 20 τὴν μορφήν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὥς ἔοικε, λέγοντας d
 σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον
 ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώ-
 25 ταρχε, εὐρόντες ὁ νῦν ζητοῦμεν· ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ
 αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῳς ἡμύνω· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώ-
 μεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πόλλ'
 30 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναι τίνας ἐπιθυμίας; e

29. νῦν δὲ ἔφαμεν] Nothing strengthen the hypothesis sug-
 of the kind has as yet been said. gested in the note on §§ 33. p.
 This is one of the passages that 53 c.

p. 34. ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταυτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω
πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἐνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ ρᾶδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες·
ἀλλ' ὁμῶς λεκτέον. 5

ΣΩ. Ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Διψῇ γέ που λέγομεν ἐκάστοτέ τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δέ γ' ἐστὶ κενοῦται; 10

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πώματός γε.

p. 35. ΣΩ. Πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως. 15

ΣΩ. Ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυ-
μῇ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πλη-
ροῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὃ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπό- 20
θεν εἴτ' αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτ' ἂν εἴτε μνήμη,
τούτου ὃ μὴτ' ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μὴτ' ἐν τῷ
πρόσθε πώποτ' ἔπαθεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

b ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γ' ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμῇ, 25
φαμέν.

8. Διψῇ που λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε
τί. "You know the meaning of
the word Thirst:"—"You use
the word Thirst with a definite
signification." So in the Meno:
ἀλλὰ σύ γέ που καλεῖς πεπεράνθαι τι
καὶ τετελευτηκέναι; τὸ τοῖονδε βού-
λομαι λέγειν, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.—
ἀλλὰ καλῶ καὶ οἶμαι μανθάνειν ὃ

λέγεις. p. 75 D. "You, no
doubt, use the words Termina-
tion and End in a certain ac-
ception. That is the sort of
thing I mean—nothing recon-
dite.—I attach a sense to the
terms, and I think I know
what you mean by them."

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

P. 35.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὃ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμῇ. διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὃ δὲ ἐπιθυμῇ πληρώσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Πληρώσεώς γ' ἄρα πῇ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ που.

10 ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ' ἄλλω ἐφάψαιτο;

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.

The second kind of Pleasure is therefore always Mixed with Pain.

15 ΧΧΙ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίνεσθαι.

These pleasures may be False. Various proofs are attempted.

20 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν αἰὲ παντὸς ζῶου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ 25 παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὔσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τὴν τε 30 ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῶου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα.

p. 35. ΣΩ. Διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ καὶ τότε περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἰδὸς τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι⁵ δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

e ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου περὶ βίου φράξεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πάσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ,¹⁰ τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ, μεμνήται δὲ τῶν¹⁵ ἡδέων ὧν γενομένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνης, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν

p. 36. ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;²⁰

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες; ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν²⁵ ἐλπίδι φανερά τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ b δὲ τούναντίον ἀνελπίστως ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνήσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος³⁰ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρα ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται p. 36.
τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύ-
5 ξεσθαι πληρώσεως; ἂρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνεται
ἀν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νῦν δὴ κατιδὼν ὥθησ
ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν; c

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων
10 τὸδε χρησόμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ
ἡδονὰς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν; ἢ τὰς μὲν τινὰς
ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὐ;

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἰεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ
ἢ λύπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ
ψευδεῖς, ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μὴ, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς
ἢ ψευδεῖς;

20 ΠΡΩ. Δόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἂν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δ
δ' ἕτερα ταῦτ' οὐκ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν
οὐ πάνν σμικρὸν ἐπιγείρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῇ λέγεις.

12. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς, &c.] The inquiry into the truth or falseness of Pleasure is necessary for the solution of two problems. First, we have to ascertain whether Pleasure or Reason is more akin to the cause of goodness in the chief Good. Three attributes of the chief Good, Truth, Beauty, and Symmetry will be indicated; and we must see whether they are

more to be found in Pleasure or Reason. Secondly, we have to determine the composition of the mixed life and the Pleasures that involve most falsehood will be excluded. This second problem has not yet been expressly proposed, but it is in the solution of this that the distinction of Pleasures, as true and false, has its chief application.

p. 36. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὦ παῖ' κείνου τάνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὁφροῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσήκον λεγομένων. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως.

e ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους αἰὲν περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νῦν δὴ προϋθέμεθα ἀπορήματα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ φῆς;

10

ΣΩ. Ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθ' ὕπαρ, ὡς φῆς, ἔστιν οὔτ' ἐν μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὅς τις ποτε δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὖ 15 δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὔ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὕτω ταῦτ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὀρθῶς, ἢ σκεπτέον εἶτ' ὀρθῶς εἶτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

20

p. 37. XXII. ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

ΣΩ. Διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νῦν δὴ

Pleasures
may at
least be

1. ὦ παῖ' κείνου τάνδρός] An allusion to the title *Philebus* usually gave his companions, and to his queries as to the relevancy of part of the discussion. See §§ 6 and 8. If any allusion to the character of the natural father of Protarchus had preceded or immediately followed, as in *Rep.* 2. p. 368 A, the words might have applied to him; but they have no point here, unless they apply to *Philebus*. Plato appears

to have been censured by contemporary critics for the wearisome length of some of his discussions. He answers in the *Politicus*, p. 286, that his *Dialogues* are not intended to amuse, or to charm by their artistic form, but to teach the art of reasoning. To justify the whole of the following discussion perhaps we ought to have before us the writings of *Aristippus*, to which it is an answer.

Right or
Wrong, as
they are
produced
indifferent-
ly by Right
and Wrong
Opinions ;
and is not
Wrong
synony-
mous with
False ?

λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γάρ που p. 37.
δοξάζειν ἡμῖν ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἥδεσθαι ;

5 ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐστὶ τι ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ τό γε ᾧ τὸ ἡδόμενον ἥδεται ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἂν τε ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ
ὀρθῶς δοξάσῃ, τό γε δοξάζειν ὄντως οὐδέποτε ἀπόλ- b
λυσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἡδόμενον, ἂν τε ὀρθῶς ἂν τε
15 μὴ ὀρθῶς ἥδῃται, τό γε ὄντως ἥδεσθαι δῆλον ὥς
οὐδέποτε ἀπολεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Τῷ ποτέ οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδῆς τε καὶ
ἀληθῆς ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς μόνον
20 ἀληθές, δοξάζειν δ' ὄντως καὶ χαίρειν ἀμφοτέρα
ὁμοίως εἴληχεν ;

ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὅτι δόξῃ μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψευδός τε
καὶ ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτα c
25 ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιά τις ἑκατέρα, σκεπτέον φῆς τοῦτ' εἶναι ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν
τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ποι' ἅττα, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἅπερ

28. ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον
ἅπερ ἐστὶ, &c.] This is an al-
lusion to the doctrine of Antis-
thenes and the Megarians, who

seem to have denied the possi-
bility of synthetical proposi-
tions. See Appendix A.

p. 37. ἐστί, ποιῶ τινε δὲ οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταυθ' ἡμῖν διομο-
λογητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτό γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ
ποιῶ τινε. πάλαι γὰρ εἶπομεν ὅτι μεγάλαι τε καὶ
d σμικραὶ καὶ σφόδρα ἐκάτεραι γίνονται, λυπαί τε καὶ
ἡδοναί.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὧ Πρώταρχε,
προσγίγνηταί τι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίγ- 10
νεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν, ὧ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ὀρθότης ἢ τουναντίον ὀρθότητι τινὶ
τούτων προσγίγνηται; μὴν οὐκ ὀρθὴν μὲν δόξαν
ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὀρθότητα ἴσχη; ταὐτὸν δὲ ἡδονήν; 15

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

e ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε ἀμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἢ,
τὴν δόξαν τότε ἀμαρτάνουσάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολο-
γητέον οὐδ' ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν;

18. τὴν δόξαν τότε ἀμαρτάνου-
σάν γε οὐκ ὀρθὴν ὁμολογητέον] ἀμαρτάνουσιν, though without
the article must be taken as
part of the subject, not the
predicate. Ὀρθή and ἀμαρτά-
νουσα, or ἀμαρτανόμενη, are con-
trasted in Greek as Right and
Wrong. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς
βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει ὁ δὲ εὖ
ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται δῆλον ὅτι ὀρθότης
τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν· οὗτ' ἐπι-
στήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης. ἐπιστήμης μὲν
γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης, οὐδὲ γὰρ
ἀμαρτία, δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἢ ἀλή-
θεια, Eth. Nicom. 6. 9. Ἡ δὲ
ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν
ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται
καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον

ἐπαινέται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα
δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς.. ἔτι τὸ μὲν
ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστι... τὸ δὲ
κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν
ράδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν· ράδιον μὲν
τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν, ib. 2. 6. We see
that ἀμαρτία and ὀρθότης have a
generic meaning, and as applied
to the intellect, express truth
or falsehood, as applied to ac-
tions or feelings express con-
formity or nonconformity to the
moral law. The last passage
shows the image that they con-
veyed to the fancy. It would
therefore be a fallacy to infer
falsehood from ἀμαρτία, as So-
crates seems to propose.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

p. 37.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν αὖ λύπην ἢ τινα ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ λυπῆται ἢ τοῦναντίον ἀμαρτάνουσαν ἐφορῶμεν, ὀρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἢ τί τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτων αὐτῇ
5 προσθήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ ἀμαρτήσεται γέ ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰκὲ γέ ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν ψευδῇ, p. 38.
τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἂν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῇ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ᾧ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ᾧ ἐταῖρε, ἢ μετὰ δόξης τε ὀρθῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;

b

20 ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ σμικρὸν διαφέρειν

XXIII. ΣΩ. Τῆς δὲ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄγε ὅπη σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ ἄγω;

25 ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπεταὶ μὴν ταύταις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν,

15. ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω] "I assert that this is the ordinary use of language." This is per-

haps better than, "I speak as I am prompted by my companions."

p. 38. ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεὶ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα
c ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχειρεῖν γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε; 5

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον
ἡγούμεθα ἵσχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνυ 10
σαφῶς τὰ καθορώμενα ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν
φαίης ἂν ταῦθ' ἅπερ ὁρᾷ;

ΠΡΩ. Φαίην ἂν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὗτος
ἀνέροιτ' ἂν ὧδε. 15

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ'
d ἐστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπὸ τινι δένδρῳ; Ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν
ἂν τις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἅττα κατιδὼν
φαντασθέντα ἑαυτῷ ποτέ; 20

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινό-
μενος ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπι-
τυχῶς εἰπών;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε. 25

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθεὶς γ' αὐτὸν τάχ' ἂν ὡς ἔστι τινῶν
ποιμένων ἔργον τὸ καθορώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

5. διαδοξάζειν only occurs in this passage. It seems to be formed on the analogy of διαλέγεσθαι, or διανοεῖσθαι, and ex-

presses either the dialogue with one's self that is presently described, or syllogism from probable premisses.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν p. 38.
 ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ^e
 ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν φθέγγεαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν
 οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἄν δ' ἄρα μόνος ἢ τοῦτο ταῦτόν πρὸς αὐτὸν
 διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ
 πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τούτων
 γιγνόμενον ὅπερ ἐμοί;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσ-
 εοικέναι.

15 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ζυμπίπτουσα εἰς p. 39.
 ταῦτόν, κακέινα ἃ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ παθήματα,
 φαίνονται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς
 ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους· καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἀληθὴ γράψῃ
 20 τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα, δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ λόγοι ἀπ'
 αὐτοῦ ζυμβαίνουσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι·
 ψευδῇ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς
 γράψῃ, τὰναντία τοῖς ἀληθέσιν ἀπέβη.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ b
 25 ῥηθέντα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν
 ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

17. κακέινα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστι τὰ
 παθήματα] i. e. τὸ δοξαστικόν, the
 judgment as concerned with
 sensuous perceptions. Below,

because of its association with
 sense, it is called τοῦτο τὸ πά-
 θημα. See Appendix D.

p. 39. ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἀπ' ὀψεως ἢ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγόν τις τὰς 5
c τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρᾷ
πως. ἢ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνες ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς; 10

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδε ἐπὶ τούτοις σκεψώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων 15
ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελ-
λόντων οὐ;

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.

d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἡδοναὶ 20
καὶ λῦπαι ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὥς πρὸ τῶν διὰ
τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίγνουτ' ἄν,
ὥσθ' ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυ-
πεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

25

1. Ζωγράφον κ. τ. λ.] As every act of the intellect is accompanied by Imagination, if Opinion is compared to Writing it must be to Picture-writing.

16. ταῦθ' οὕτω πάσχειν] This must refer to ξυμβαίνειν βούλεσθαι κρίνειν above, not to the γράμ-

ματα and ζωγραφήματα, which will be mentioned presently; or else the same question would be asked twice. Ἐλέχθησαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, refers to τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγευνόν, §. 18.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφή- p. 39.
ματα, ἃ σμικρῶ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι,
περὶ μὲν τὸν γεγονότα καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστί, ο
περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα
ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὔσαι, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ
παντὸς τοῦ βίου αἰὲ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

10 XXIV. ΣΩ. Ἄγε δὴ, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις
καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὖσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως
ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἐστίν;

15 ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἄρ'
οὐ τούναντίον ἐκείνῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μὴν ἐλπίδων, ὥς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς
20 ἄνθρωπος γέμει;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Λόγοι μὴν εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν, ἃς ἐλπί-
δας ὀνομάζομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

25 ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐξωγραφημένα,
καὶ τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἐαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφ-
θονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονὰς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνε-

25. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα
ἐξωγραφημένα] The meaning of
this and the previous sentence
is: "What we call Hopes are
Propositions and Pictures." As
the text stands, ἐξωγραφημένα is

the predicate of φαντάσματα.
Perhaps we express this suffi-
ciently if we translate: "And
the images painted:" i.e. "and
paintings of the images."

As the
Hopes of
the vicious,
i. e. their
Imagina-
tions and
Opinions of
future
Pleasures,
are Real
but False,
by parity
of reason
the present
Pleasures
that those
hopes occa-
sion may
be False
though
Real.

p. 40.

p. 40. ζωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα
b καθορᾶ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς
ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ 5
τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ πολὺ τού-
ναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδوناί γε οὐδὲν ἦττον
πάρεισιν ἐζωγραφημένοι, ψευδεῖς δὲ αὐταί πον. 10

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν ;

c ΣΩ. Ψευδέσιν ἄρα ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ
χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους ψευδεῖς ἐν 15
ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημένοι
μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα· καὶ λῦπαι δὲ
ὡσαύτως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ὄντως αἰετῶ τὸ 20
παραπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μηδὲ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι
μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

d ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτά γε ἦν, οἶμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα
δόξαν ψευδῇ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ ; 25

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε

12. The falsely anticipated Pleasure in mistaken Hope may be called, as here, False Pleasure. This is, however, an inaccurate expression. It is not the Pleasure, but the anticipation of it, i. e. the Imagi-

nation or Opinion, that is False. Socrates therefore does not dwell upon this point, although Protarchus allows the expression to pass.

27. οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀν-

καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις ; p. 40.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἦν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως ἀεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὀπωσοῦν καὶ εἰκῇ χαίρουσι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσι
5 μὴδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίετε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως
πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μὴδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι. e

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβων τε
10 καὶ θυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὥς ἔστι καὶ
ψευδῇ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνίετε ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ἢ
ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν ;

15 ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονὰς γ', οἶμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὥς p. 41.
ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς
εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
20 εἴρηκας. σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψεῦδει μὲν οὐ πάνυ πονηρὰς
ἂν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλη καὶ
πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίᾳ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ
πονηρίαν οὖσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν
25 ἔτι δοκῇ νῶν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν
ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνούσας τε καὶ ἐγγιγνο-

τίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις ;] Comparing ἐν ἐκείνοις with ἐν τοιούτοις τισί in the next section, we must suppose that it refers to : ὄντως μὲν, μὴ ἐπ' οὖσι δὲ μὴδὲ ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μὴδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένοις (not merely to τοῖς μὴ οὖσι κ.τ.λ.) and translate : "in respect of those

predicates," i. e. reality and groundlessness. The ἀντίστροφος ἔξις, corresponding condition, will be, that Pleasure and Pain, as well as Opinions, (τούτων) are susceptible of these predicates.

p. 41. μένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἴσως χρησόμεθα πρὸς τὰς
 b κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ; εἴπερ γε εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰσὶ κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμήν.
 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἵ
 ἀνέλεγκτον δῆπου γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

XXV. ΣΩ. Προσιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ
 πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴπομεν, εἴπερ μεμνήμεθα, ὀλίγον
 c ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὥς ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν
 ἡμῖν ὦσι, δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς
 ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι διείληπται.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προεῤῥήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν
 τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίων ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγηδόνα ἢ
 τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὴ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

d ΣΩ. Γίνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ἢ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρα-
 κεῖσθαι λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις
 ἅμα παρ' ἀλλήλας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ
 νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

5. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα κ. τ. λ.]
 "As long as I hold this opinion
 (or, you hold the opposite opi-
 nion) of course it has a claim
 to be examined : " or, giving
 with Badham a different sense

to εἶς, "Until this question is
 settled, of course it must not
 cease to be examined."

25. ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη] i. e. in
 § 21, when Hope or the second
 kind of Pleasure was discussed.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογη- p-41.
μένον ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθε κείμεναι ;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον ἄμφω τούτω
δέχεσθον, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἀπείρων
εἴτην.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴρηται· τί μήν ;

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν μηχανὴ ταύτ' ὀρθῶς κρίνεσθαι ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ δὴ καὶ πῶς ;

10 ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τούτων ἐν
τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι βούλεται ἐκάστοτε, τίς τού-
των πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάττων καὶ τίς
μᾶλλον καὶ τίς σφοδοτέρα, λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ
λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονή πρὸς ἡδονήν.

15 ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις
τῆς κρίσεως αὕτη.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἐν μὲν ὅφει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύ-
θεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῇ p.42.
ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, ἐν λύπαις δ' ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι
20 ταῦτὸν τοῦτο γιγνόμενον ;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε
γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις ;

25 ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς
αὐταὶ γιγνόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ
παρ' αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίμπλασαν.

10. ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι] such predicates, attributes, relations." Ἐν indicates the predicate of a proposition of which Pleasure or Pain is the subject.

p. 42. ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

b ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθέν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἡδονὰς τούναντίον ἐκείναις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅσφ μείζους τῶν οὐσῶν ἐκάτεροι καὶ ἐλάττους φαίνονται, τοῦτο ἀποτεμόμενος ἐκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὃν οὔτε αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς φαινόμενον ¹⁰ ἐρεῖς, οὐδ' αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὀρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς τολμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἐξῆς ὀψόμεθα, εἴαν τῇδε ἅπαν- ¹⁵ τῶμεν, ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις ;

XXVI. ΣΩ. Εἴρηται που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσειςι καὶ ²⁰ διακρίσειςι καὶ πληρώσειςι καὶ κενώσειςι καὶ τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσειςι λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναί τε καὶ πάνθ', ὅποσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει, ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

The Absence of both Pleasure and Pain, a state which the disciples of Heraclitus ²⁵ may admit to be possible, is

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, ταῦτα εἴρηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῇται,

10. Τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὃν must mean the apparent pleasure, therefore τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἡδονῆς γιγνόμενον means another pleasure occasioned by the former, as in Memory or Hope.

17. φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας] οὔσας is added because he has

allowed that a False pleasure may be Real. In the sentence above, τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὃν referred to an imagined future or past pleasure which had never been enjoyed or never would be, and therefore was Unreal as well as False.

sometimes mistaken for Pleasure ; another argument that a Pleasure may be False.

ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' p. 42.
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγ-
5 νόμενον ἡμῶν ᾗ ;

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἤρου τὸ ἐρώτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή ;

10 ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερέσθαι σε πάλιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φήσω,
τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν
15 ἡμῶν ;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἐκάτερα φῆς ;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς οὔτε
20 ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ποτὲ οὔτ' ἂν τις λύπη.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, τόδε p. 43.
λέγεις, ὥς αἰεὶ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῶν ξυμβαίνειν, ὥς οἱ σοφοὶ φασιν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ρεῖ.

1. κατάστασιν] This term is used by Aristotle to define Pleasure in his treatise on Rhetoric : ὑποκείμεθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοῦναντίον. I. XI. He defines it differently in his Ethics and Psychology.

24. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ρεῖ] Heraclitus taught that nature is perpetually

changing in a recurrent cycle, all things gradually passing into their opposites and being reproduced in turn from their decay. If we imagine the plane of the circle of revolution to be perpendicular, we shall understand why the change is spoken of as an ascending and descending, or movement up and down (ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω). That this was the image we

p. 43. ΠΡΩ. Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γε οὐ φαύλως λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ φαῦλοί γε ὄντες ; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπεκστῆναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῇδ' οὖν διανοοῦμαι φεύγειν, καὶ σύ μοι ξύμφευγε. 5

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπη.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους. σὺ δ' ἀπόκριναι· πότερον αἰεὶ πάντα ὅποσα
b πᾶσχει τι τῶν ἐμφύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πᾶσχον, καὶ οὗτ' αὐξανόμενοι λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε 10
τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν πᾶσχοντες, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον ; ὀλίγον γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ' ἡμᾶς ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἄπαν δῆπου τούναντίον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν ὥς αἱ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμεναι 15
λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

may gather from the following passage of Diogenes Laertius, from whence we may also learn that the transmutation of elements, which we find in the physical theories of Plato and Aristotle, was originally an idea of Heraclitus. Καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω κάτω, τὸν τε κόσμον γίγνεσθαι κατὰ ταύτην. πυκνούμενον γὰρ τὸ πῦρ ἐξυγραινέσθαι συνιστάμενόν τε γίγνεσθαι ὕδωρ, πηγνύμενον δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς γῆν τρέπεσθαι· καὶ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω εἶναι. πάλιν τε αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὕδωρ γίγνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ λοιπὰ, σχεδὸν πάντα ἐπὶ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἀνάγων τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ὁδός. ix. 7. "Change he called a road upwards and downwards, and Nature a movement along such a path. Fire liquefies by condensation and compression

into Water, and Water solidifies into Earth ; and this is the downward road. Earth dissolves into Water, and from Water the rest is reproduced, evaporation from the ocean being the process by which the reproduction is explained ; and this is the upward road." Air is not mentioned here, but we find it in another passage, from whence we may infer that the Heraclitean elements were the four afterwards received. Ψυχῇσι θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίγνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή. Clem. Al. Strom. 6, p. 624 C. "The death of Air is the birth of Water, the death of Water the birth of Earth, the death of Earth the birth of Water, the death of Water the birth of Air."

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

p. 43.

ΣΩ. Ὡδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀγεπιληπτότερον τὸ ε
λεγόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

5 ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ
ἡδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριά τε καὶ σμικραὶ
τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότερον οὕτως ἢ 'κείνως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ῥηθεὶς
10 βίος ἂν ἦκοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Ἄν ἁλυπὸν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν
εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθώμεν τριττοὺς ἡμῖν βίους,
ἓνα μὲν ἡδύν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἓνα μηδέτερα. d
ἢ πῶς ἂν φαίης σὺ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς
βίους.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε
ταῦτὸν τῷ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ὅποταν οὖν ἀκούσης ὥς ἡδιστον πάντων
ἔστιν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθ' ὑπο-
25 λαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἢδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οὗτος τὸ μὴ
λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει,
καλλίωσιν ἵνα ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δ' e
30 ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων.

5. αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι, &c. See the passage from the *Timæus*
quoted in the note, p. 31, d.

p. 43. ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μῆδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γένοιτ' ἄν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ μέσος βίος ἡδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε οὐτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζοιτο, οὐτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεχθείη, κατὰ γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν ;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ

p. 44. δοξαζόντων αισθανόμεθα.

10

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἶονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται ;

7. κατὰ γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον] ὀρθὸς λόγος generally means "right reason," but here, as there is an evident allusion to the antithesis established above between λόγος and δόξα, it is used by a sort of play upon words for "right speech." The thought that the absence of Pain is mistaken for Pleasure, and that which is expressed below, that the intensest Pleasures are alloyed with Pain, and, in general, the Falseness of these Pleasures, is developed in the Republic, the same definition of Pleasure being assumed as was given above. The intermediate state, the absence of Pleasure and Pain, is compared to a middle point, the ascending from which is true Pleasure, and descending true Pain : but the rising to the middle from a lower point, or the renovation of the impaired bodily frame, is not genuine or true, but only apparent Pleasure. Ἀθρεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθὲς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων

ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονήμον, οὐδὲ καθαρὰ ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἷ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί, σχεδὸν αἱ πλείσταί τε καὶ μέγιστα, τούτου τοῦ εἵδους εἰσὶ, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί... ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς συνεῖναι μεμιγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοισι τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις ὥστε σφοδροὺς ἐκατέρας φαίνεσθαι ; 9, p. 583. "No Pleasures but those of the wise are quite true or pure, but painted imitations, as I think I have heard from some Philosopher... For the Pleasures, so called, that come to the soul from the body, the most numerous and greatest, are of this sort, deliverances from Pain... Does it not follow that they are mixed with Pain, and merely phantoms of Pleasure, and painted copies exaggerated by juxtaposition ?"

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

p. 44.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

5 ΣΩ. Ψευδῇ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς τοῦ μὴ λυπείσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν ἢ φύσις ἐκατέρου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρὶς γε ἦν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰρώμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι,
10 καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνον, λύπην μὲν κακὸν ἡ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν οὖν, ἢ δὴν προσαγορεύεσθαι;

XXVII. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὃ Σώ-
κρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μαν-
15 θάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὅντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλήβου τοῦδε,
ὃ Πρώταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δὲ αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινούς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν,
20 οἱ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὐ φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγὰς ἅς νῦν ο
οἱ περὶ Φιλήβου ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

22. Καὶ μάλα δεινούς λεγομέ-
νους κ. τ. λ.] It is not known
what school are alluded to.
Antisthenes and the Megarici
have been suggested, but we
have no positive testimony that
either defined Pleasure to be
the Absence of Pain. Besides,
the advocates of this tenet are
said to be eminent in Physical
science. Now we are expressly
told that Antisthenes abstained

from Physical speculation: 'Ἀρέ-
σκει οὖν αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Κυνικοῖς) τὸν
λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περι-
αιρεῖν... μόνον δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἠθικῷ.
Diog. L. 6, 103: and the affinity
of the Megarians to the Elea-
tics, with their logical subtleties,
which procured them the name
of Sophists, Ἐριστικοί, makes it
improbable that they were
addicted even to abstract Phy-
sical speculations.

The same
school that
has defined
Pleasure to
be the as-
suagement
of Pain,
has direct-
ed our at-
tention to
the fact
that the
Greatest
Pleasures
are those
which are
Morbid
and Inde-
corous.

p. 44. ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ο ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρησθαί τισι, μαντευομένοις οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ τινι δυσχερεῖα φύσεως οὐκ ἀγεννοῦς, λίαν μεμνηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύ- 5 ναμιν καὶ νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν, γοήτευμα, οὐχ ἡδονὴν, εἶναι.

d τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκεψάμενος ἔτι καὶ τᾶλλα αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα αἱ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδوناὶ ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, πεύσει, ἵνα 10 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῳς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκωμεν δὴ τούτους ὥσπερ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἵχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοι- 15 ὂνδε τι λέγειν αὐτοῦς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς ο εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁπουοῦν εἶδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἶον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιομεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι ; δεῖ δὴ σε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, 20 καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γε αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

6. νενομικότων οὐδὲν ὑγιές] *ὑγιές* does not mean "salubrious" or "salutary," but "genuine," "solid," "real," as opposed to "hollow," "counterfeit," "illusory."

24. This postulate, as immediately interpreted, is inconsistent with one presently made, p. 53, a, b, c, which must be regarded as Plato's own opinion : that, to discover the true

character of any element, we must examine it, not in its greatest masses, which may possibly be impure, but, in its state of purity, and when all foreign elements have been completely eliminated. This axiom, indeed, is the basis both of induction and of scientific deduction, the one isolating the phenomenon, the other the idea or law.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν p. 44.
 ἥντινά ποτε ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολ-
 λαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτόν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀκροτάτας p. 45.
 καὶ σφοδροτάτας λεγομένας.

5 ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν σοι ταύτη συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ οὖν αἱ πρόχειροι αἵπερ καὶ μέγισται τῶν
 ἡδονῶν, ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν
 αὗται ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

10 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μείζους εἰσὶ καὶ γίνονται περὶ
 τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας ;
 εὐλαβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπετῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταίσω-
 μέν πη. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

15 ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; οὐχ αὗται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, b
 ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμῖαι μέγισται προγίγνωνται ;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις
 νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ῥιγῶσι, καὶ
 20 πάντα ὅποσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν,
 μᾶλλον τ' ἐνδεία ξυγγίγνωνται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων
 μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχουσιν ; ἢ τοῦτο οὐ φήσομεν ἀλη-
 θές εἶναι ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν νῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται.

25 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ὀρθῶς ἂν φαινοίμεθα λέγοντες ὥς εἴ ο
 τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιτο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν
 ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν ; ὅρα δέ, μή με ἡγῇ
 διανοούμενον ἐρωτᾶν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα
 νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαίνόντων, ἀλλ' οἷου μέγεθός με
 30 ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ποῦ
 ποτὲ γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαμὲν ἥντινα
 φύσιν ἔχει καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ φάσκοντες μὴδ' εἶναι d
 τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.

p. 45. ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἔπομαι τῷ λόγῳ σου.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἦττον δείξεις. ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μέζους ἡδονάς, οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερχούσας ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέ-
χων τὸν νοῦν.

If we consider any instance of these we shall see how dependent the Pleasure is upon an antecedent and concomitant Pain, and how Mixed the resultant sensation is.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔμαθον ὁ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρον ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροί-
e μαζόμενος ἐπίσχει λόγος ἐκάστοτε, ὁ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν παρακελεύόμενος, ᾧ πείθονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων 10
τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἢ σφοδρὰ ἡδονὴ κατέ-
χουσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὥς ἐν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λῦπαι 15
γίγνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελόμενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι, τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

20

p. 46. ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονάς, τίνα ποτὲ ἔχουσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὐς εἵπομεν δυσχε- 25
ρεῖς μισοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

5. ὁ παροιμαζόμενος λόγος]

ἦν Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων σοφός, ὃς τόδ' ἔλεξε,
μηδὲν ἄγαν. καίρῳ πάντα προσέστι καλά.

Theognis has expressed the same :

μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· πάντων μέσ' ἄριστα· καὶ οὕτως
ἔξεις Κύρην ἀρετὴν ἣν τε λαβεῖν χαλεπόν.

ΣΩ. Οἷον τὰς τῆς ψώρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ p. 46.
 ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο
 γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε φῶμεν
 ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

5 ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτό γ' ἄρ', ὃ Σώκρατες, εἴοικε
 γίγνεσθαι τι κακόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ Φιλήβου γε ἔνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν ὁ
 λόγον· ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν
 καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατοφθῶσι, σχεδὸν
 10 οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυνάίμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητού-
 μενον.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς.

ΣΩ. Τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινωνούσας λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

15 ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ τοίνυν μίξεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν
 αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ
 ψυχῇ, τὰς δ' αὖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρή-
 20 σομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς μιχθείσας, τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ
 ξυναμφότερα τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπικαλουμένας.

20 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅποταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφ-
 25 θορᾷ τάναντία ἅμα πάθη πάσχη, ποτὲ ῥιγῶν θέρηται
 καὶ θερμαίνόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχεται, ζητῶν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν
 ἔχειν, τοῦ δ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον πικρῶ
 30 γλυκὺ μεμιγμένον, μετὰ δυσapaλλακτίας παρόν,
 ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ. d

24. ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ] ξύν-
 τασιν (see συντείνει below) is the
 reading of the best MSS. Stall-
 baum prefers ἐύστασιν, referring
 to expressions common to Latin
 and Greek, like Cicero's "ef-
 fusio animi in lætitia, in dolore
 contractio," metaphors derived
 from the outward signs of pas-

sion, "vultum, frontem, astrin-
 gere, diffundere." But from the
 line of Euripides, τοῦ νῦν σκυθρω-
 ποῦ καὶ ξυνεστῶτος φρενῶν, Alc.
 809, it appears that ἐύστασις ex-
 presses a sullen, gloomy, moody,
 or pensive state, not excite-
 ment, tension, fury, which the
 context requires.

p. 46. ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ λυπῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐτέρων πλειόνων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

5

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν, ὅταν πλείους λῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν γίνωνται, τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν, ὁπόταν ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ἢ καὶ τὸ φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίβῃ δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆται τις, τὰ δ' ἐπιπολῆς μόνον δια- 10
 6 χέη· τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς τοῦναντίον ἀπορίαις μεταβάλλοντες, ἐνίοτε ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς τοτὲ δὲ τοῦναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας, ἡδονὰς, συγκερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρέσχοντο, τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ 15

p. 47. διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν καὶ ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρα-
 τίθεναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁπόταν αὖ πλείων ἡδονὴ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ξυμμιχθῇ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμιγμένον τῆς 20
 λύπης γαργαλίζει τε καὶ ἡρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δ' αὖ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ πλείον ἐγκεχυμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα,

8. γαργαλισμῶν] Tingling, internal throbbing or irritation. It is described in the next sentence, but it is not obvious what ailment is meant.

10. κνήσει] Heusde's conjecture for the κνήσει of the MSS.

11. τότε φέροντες—παρέσχοντο] "then, by exposing the external parts to fire, or rushing back for the chance of relief to the extreme of cold, the sufferer occasions to the inner parts excessive plea-

sure, and sometimes the reverse, mixed with pain or pleasure of the outer parts as the balance may incline." Πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας, ἡδονὰς, is an asyndeton for πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἢ ἡδονὰς, of which εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ is an exegesis. Of course λύπας corresponds to the preceding ἡδονὰς, and the second ἡδονὰς to τοῦναντίον. Συγκερασθείσας agrees with the first ἡδονὰς.

παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα ἀπεργαζόμενον πᾶσαν ἔκπληξιν καὶ βοὰς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἐνεργάζεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

b

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου, ὥς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἷον ἀποθνήσκει· καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ παντάπασιν αἰὲν μεταδιώκει τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν τυγχάνῃ.
10 καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύταις ὅτι μάλιστ' αἰὲν ζῶντα εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέρανας.

c

ΣΩ. Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν
15 τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντὸς κερασθέντων· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι τάναντία ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφότερα κρᾶσιν ἰέναι, ταῦτα ἔμπροσθε μὲν διήλ-
20 θομεν, ὥς ὅποταν αὖ κενῶται πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμῇ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δὲ ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὥς
ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις πλή-
θει ἀμηχάνοις οὔσι μίξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς
25 ξυμπίπτει γενομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης
τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.

We have
now ex-
amined two
kinds of

16. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι] The text is corrupt. The sense requires something like περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν αἰς ψυχῇ, or,

περὶ δὲ τῶν ὅτε ψυχῇ, &c. : "about the Pleasures where the soul," &c.

p. 47. ΠΡΩ. Ποία, φής;

ΣΩ. Ἦν αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ πολλάκις λαμβάνειν σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

e ΣΩ. Ὅργην καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον, καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς τίθεται ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἡδονῶν μεστὰς εὐρήσομεν ἡ ἀμυχάνων; ἢ δεόμεθα ὑπομινῆσκεσθαι τὸ

ὅς τ' ἐφείκε πολὺφρονά περ χαλεπῆναι,

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μελιτος καταλειβομένοιο,

p. 48. καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας ἀναμεμιγμένας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ξυμβαίνειν γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἅμα χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἅρ' οἶσθ' ὥς ἔστι καὶ τούτοις μίξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πᾶν κατανοῶ.

b ΣΩ. Παντάπασι γὰρ οὐ ῥᾶδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐν τούτῳ ξυννοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὐκ ὥς γ' εἰκεν ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσοῦτόν μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ σκοτεινότερόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾶν καταμαθεῖν τις οἶός τ' ἢ μίξιν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγοις ἄν.

Mixed Pleasures : those in which both the Pleasure and the Pain are Corporeal, and those in which one sensation is Corporeal, the other Mental : a third kind of Mixed sensations remains, namely, those which are purely Mental. If we examine as an instance of these the 15 emotion that attends the perception of the Ludicrous we shall find that it always contains a 20 Mixture of contrary feelings.

ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα p. 48.
λύπην τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς ;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν
5 πέλας ἡδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἦν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέ-
ραν ἔξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν ;

10 ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἦντινα φύσιν
ἔχει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον
ἔξεώς τινος ἐπὶ κλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονη-
15 ρίας ἐστὶ τὸ ναντίον πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ
τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ γινῶθι σαυτὸν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε. τὸ ναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ d
μυδαμῇ γινώσκειν αὐτὸν [λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ γράμ-
20 ματος] ἂν εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. ὦ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῇ
τέμνειν.

13. Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία, &c. Πονηρία τις ἔξεως τινός, is used for εἶδος τι πονηρᾶς ἔξεως τινός, "a subdivision of a species of vice." See below : ἢ μὴ φῶμεν τὴν τῶν φίλων ἔξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχη τις τὴν ἀβλαβῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις γελοῖαν εἶναι ; Mischievous self-delusions are objects of Fear or Hate, harmless of Laughter.

Ἐπὶ κλην expresses a specific name that distinguishes one

species from another. So in the Timæus : ἀέρος τὸ μὲν εὐαγέστατον ἐπὶ κλην αἰθὴρ καλούμενος ὁ δὲ θολερῶτατος ὀμίκλην τε καὶ σκότος, ἑτέρα τε ἀνώνυμα εἶδη. p. 76. Compare below : καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι γελοῖους τοιούτους φάσκων εἶναι τὰ ληθῇ φθέγγει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβερούς καὶ ἐχθρούς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τούτων σαντῶ λόγον ἀποδώσεις.

p. 48. ΠΡΩ. Πῇ φῆς ; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.

ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν ;

ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῷ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ
τρία ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον ; 5

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι
ε πλουσιώτερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος
ἔχοντες. 10

ΣΩ. Πλείους δέ γε, οἱ μείζους καὶ καλλίους
αὐτοὺς δοξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι
διαφερόντως τῆς οὐσῆς αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πολὺν δὲ πλείστοί γε, οἶμαι περὶ τὸ τρίτον 15
εἶδος τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήκασιν, ἀρετὴν
δοξάζοντες βελτίους ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

p. 49. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἄρ' οὐ σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλήθος
πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας 20
ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς ;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν
ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε. 25

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
δίχα, εἰ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον
ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὄφρ' εἶναι μίξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνωμεν δίχα, λέγεις ;

b ΣΩ. Πάντες ὅποσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῇ δόξαν περὶ 30
ἑαυτῶν ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώ-
πων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἔπ' εἶναι τοῖς μὲν

ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δέ, οἶμαι, τοῦ- p. 49.
ναντίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τοίνυν δέλεε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι
5 μετ' ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι
τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τάλληθῇ
φθέγγξει· τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ
αἰσχροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τού- c
των σαντῶ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἄγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν
10 ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά· βλαβερά γὰρ καὶ τοῖς
πέλας αὐτῇ τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσὶν· ἡ δ'
ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἵληχε τάξιν τε καὶ
φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδο-

7. τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖ-
σθαι] αἰσχροὺς is the emendation
of Schütz for ἰσχυροὺς.

9. ἄγνοια γὰρ — φύσιν] αἰσ-
χρὸν is here used in its strong-
est sense and confined to bane-
ful delusions. Harmless self-
delusions are objects of mirth
(γελοῖα) not of reprobation (αἰσ-
χρά). Aristotle's definition of
the Ridiculous seems to have
been suggested by this passage.
Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν μίμησις φαν-
λοτέρων μὲν οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν
κακίαν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ
γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον
ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώ-
δυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν· οἷον εὐθὺς
τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσchrὸν τι καὶ
διεστραμμένον ἄνευ οὐδύνης. De
Arte Poet. chap. 5. "Comedy
is the representation of faults,
not, indeed, of every degree of
badness, for the Unbeautiful is
a genus that includes other
things besides the Ludicrous.
The Ludicrous is a wrongness
and want of beauty that causes

no suffering or ruin. A ludi-
crous mask, for instance, is ugly
and distorted, without express-
ing acute pain." From his de-
finition of Fear (λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ
ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρ-
τικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ, καὶ ταῦτα ἂν μὴ
πὸ ῥῶ ἀλλὰ σὺν ἐγγὺς φαίνεται
ὥστε μέλλειν. Rhet. 2. 5) we
see that the last words are
added to distinguish, as Plato
had done, the objects of Ridicule
from the objects of this emotion.
They also distinguish them from
the objects of Pity: ἔστω δὲ ἔλεος
λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρ-
τικῷ καὶ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγ-
χάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκῇσιν
ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ
τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται. ib.
2. 8.

11. αὐτῇ τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες
αὐτῆς] "both in real life and on
the stage." Τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν
appear to correspond to this
division, and therefore may be
translated, "in fiction and in
reality."

p. 49. νῶν καὶ λυπῶν μίξις ἐν τούτοις οὐπω μοι καταφανής.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

5

ΣΩ. Λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή;

d ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὐτ' ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

10

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὀρώντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δὲ ἄρ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἵπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

15

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξο-
e καλίαν καὶ ὅσα νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἶδεσι γίνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὅπως ἀσθενῇ, μισητὰ δ' ὅποσα ἐρρώμενα. ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἕξιν ταύτην, ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ
20 τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοῖαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτήν, ἄγνοιαν οὖσαν, εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

25

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;

p. 50. ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτο ἀπεργαζόμενον;

30

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων

γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύοντας ἡδονὴν φθόνῳ, p. 50.
 λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ξυγκεραννύουσι· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον
 ὁμολογήσθαι λύπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ
 γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τούτοις τοῖς
 5 χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ b
 ἐν τραγωδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ
 βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγωδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς
 10 ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὃ Σώ-
 κρατες, εἰ καὶ τις φιλονεικοῖ πάννυ πρὸς τάναντία.

We have
 now exa-
 mined the
 three kinds
 of Mixed
 Pleasures,
 and inves-
 tigating
 their attri-
 butes have
 found them
 to be False,
 Superla-
 tively
 Great,
 (Unmea-
 sured) and
 Morbid
 or Vicious,
 (Unbeau-
 tiful).

XXX. ΣΩ. Ὅργην μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον
 καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προϋθέ-
 15 μεθα καὶ ὅποσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς φαμὲν εὐρήσειν μυγ- c
 νύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα, ἧ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου
 καὶ ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπεραυνθέντα;

20 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

1. φησὶν ὁ λόγος] It is un-
 necessary to point out the pre-
 mises in this deduction which
 can only be admitted with a
 qualification. It is obvious that
 the conclusion is false, and that
 malice is not necessarily in-
 volved in the perception of the
 ludicrous. No doubt there is
 such a thing as malicious Plea-
 sure: and rejoicing at the mis-
 fortunes of our neighbour, (ἐπι-
 χαιρεκακία,) and feeling pain at
 his prosperity, are the two in-
 gredients which compose Envy.

But is this the pleasure legi-
 timately produced by comic
 scenes? According to Plato's
 theory a man's susceptibility of
 being pleased by what is laugh-
 able, ought to be in direct pro-
 portion to his malignity, but it
 is rather in an inverse propor-
 tion. A certain irritation at
 the follies of our fellow crea-
 tures may enhance the Pleasure
 we derive from seeing them ex-
 posed in Comedy or Satire, but
 this is not Envy, and is it essen-
 tial to the Pleasure?

p. 50. ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δείξαι
 σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μίξιν; ἄρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν
 d ὅτι τὴν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ῥάδιον κράσιν ἐπιδείξαι; λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ 5
 σαντῶ ἀφεῖναι με μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκείνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύ-
 νειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ
 σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ
 μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκ-
 ραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίης 10
 με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί
 σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναι με· τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων
 e αὐριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ
 λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φί-
 ληβος ἐπιτάττει.

15

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ
 ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.

XXXI. ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μιχ-
 θείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δὴ τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους
 πορευοίμεθ' ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει.

p. 51. ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν
 ὑμῖν αὐτάς. τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν
 πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλ' ὅπερ
 εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς 25

Unmixed
 Pleasures
 are also of
 three

20 kinds: (1)
 those that
 belong to
 the sense
 of Smell,
 (2) those
 that belong
 to the
 senses of
 Sight and

3. ἄρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν] There
 is a conversational carelessness
 here: πίστεως χάριν followed by
 ὅτι ῥάδιον, must be translated
 "to convince," by ἀφεῖναι, "to
 induce:" unless we govern ἀφεῖ-
 ναι by δεῖν, as Badham proposes.

11. μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας]
 "argue till midnight." Stall-
 baum quotes from the Antho-

logy: νύκτα μέσῃν ἐποίησε τρέχων
 ποτὲ Μάρκος ὀπλίτης, "ran till
 midnight."

25. πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς]
 "that some apparent but un-
 real pleasures, and others seem-
 ingly great and numerous are,
 for all their appearance, mix-
 tures, &c." Πρὸς τό must appa-
 rently be joined with εἶναι δ'

Hearing,
and (3)
those that
belong to
the Intel-
lect.

εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ' οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας p. 51.
τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς
συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν
ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς
5 ἀπορίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμ- b
βάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ
περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ
10 τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους
ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ
ἡδέϊας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν
οὕτως;

15 ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δηλὰ ἐστὶν ἃ λέγω,
πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ c

αὐτάς, though it is an inaccuracy to say that the first set of pleasures, i. e. the relief of pain (λυπῶν ἀποφυγαί) are mixed with the relief of pain (ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν). In εἶναι δ' αὐτάς, δὲ marks the apodosis, and αὐτάς may be translated "nevertheless," "all the while." Πολλὰς must be taken not with ἐτέρας, as part of the subject, but with μεγάλας, as part of the predicate. Τὸ πολὺ is an element of the ἄπειρον, to which class Pleasure has been referred. The number, quantity (πλῆθος) of the pleasures of sense was insisted on by Philebus above, p. 27 e. See also below: τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρινές, ἢ τὸ πολὺ; and: πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότῃ τὸ... πλείστον, ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον.

16. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος κ.τ.λ.] The Beauty of the sphere is referred in the Timæus to its equality and similarity, species of Unity: which in the discussion of the Limit (πέρας) we have already found identified with Goodness. Διὸ καὶ σφαιροειδὲς, ἐκ μέσου πάντῃ πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἴσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερές αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιοτάτον τε αὐτὸ ἐντῷ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοῖον. p. 52 D. "He gave the universe a spherical form, having a middle point equidistant from every part of the circumference, and perfectly round as if produced by the turning lathe, of all figures the most perfect and self-similar, because he deemed there is ten thousand times more beauty in similarity than in dissimilarity."

P. 51. ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζώων ἢ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τórνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίπεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου μανθάνεις. ταῦτα 5 γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' αἰὲ καλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι καὶ τινας ἡδονὰς d οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κινήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα καλὰ καὶ ἡδονὰς. ἀλλ' ἄρα μανθάνομεν. ἢ πῶς ; 10

ΠΡΩ. Πειρῶμαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τῶν φωνῶν τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἐν τι καθαρὸν ἰείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων 15 ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἐπομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

6 ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁσμάς ἦττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμίχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγ- 20 χάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτ' ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον

8. κινήσεων] The emendation of Heusde for κινήσεων.

13. Λέγω δὴ τῶν φωνῶν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture. The MSS. give λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγων, which is unmeaning. It is difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of words which express sensations. A smooth sound (λεία opposed to τραχεία) is said in the *Timæus* to be ὁμοία καὶ ὁμαλή, i. e. produced by a succession of regular and equable pulsations. This is properly the definition of a sweet or musical sound. Λαμπρὰ φωνή,

a clear, brilliant, voice, is said by Aristotle, de Audibilibus, to be pure, full, and piercing. Λαμπραὶ δὲ εἰσιν αἱ σαφεῖς καὶ πυκναὶ καὶ καθαφαὶ καὶ πόρρω δυνάμεναι διατείνειν. He opposes it to τυφλή, a muffled, and κωφή, a dying sound.

20. καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει] "The mode and cause of this." The cause of painlessness in these cases is said in the *Timæus* to be the gradual and insensible degradation of the organ. See note p. 31, d.

ἄπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἶδη δύο λεγομένων p. 51.
ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ p. 52.
5 τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὐταί
πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μαθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθη-
μάτων πείνην ἀλληλόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ξυνδοκεῖ.

4. "Ἐτι δὴ τοίνυν] So we read in the N. Ethics. Καὶ ἄνευ λυπῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεούσης. 7, 12. "Distress and craving do not precede all pleasures, not intellectual activities for instance, as the natural state is not defective." In another passage Aristotle alludes to the other classes of Unmixed Pleasures: ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν. ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γιγνομένους καὶ προληπτηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπλήρωσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γὰρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνας οὖν αὐταὶ γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδένας γὰρ ἔνδειαι γεγενῆσθαι οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. "The opinion that Pleasure is a process of Becoming seems based on the nutritive Pleasures and Pains, where want and Pain precede, and Pleasure attends the supply. But it is not always so. There is no Pain in intellectual Pleasures; nor, among the Pleasures of sense, in those of smell, hearing, or

vision; nor in a great number of memories and hopes. How then can these be processes of Becoming, or where is there a want to be supplied?" Indeed the whole division of Pleasures given in this dialogue is adopted by Aristotle, and may be traced in the arrangement of his Ethics. In Book 3. c. 10, he divides Pleasures into Bodily or Sensational (σωματικαί) and Mental (ψυχικαί). He separates from the Sensational those belonging to Touch and Taste, and makes them subjects of Temperance and Intemperance, (and Book 7. c. 4.) of the principal form of Continence and Incontinence. Here we have Plato's two first classes of Mixed Pleasures. He divides the Mental into Intellectual and Emotional, instanced by the Pleasures of Knowledge (φιλομάθεια) and Ambition (φιλοτιμία); and makes the latter the subjects of the other Virtues and Vices, and of the secondary forms of Continence and Incontinence. These correspond to Plato's third class of Mixed Pleasures. The Intellectual and remaining Sensational Pleasures correspond to Plato's three classes of Unmixed Pleasures.

p. 52. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίνωνται, καθορᾶς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλ' ἐν τισι λογισμοῖς
b τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεῖς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν
χρείαν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπαρεαίνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῇ τοίνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης¹⁰ ἡμῖν λήθη γίνεταί ἐκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον;

c XXXII. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρί-
μεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν
ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ

15

The Pure
or Un-
mixed
Pleasures
possess the

13. οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων] This is said because the abundance (πλῆθος, i. e. ἀπειρία) of sensual Pleasures was insisted on by Philebus.

18. προσθῶμεν ... ἐμμετρίαν] Here too Aristotle follows closely the doctrine of the Philebus, using the terms capability or incapability of Excess, instead of the Platonic Measure or want of Measure. Thus of the Unmixed Pleasures he says: αἱ αἱεν λύπης (ἡδοναὶ) οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. Nic. Eth. 7, 14. Though he seems to say in another place that the Unmixed Sensational Pleasures are susceptible of Excess though it does not amount to Vice. Οἱ γὰρ

χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἶον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σῶφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καὶ τοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὥς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐδεὶς ἀκόλαστος λέγει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὥς δεῖ σῶφρονας, οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμήν. ib. 3, 10. "Delight in objects of vision, colours, forms, paintings, is not called Temperance or Intemperance. Yet here too apparently there is a right degree and excess and defect. And so with the objects of hearing. Excessive delight in music or eloquence is never called Intem-

characters
of Mea-
sure,
Truth, and
Beauty.

ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ του- p. 52.
ναντίον ἐμμετρίαν· καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ,
καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς
τοῦ ἀπείρου γ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἦττον καὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τε
5 σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου προσθῶμεν αὐταῖς
εἶναι γενεᾶς, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων. d

perance, nor the right degree Temperance. And so of the pleasures of smell." All the Mixed Pleasures on the contrary are susceptible of Excess. Of those of touch and taste he says: τῶν ἔξω καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅσων δ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστὶ τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐστὶν ἄλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας. ib. 7, 14. "If a moral state or course of action cannot be increased beyond the limit of what is good, no more can the corresponding pleasure: but bodily goods are capable of Excess, and the vicious pursue the Excess instead of the necessary degree." The Emotional Pleasures are susceptible of Excess, but not of so immoral an Excess as the former. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιοῦντων ἡδονὴν τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν... λέγω δὲ οἷον νίκην, τιμὴν, πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς προστιθέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ. ib. 7, 4. "Sometimes the causes of pleasure are necessities of life, at others things essentially desirable but capable of Excess,

as superiority, honour, riches, and this class of things good and pleasant. In the latter case when right reason is exceeded in spite of her monitions, the word Incontinence cannot be applied without qualification, but the subject must be added, as Incontinence of anger, of the desire of riches, of gain, of honour." And again: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων, τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἕνα φύσει αἰρετὰ, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοιούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ... πρὸς ἅπαντα δὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (τὰ φύσει αἰρετὰ) καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. ib. "As the causes of appetite and pleasure are sometimes essentially beautiful and good, and naturally desirable, at other times the reverse (the objects of brutal or diseased appetite, θηριότης) - at others again intermediate (the subjects of temperance, above called the necessities of life); in the first and third class it is not the emotion or desire or love that is to blame, but the degree of these affections when they are excessive."

6. If, as Badham proposes, we read γενεᾶς for γένους, the reading of the MSS., no other alteration is necessary. Τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν is equivalent to

p. 52. ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν διαθεατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ εἰλικρινές, ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλό-
μενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ¹⁰
ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἐκα-
τέρου καθαρὸν ἐστι, τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρὸν, ἵνα καθαρὸν
ἐκάτερον ἰὼν εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάπασι
τοῖσδε ῥᾶω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη
λέγομεν, οὕτωςι διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον ¹⁵

p. 53. ἔν τι διασκοπῶμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελώμεθα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτον, εἰ βούλει, θεασώ-
μεθα γένος. ²⁰

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν
εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλείστον ἢ τὸ ἄκρα-

τὰς μεγάλας καὶ τὰς σφοδράς, and
αἰταῖς will refer to the whole
genus of Pleasure. Socrates
thus corrects the statement of
Philebus § xv, that the whole
genus of Pleasure belongs to the
class of Infinites and says that
only those which admit of ex-
cess belong to this class. This
reference to Philebus explains
the force of γε after ἀπείρου.

16. κρᾶσιν] This is Badham's
proposal for the κρίσιν of the
MSS. The diversities of purity
are forgotten when we come to
the κρίσις (which thus, indeed,
becomes less satisfactory) but
are made of great importance
in the κρᾶσις.

20. διανοηθῶμεν] "inquire,"
"investigate."

τέστατον, ἐν ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμία μοῖρα ἄλλη μηδε- p. 53.
νὸς ἐνείη;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ' εἰλικρινὲς ὄν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτο ἀληθέστατον, ὃ
5 Πρώταρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων
θῆσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλείστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον; b

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατά γε.

ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένον
πολλοῦ λευκοῦ λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀλη-
10 θέστερον ἐὰν φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν
ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δὴ που πολλῶν δεησόμεθα
παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι
15 λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ὥς ἄρα καὶ
ξύμπασα ἡδονὴ σμικρὰ μεγάλης καὶ ὀλίγη πολλῆς c
καθαρὰ λύπης ἡδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλλίων
γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παράδειγμα
20 ἰκανόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκη-
κόαμεν ὥς αἰὲ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὖ τοῦτον τὸν
λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

25 ΠΡΩ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαί σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν,
ὃ Πρώταρχε φίλε. d

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

23. κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ κ. τ. λ.] The person alluded to is Aristippus: we are told he defined Pleasure to be a smooth movement, Pain a rough movement (in the sen-

tient organ): τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχείαν κίνησιν. Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. 14, 18. γένεσις is a species of κίνησις.

p. 53. XXXIII. ΣΩ. Ἐστὸν δὴ τινε δύω, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τούτῳ καὶ τίνε λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον αἰεὶ πεφυκός, τὸ δ' ἐλλιπὲς ἐκείνου.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικά που καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήκαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοίνυν ἐοικότα δυοῖν οὐσι δὴ ἄλλα 10
ἐζητεῖ κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ, λέγε σαφέστερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ τι λεγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τι ποικίλον, ὦ Πρώταρχε· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῶν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του 15
τῶν ὄντων ἔστ' αἰεὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ χάριν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μόγισ ἔμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Τάχα δ' ἴσως, ὦ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα

p. 54. προελθόντος τοῦ λόγου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὴ τάδε ἕτερα λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἔν.

If we now, by way of parenthesis, reconsider our first problem, we may infer from the Cyrenaic definition of Pleasure, which makes it a certain Process of Becoming, that no Pleasure can be an absolute End, or, what is synonymous, a Good.

12. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρῶ] Badham's emendation of the MSS. reading: ΣΩ. Τούτοις τοίνυν... ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρω. ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον. This might be translated: "Look for two other things related like these two wherever one thing is said to be a third to a second," i. e. "a means to a second," or,

"an end to a second." But this would suppose Protarchus already in explicit possession of the conception of Means and End, the very conception which Socrates wishes to enable him to form by generalization. With κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι compare: ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν αἰεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι § vi.

ΠΡΩ. Δύο ἀποδέχομαί σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ p. 54.
γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέ-
ρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν
5 εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο ὃ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως
ἕνεκα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστί, νῦν πυνθάνει;

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεῶν ἄρ' ἂν ἐπανερωτῶς με; b

10 ΣΩ. Τοιόνδε τι λέγω, ὧ Πρώταρχέ μοι, πότερα
πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας; καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ'
ἐστί, λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὧ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαντῶ, ὧ
15 Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὗ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμ-
μέτεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ
20 πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν, c
ἐκάστην δὲ γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκά-
στης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας
ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

25 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστί, ἕνεκά
τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται ἅν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τό γε μὴν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον
· αἰὲ γίγνεται ἅν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκείνῳ ἐστί.

9. Πρὸς θεῶν κ. τ. λ.] ἐπανερω-
τῶς seems to be the right
reading, or perhaps the rare

form ἐπανερωτῶς: "Will you
repeat the question?"

p. 54. τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἔνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὧ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιοτάτον.

d ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς 5
θήσομεν ;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ μνηύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μὴδ' ἡντιοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. 10
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελά.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

e ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐκάστοτε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται. 15

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώνμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα γένεσις ἐξιάται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἅτε ἡδονῆς οὔσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασὶ ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες καὶ τᾶλλα, ἅ 20
τις ἂν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἐπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι μὴ πάσχοντες.

p. 55. ΠΡΩ. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τούναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἄν. 25

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἰροῦτ' ἄν τις

14. τῶν ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων] "Who find their τέλος in a productive process," "who adopt a process of Becoming for their End." This alludes perhaps to the Cyrenaic definition of the End : τέλος δ'

ἀπέφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην. The words, δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελά, are of course ironical.

23. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν] The text is probably corrupt.

τουθ' αἰρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκείνον βίον, τὸν p. 55.
ἐν ᾧ μήτε χαίρειν μήτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἦν δυνα-
τὸν ὡς οἶόν τε καθαρῶτατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλή τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία

4. Πολλή τις — τιθῆται] As the question whether Pleasure is the supreme Good has been long dismissed and a very different problem is now being discussed, this argument about *γένεσις* and those which immediately follow seem to be misplaced here and we may suspect an interpolation of the whole passage from τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε down to ἀλογώτατα.

If we consider it comes from the hand of Plato we may suppose that an undercurrent of thought somewhat different to that which is expressed is intended to suggest itself to the reflecting reader. We may suppose its real drift is not to overthrow the thesis that Pleasure is the chief Good, but to suggest the narrowness of the Cyrenaic definition of Pleasure, and ridicule its inconsistency with the favourite tenet of the school. After discussing the lowest kinds of Pleasure which he agrees with the Cyrenaics in defining to be *γένεσις*, and then enumerating a higher order of Pleasures, Plato might have added, and these require a different definition, for they are neither *γένεσις*, nor attended with *γένεσις*. Instead of this he prefers tacitly to ridicule Aristippus, for excluding even these by his faulty definition from the sphere of the Good. Plato himself may have agreed with Aristotle who says, referring perhaps to this passage:

οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αἱ ἡδοναί, οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γιγνομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, ἀπὲρ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητῆν, ἀνεμπόδιτον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἰοῦνται εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἕτερον. Nic. Eth. 7, 12. "We need not infer that there is any higher good than Pleasure, because, as they say, an End is better than the productive process. For Pleasure is neither a process of production nor always attended with a process of production, but is sometimes an ultimate function and final activity, accompanying, not a process of formation but, the application of what is perfectly formed to its destined purpose. And the End of pleasures does not always lie beyond them, but beyond those only which attend the progress of our nature to its perfection. So that the true definition of Pleasure is, not a sensible formation of the normal state but, a function of the normal state when formed, and say instead of sensible, unimpeded. It is supposed to be a productive process on account of its finality, because

P. 55. *Ξυμβαίνει γιγνεσθαι, εἰάν τις την ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῇται.*

ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι λέγωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

b ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ μὴδὲ καλὸν μήτε ἐν σώμασι μήτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ εἶληχε ψυχῇ, μὴδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι; πρὸς τούτοις δὲ

the ultimate function is confounded by some thinkers with the process of production, widely as they differ."

However, even this interpretation does not account for the last words, πολλή· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῇδε —ἀλογώτατα, which can only apply to the original thesis, that Pleasure is the chief and sole Good. Shall we suppose that the Philebus is a composition of two distinct fragments, forming a well-proportioned whole, but rather carelessly soldered together in respect of some of the minuter touches? One of the fragments may have consisted of the two Ethical problems, and the solution of each by means of three criteria; the other of the exposition of Dialectical method, the list of Principles, the Classification of Pleasures and Sciences, and the Composition of the Highest Good. In confirmation of this hypothesis it may be observed, that when the criterion of Truth is applied, § 41, to ascertain the degrees of affinity of Pleasure and Knowledge to the Good, no notice is taken of the elaborate arguments of Socrates, § 21-26, to establish the

Falseness of the Mixed Pleasures; but some rather poetical logic is extemporized by Protarchus, who contributes much more to the reasoning on the first problems than to the other portions: and on the other hand no notice is taken of the fact that the Pure Pleasures were allowed, § 32, to possess Truth, Beauty, and Measure. No notice again is taken of the affinity of Reason to the divine Cause, § 16, though it tends to an immediate solution of the point in issue. Again, after Division and Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the Philebus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues. It would be interesting to know what theory was advanced by Galen, in his lost work, περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Φιλήβῳ μεταβάσεων, "On the abrupt transitions of the Philebus."

ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλγοῦντα δὲ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι p. 55.
φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε ὅταν ἀλγῇ, καὶ ἢ ἄριστος
πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντα αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει,
τότε ὅταν χαίρῃ, τοσούτῳ διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετὴν. c

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατόν
ἀλογώτατα.

XXXIV. ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως
ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ
ἐπιστήμης οἷον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανώμεν· γεν-
10 ναίως δέ, εἴ πῃ τι σαθρὸν ἡχέι, πᾶν περικρούωμεν,
ἕως ὅ τι καθαρώτατόν ἐστ' αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο κατι-
δόντες εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινὴν τοῖς τε
τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις. d

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μέν, οἶμαι, δημιουργικόν ἐστι
τῆς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν
καὶ τροφήν ; ἢ πῶς ;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνικαῖς διανοηθώμεν

12. κρᾶσιν is Schleiermacher's correction. It is required for the reason stated in the note, p. 52, e.

15. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν κ. τ. λ.] A four-fold division of Sciences is given. They are Productive or Practical (δημιουργικαὶ, χειροτεχνικαὶ) and Contemplative or Theoretical. These classes are again subdivided. The Productive are (1) Music with its group, and (2) Architecture with its group. The Contemplative are (3) Mathematics, subdivided into Pure and Applied, and (4) Dialectic or Speculative Philosophy. Physical Science would

make a fifth class, unless it is to be grouped along with Applied Mathematics. If we merge both of them in the Architectural group, we get a division identical with that in the sixth book of the Republic. We there have four classes, Ἐπιστήμη or Dialectic, Διάνοια or the Mathematical Sciences, and Πίστις and Εἰκασία. The two last are not exactly defined, but Πίστις appears to include, along with other members, Physical Science, and Εἰκασία the Mimetic arts.

19. διανοηθώμεν] "Examine."
Διάνοια = ζήτησις, Eth. Nic. 6, 9.

b. Proceeding now to examine Science, we find that its first division is into Productive and Theoretical. The Productive Sciences are subdivided into two classes, differing like the Pleasures in Purity, and represented by Music and Architecture.

p. 55. πρῶτα, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δὲ ἦττον ἔνι, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτατα νομίζειν, τὰ δ' ὡς ἀκαθαρότερα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ.

ΣΩ. Τὰς τοίνυν ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἐκάστων 5 αὐτῶν χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας καὶ πῶς;

e ΣΩ. Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἂν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετρητικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἐκάστης ἂν γίγνοιτο. 10

ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν, ἃς

p. 56. πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ τὴν 15 ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατά λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μεστὴ μὲν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ ξύμφωνον ἀρμόττουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτης στοχασμῷ καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικῇ, τὸ μέτρον 20

Theoretical Science is subdivided into Mathematics and Dialectic. The Mathematical sciences are further divided into two classes, the Popular and the Philosophic.

8. Οἷον πασῶν κ.τ.λ.] So in the Republic: τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν...οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι, ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν...λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμόν. ἥ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίνεσθαι; 7. p. 522. "Take some of the sciences of universal application; the common element, for example, that is adopted into all arts, deductions, and sciences, and that must always be mas-

tered first; I mean Arithmetic and the theory of Ratios. Is it not true that every art and science must borrow from these?"

12. εἰκάζειν] This word seems to identify the group under discussion with the fourth class of sciences in the Republic which are called Εἰκασία.

20. καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς αὐλητικῇ] καθαριστικὴ καὶ αὐλητικῇ, the theory of stringed and wind instruments, were considered an exhaustive division of instrumental music. Only αὐλητικῇ is expressed, because καθαριστικῇ is implied in ἀρμόττουσα. The

ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύουσα, p. 56.
ὥστε πολλὸν μεμιγμένον. ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν
δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέατατα.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἰατρικὴν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυ-
βερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὐρήσομεν
ἐχούσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δέ γε, οἶμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις
10 τε καὶ ὀργάνοις χρωμένην, τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ
πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν
παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ;

ΣΩ. Κατὰ τε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ
15 ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γάρ,
οἶμαι, καὶ τὸρνῳ χρῆται καὶ διαβήτη καὶ στάθμῃ καί ο
τινι προσαγωγίῳ κεκομψευμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας,
20 τὰς μὲν μουσικῇ ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάτ-

words τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορδῆς
τῷ στοχάζεσθαι φερομένης θηρεύ-
ουσα compared with μιμήσεως,
§ 38 seem to show that wind
instruments were regarded as
subordinate to stringed instru-
ments. Instead of αὐλητικῇ, αἰ
πλητικῇ has been proposed. Ἀρ-
μόττουσα would then refer to
the tuning an instrument, as
opposed to the playing upon it.
Μέτρον here must mean pitch,
not time or rhythm.

9. πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ
ὀργάνοις χρωμένην] If Plato had
foreseen the apparatus of in-
struments for detecting and

measuring phenomena that
would be placed at the com-
mand of the student of nature,
he must on his own principles
have allowed that physical in-
vestigation might some day rise
to the rank of a tolerably ac-
curate science.

16. καὶ διαβήτη κ.τ.λ.] διαβήτη
is explained to mean καθιεμένη
μολύβδος, a plummet. Στάθμη
is σχοινίον λεπτὸν ἐρυθρῷ ἢ μέλανι
χρώματι κεχρισμένον, a red line,
προσαγώγιον is τὸ τῶν τεκτόνων
ὄργανον ὃ προσάγοντες εὐθύνουσι
τὰ στρεβλὰ ξύλα.

p. 56. τονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κείσθω.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἃς νῦν δὴ πρώτας εἵπομεν. 5

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ὅσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέγξω νῦν δὴ.

d ΣΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἀλλ', ὧ Πρώταρχε, ἄρ' οὐ διττὰς αὐ καὶ ταύτας λεκτέον; ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ λέγεις; 10

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρώτον ἄρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φατέον, ἄλλην δ' αὐ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῇ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην θείη τις ἂν ἀριθμητικὴν; 15

ΣΩ. Οὐ σμικρὸς ὅρος, ὧ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθ-
e μόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βουῖς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος 20 ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρειουσάν τις θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις οὐ σμικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμὸν τευταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δὴ αὐτὰς εἶναι. 25

5. πρώτας, i. e. ἡγεμονικάς] Mathematical truths are primary because they are presupposed by the Physical sciences as their logical basis; and the study of Mathematics therefore naturally precedes the study of Physical science. The chronological order in which nature

developes the ideas is in harmony with their logical relation, if, at least, it is true that μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σόφος δὲ ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. Nic. Eth. 6. 8. "A boy may be a Mathematician but is not fit for Speculation or Physical philosophy."

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; λογιστική καὶ μετρητική ἢ κατὰ τεκτο- p. 56.
νικήν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεω-
μετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων; πότερον p. 57.
ὥς μία ἐκατέρα λεκτέον ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἂν δύο κατὰ
τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἐκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς. οὐ δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα
εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σέ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφύνασθαι
10 τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐχ ἦττον
ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἡρχόμεθα ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζήτων
ἀντίστροφον ἐνταῦθα προβεβηκέναι, σκοπῶν ἄρα b

1. λογιστική perhaps is that part of the theory of numbers which treats of Ratios (λόγοι). It is somewhat enigmatically contrasted with Arithmetic in the Gorgias. *Τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη*; — τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιον τε καὶ περιττὸν γνῶσις ὅσα ἂν ἐκά- ~~τερος~~ *τυγχάνη ὄντα*... τὴν δὲ λογισ- ~~τικήν~~ *τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην*; — τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἔχει. περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν' διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλ- ~~ληλα~~ *πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἢ λογιστική.* p. 451. "Arithmetic is one of the sciences that consider the Even and the Odd, and investigates the amount of either separately. Logistic agrees with Arithmetic up to a certain point, having the same thing, Even and Odd, for its subject. The differentia is that both the internal and external numerical relations of the Even and Odd are investigated by Logistic."

The writer of the Epinomis after saying that man was divinely taught Arithmetic by the alternations of day and night, and periodic changes of the moon, proceeds apparently to refer to Logistic. Καὶ μέχρι μὲν τούτων τε καὶ ἐν τούτοις ξύμπαν τὸ δυνατόν τῶν ζώων μάλα ἀριθμη- ~~τικὸν~~ *γέγονε, τὸ καθ' ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ σκοποῦν*· τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἀεὶ λογίζεσθαι δοκῶ μὲν μείζονος ἔνεκα καὶ τούτου σελή- ~~νην~~ *αὐξανομένην καὶ φθίνουσαν ἐμ- ποιήσας μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ξυνεστήσατο καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἡρξάτο ξυνορᾶν εἶδαι- μوني τύχη.* p. 979. These words are hopelessly corrupt, but we may gather from them that the writer regards the Relation of numbers (*μῆνας πρὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν, ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν*) as the special province of Logistic.

12. *ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζήτων ἀντί- στροφον*] "to find something analogous to pleasures," i. e. some division of the sciences

p. 57. ἐστὶ τις ἐτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφές τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἔνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς 5
ἐμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις ἄλλην τέχνην οὔσαν ἀνευρίσκει σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἄρ' οὐ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δύο καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς, 10
c πάλιν ὡς δύο ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοις αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ταῦτα πότερον ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ διδῶμεν ἀπό- 15
κρισιν;

Of these the Philosophic has the more Exactitude and Purity : Dialectic, however, otherwise called Reason or Wisdom, is the Truest and Purest Knowledge.

analogous to the division of pleasures. Προβεβηκέναι is Schleiermacher's emendation for προβεβληκέναι. It is required to form with ἐνταῦθα an antithesis to στε ἡρχόμεθα.

9. ὁμώνυμον] "an individual," or, "an indivisible species." Ὁμώνυμον in Plato is not equivalent either to ὁμώνυμον, or συνώνυμον, as defined by Aristotle. According to the latter ὁμώνυμον is a thing with an equivocal name, i. e. a name with two or more unconnected meanings : συνώνυμον, a thing with a generic name, i. e. a name denoting two or more things essentially related. Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὃν ὄνομα μόνον κοινὸν ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὅτε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον... συνώνυμα δὲ λέ-

γεται ὃν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς. Categ. p. 1. It happens that in speaking of the division of the sciences which Plato mentions in the text, Aristotle uses the word συνώνυμος : σχεδὸν δὲ συνώνυμοί εἰσιν ἔναι τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἀστρολογία ἢ τε μαθηματικὴ καὶ ἡ ναυτικὴ, καὶ ἁρμονικὴ ἢ τε μαθηματικὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν. Anal. Post. 1. 13. "The same name in a nearly univocal sense is sometimes applied to both branches; as astronomy denotes the mathematical science and a branch of the art of navigation, and harmonics both the mathematical and the æsthetic science." Here συνώνυμος means just the opposite to ὁμώνυμος in our text.

ΠΡΩ³ Ω Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγε- p. 57.
θος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινόμεθα ῥᾶον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν
5 αὐταὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ'
αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν d
ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ τε καὶ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ
ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύ-
10 οντες θαρρόυντες ἀποκρινώμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ
λόγων ὀλκὴν,

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ

II. λόγων ὀλκὴν] seems to mean "misunderstanding," "misrepresentation," "misinterpretation of a doctrine to be refuted," "doing violence to the meaning of a formula." Compare: οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς ἀλλ'...ὥς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε λέγομεν...καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει...ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπη ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι. Theaet. p. 168 c. Plato probably alludes to some of his own adversaries, perhaps the Megarian Eristici. Protagoras, however, appears to have written against the Mathematicians, asserting that nothing in nature corresponded to their definitions. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἂν εἴη μεγεθῶν οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἢ ἀστρολογία τόνδε· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ αἰσθητὰὶ γραμμαὶ τοιαῦται εἰσιν οἷας λέγει ὁ γεωμέτρης· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνθὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὕτως οὐδὲ

στρογγύλον. ἄπτεται γὰρ τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας. Arist. Metaph. p. 998 A. "On the other hand sensible magnitudes and the visible heavens can hardly be the subjects of astronomy. No sensible lines satisfy the geometrical definitions of straightness or curvature, for a ruler touches a material circle at more points than one, as Protagoras said in his Confutation of Geometry." This polemic may be alluded to here.

13. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ κ. τ. λ.] The division of the sciences into two branches, one more practical, the other more theoretical, one dealing with facts, the other with laws, one with rules, the other with principles, is again enforced in the Republic, and appears to have been indicated here for the first time. It implies a consider-

p. 57. καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται ξυνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωνωμένοι.

ΠΡΩ. Διδῶμεν τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τούτοις, οὓς φῆς δεινοὺς εἶναι, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὧ Σώκρατες. 5

ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστα εἶναι ;

able progress of scientific inquiry, and in fact furnishes a principle for the systematic co-ordination of the sciences. "Ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον διαφέρει τὸ διότι τοῦ ὅτι τῷ δὲ ἄλλῃς ἐπιστήμῃς ἐκατέρων θεωρεῖν. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστ' εἶναι θάτερον ὑπὸ θάτερον, οἷον τὰ ὀπτικά πρὸς γεωμετρίαν καὶ τὰ μηχανικά πρὸς στερεομετρίαν καὶ τὰ ἁρμονικά πρὸς ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πρὸς ἀστρολογικὴν... ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὅτι τῶν αἰσθητικῶν εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ διότι τῶν μαθηματικῶν... ἔχει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀπτικὴν ὡς αὕτη πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἄλλη πρὸς ταύτην, οἷον τὸ περὶ τῆς ἱριδος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι τὸ δὲ διότι ὀπτικοῦ. Anal. Post. i. 13. "Another contrast between law and fact is that they may belong to different sciences, which happens when two classes (or sciences) are related as species and genus. as, for instance, Optics and Geometry, Mechanics and Stereometry, Harmonics and Arithmetic, Celestial Phenomena and Astronomy... Again the same relation that Optics bears to Geometry, another science bears to Optics ; as, for instance, the theory of the rainbow. Here the facts belong to Natural Science, the explanation to Optics." A similar division is traceable in the truths of Poli-

tical philosophy. The Æsthetics of Morality are most requisite for individual practice. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Eth. Nic. i. 4. "The first step in moral knowledge is to recognise a particular duty ; and where this is sufficiently evident to sense, a man need not know the law on which it depends." Even in practice, however, we sometimes require the guidance of general ideas. "Ὡστε δεῖ ἅμφω ἔχειν (τὴν τε τῶν καθόλου φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν τῶν καθέκαστα) ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. ib. 6. 7. "Both Rational and Æsthetic morality are requisite, though more especially the latter." Ἄλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖν ἂν ἀριστα τοῦ καθ' ἕνα καὶ ἱατρός καὶ γυμναστής καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδὼς ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῦσδε... τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ τῷ βουλευμένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτε ὀλίγους νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι. ib. 10. 9. "Rules for the government of an individual would be best laid down by the physician, gymnastic teacher, or other artist who knows the universal or special law ; and so a man who has to educate whether many or few should attempt to acquire the general ideas of a legislator."

6. ἀκριβεῖς] The gradations of severity in method of the

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

p. 57.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ

different sciences, first indicated here, became an established doctrine of Logic, and is often insisted on by Aristotle. It may be interesting to cast a glance at his treatment of this subject. There are degrees of severity, he says, even in the Mathematical sciences. Ἀκριβοτέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἢ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι· καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικῆς ἀρμονικῆς· καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆς. Anal. Post. I. 27. "Priority and a higher degree of exactitude belong to the science which deals with laws as well as facts compared with another which deals with facts alone : to the science whose subject is abstract compared with another whose subject is concrete, as to Arithmetic compared with Harmonics : and to the science whose subject is relatively incomplex compared with another whose subject is complex, as to Arithmetic compared with Geometry (whose subject combines Space with Quantity)." Less rigorous demonstration is to be expected from the Natural sciences than from the Mathematical. Τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτῇ τέον ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ τρόπος, ἅπαντα γὰρ ἴσως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην. Met. D. p. 995. "The rigorous demonstration of the Mathematician is not always to be de-

manded, but only when the subject matter of a science is an abstraction. Therefore the Natural sciences have a different modality, for their subjects are always concrete." Again there is less exactitude in the Æsthetic than in the Rational branch of Morality. Ἐκείνο δὲ προδιωμολογήσθω ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύφῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἵπομεν, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι ... τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθέκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. "Let us first postulate that Moral laws are unsusceptible of precise codification, as we said above that the subject matter determines the amount of precision to be required in the propositions. And, vague as is the general theory, the details are still more indeterminate." The consideration of the different modality (τρόπος) of the different sciences, sometimes said from a narrower definition of Logic to be extralogical, was a principal function of the Aristotelian Logic. At least it is generally in reference to this office that he alludes to Logic, viewing it on this account as a general Propædæutic. Ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινες περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δεῖ ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἤκειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν. Met. T. 3. p. 1005 B. "The discussions of some Meta-

p. 57. τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.

p. 58. ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν ;

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἡ πᾶς ἂν τὴν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίῃ. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν αἰεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν. σὺ δὲ τί πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνεις ἄν ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε ἰο Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὥς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρειο
b πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ δοῦλα δι' ἐκόν-
τῶν ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δ' οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι. 15

ΣΩ. Τὰ ὅπλα μοι δοκεῖς βουλευθεῖς εἰπεῖν αἰσ-
χυνθεὶς ἀπολιπεῖν.

physicians on the modality (degree of rigour) to be required in the proofs, are due to a want of previous training in Logic. For the investigator ought to come antecedently prepared with this knowledge, and not mix up two inquiries." Παιδευμένον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογῶντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. Eth. Nic. I. 3. "He who has had the right preliminary training will measure his demands of exactitude in any province by the nature of the subject matter. For it is as illogical to demand demonstration from an Orator, as to

accept probable reasoning from a Mathematician." Διὸ δεῖ πε-
παιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτόν, ὥς ἀποπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης. Met. 2, 3: "A preparatory Education should instruct us in the right method of the various sciences, for it is out of place to inquire into the mode of investigation after we have begun to investigate."

4. Δῆλον ὅτι ἡ πᾶς ἂν] Thompson's emendation in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. XI. The reading of the MSS. is δὴλον ὅτι ἡ πᾶσαν, κ. τ. λ.

16. Τὰ ὅπλα, κ. τ. λ.] The phrase of Protarchus is elliptical. He probably meant: ἐναντίαν τίθεσθαι τὴν ψῆφον, but Socrates suggests that he was going to say: ἐναντία τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα (which

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτη, ὅπη σοι δοκεῖ. p. 58.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν αἷτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε ;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

- 5 ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐξήτουν
 πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ
 μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλείστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, c
 ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ ἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέ-
 στατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, καὶ εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὄνυνᾶσα.
 10 τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὅρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἀπεχθῆσαι Γοργία, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνη
 διδούς πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν, ἣ δ' εἶπον
 ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεία, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε
 ἔλεγον, καὶ εἰ σμικρὸν καθαρὸν δὲ εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ
 15 καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν τούτῳ γ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθε- d
 στάτῳ· καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς
 διαλογισάμενοι, μήτ' εἰς τινὰς ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν
 βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκίμιας, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε
 τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ
 20 πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἰπῶμεν διερευ-
 νησάμενοι, τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως εἰ
 ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν,
 ἣ τίνα ἐτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον. e

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπόν, οἶμαι, συγχω-
 25 ρῆσαί τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας
 ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.

we may infer from this passage would have sounded more presumptuous), but checked himself. We may translate: "But now I should not like to break with either of you."—"Break a lance with either, you were going to say, I think, but a sud-

den humility restrained you."

11. ὑπάρχειν] Badham proposes ὑπερέχειν for ὑπάρχειν and κρατεῖν δ' ἢ εἶπον for κρατεῖν ἢ δ' εἶπον. Perhaps we should read ὑπερέχειν with Badham, and change κρατεῖν ἢ δ' εἶπον into πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν δ' ἢ εἶπον.

- p. 58. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐννοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις
νῦν, ὥς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταῦτα πεπό-
p. 59. νηνται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ
δόξαν ζητοῦσι ξυντεταγμένως; εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως
ἡγεῖται τις ζητεῖν, οἶσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον 5
τόνδε, ὅπη τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπη πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπη
ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φαῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα,
ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντα αἰέ, περὶ δὲ τὰ 10
γιννόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὁ τοι-
οῦτος ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφὲς ἂν φαῖμεν τῇ ἀκρι-

2. ὅσοι] This is an obvious correction for ὅσαι. Badham would also change ταῦτα into ταύτας.

4. εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως, κ.τ.λ.] No place was expressly allotted to the Physical sciences. Unless we rank them with Practical Mathematics, we must invent a new class for them. We shall then have six altogether.

14. Τούτων οὖν τι σαφές, κ.τ.λ.] The belief in the proposition that Nature is uniform and invariable, which is the basis of the inductive sciences, appears to be partly the result of the cultivation of these sciences. At least it hardly seems to be fully realized in the ancient philosophies. Yet we find much more than its germs there, propositions, in fact, that are inconsistent with the text. In the Timæus the material element is said to be the seat of Necessity, the spiritual world the sphere

of will and freedom. Μεμιγμένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συνστάσεως ἐγεννήθη. νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλείστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτη κατὰ ταῦτά τε δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἐμφρονος οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ξυνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν. Timæus, p. 48.

"This world is the result of the meeting of Necessity and Reason. And as Reason ruled Necessity and persuaded her to produce generally the best results, it was thus, Necessity yielding to the persuasion of Wisdom, that this Universe originally arose." Aristotle repeats the same. When we reason from an End, he says, our conclusions are hypothetically necessary: that is, we only ascertain the necessary conditions of that End: but in reasoning from the material element the conclusions are ab-

βεστάτη ἀληθεία γίνεσθαι, ὧν μήτε ἔσχε μὴδὲν ^{p. 59.}
 πώποτε κατὰ ταῦτα μήθ' ἔξει μήτε εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ^b
 ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

5 ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μὴδ'
 ἡντινοῦν πῶς ἂν ποτε βέβαιον γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ
 ὅτιοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα νοῦς οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά
 10 ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε.

XXXVI. ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμέ καὶ Γορ-
 γίαν καὶ Φίληβον χρὴ συχνὰ χαίρειν ἑᾶν, τόδε δὲ
 διαμαρτύρασθαι τῷ λόγῳ. c

15 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἡ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ
 τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές,

E. We
 are now
 prepared
 to deter-
 mine the
 Composi-
 tion of the
 15 Perfect
 human life,
 and to
 solve our

solutely necessary. Φανερόν δὴ
 ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς
 τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις
 αἱ ταύτης. Physic. Ausc. 2. 9.
 "Absolute necessity in the phy-
 sical world is due to the mate-
 rial element and its operations."
 And yet, after truly criticizing
 the doctrine of Heraclitus, that
 nothing in nature is unchange-
 able, and pointing out that even
 change may obey unchanging
 laws, he immediately after-
 wards, as if dissatisfied with
 this, takes refuge in the mo-
 tions of the heavenly bodies, as
 an instance of something regu-
 lar and uniform. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα
 παρέτεες ἐκεῖνα λέγωμεν, ὅτι οὐ ταύ-
 τόν ἐστὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ
 ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον. κατὰ μὲν
 οὖν τὸ ποσὸν ἔστω μὴ μένον, ἀλλὰ

κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γινώσκωμεν.
 ἔτι δ' ἄξιον ἐπιτημῆσαι τοῖς οὕτως
 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων τὸν
 ἀριθμὸν ἰδόντες οὕτως ἔχοντα, περὶ
 ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁμοίως ἀπεφή-
 ναντο. Met. I, 5. p. 1010 A.
 "Waving this we will say, that
 there is a difference between
 change of quantity and change
 of quality. Assume that the
 quantity is variable: it is al-
 ways the Form that is the ob-
 ject of science. And there is
 another ground for censuring
 those who hold this view; for
 even among sensible objects it
 is the lesser number that sug-
 gest it, and yet all the move-
 ments of the celestial bodies
 are equally included in their
 ban of inconstancy."

γ. 59. περὶ τὰ αἰὲ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμκτότατα ἔχοντα,
ἢ δευτέρως ἐκείνων ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐστὶ ξυγγενές· τὰ δ'
ἄλλα πάντα δευτέρά τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλ- 5
λιστα ἄρ' οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιοτάτον ἀπονέμειν ;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

d ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις ἃ γ' ἂν τις
τιμήσειε μάλιστα ὀνόματα ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

10

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρα ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὄν ὄντως ἐννοίαις
ἐστὶν ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἃ γε εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρε-
σχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα.

15

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι
e πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλων μίξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημι-
ουργοῖς ἡμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρα-
κείσθαι, καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.

20

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄρ' οὐ μὴνῦναι ἐπιχειρη-
τέον ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν 25
ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι ;

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ;

ΣΩ. Ἄ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὖ δ' ἢ παροιμία

second prob-
lem.
Recapitu-
lation :

The ori-
ginal pre-
tensions of
Pleasure
and Know-
ledge were
over-
thrown by
the test of
Suffici-
ency.

12. ἀπηκριβωμένα] This word and is equivalent to πάνν or
connected with ὀρθῶς has the μάλα. ἀπηκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς=ὀρ-
force of a superlative adverb, θότατα ; "superlatively right."

δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δις καὶ τρις τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἔπα- p. 60.
ναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός. οἶμαι γὰρ οὕτω πῶς τὰ
5 τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι
ζώοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι,
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ξύμπασι, καὶ δύο
10 ὀνόματα, τὰγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἐνὶ τινὶ καὶ φύσει μιᾷ
τούτῳ ὀρθῶς τεθέντ' ἔχειν. Σωκράτης δὲ πρῶτον μὲν
οὐ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἡ
τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν
ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας
15 τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἡν
τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν
ξυνομολογοῖτο;

20 ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τὰγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν
ἄλλων.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνι;

ΣΩ. Ὡς παρὲν τοῦτ' αἰὲ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους
25 πάντως καὶ πάντη, μηδεὶς ἐτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖ-
σθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἐκάτερον
ἐκάτερον θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκάστων, ἄμικτον μὲν
30 ἡδονὴν φρονήσῃ, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ
τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσιν;

p. 60. ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

d ΣΩ. Μὴν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

XXXVII. ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, ⁵ νῦν ὅστισιν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας τιθέμενος, καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἂν οἱ καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δὴ γε ἡδονήν, εἴθ' ὥς πλείστην εἴθ' ὥς σφοδροτάτην, εἰ μήτε ἀληθῶς ¹⁰ δοξάζοι χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παράπαν γινώσκει τί ποτε e πέπονθε πάθος, μήτ' αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μὴδ' ὄντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταῦτα δὲ λέγω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδο- ¹⁵ νῶν, ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

p. 61. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἰρετόν καὶ ¹⁰ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἥτοι σαφῶς ἢ καὶ τινα

16. ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς] This is not a mere repetition of the first question (εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.) Socrates then asked whether Pleasure alone is even desirable (αἰρετόν); now, whether it is perfect (τέλεον). See the note on the distinction of τέλεον, ἱκανόν, αἰρετόν, p. 20, d.

23. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν is henceforth used to signify the ideal or supramundane Good; and τὸ

τέλεον, i. e. ὁ μικτὸς βίος, the final cause of human life, only holds the second rank. The characteristics of this latter are deduced from the attributes of the ideal Good or the divine nature. In the present dialogue, which is of a somewhat popular character, this is done without much severity of argument: but Plato appears to have pursued the same method

What is the principle of Goodness in the Perfect life? What shall we admit into the Composition of the Perfect life? We will first admit what we have ascertained to be the Truest Pleasures and Sciences, namely, the Purest.

τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵν' ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ p. 61.
δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μὲν τινα ἐπὶ τάγαθον εἰλήφα-
5 μεν ;

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα ;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἴ τις τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν
οἶκησιν πρῶτον ὀρθῶς, ἵν' οἰκεῖ, πύθοιτ' αὐτοῦ, μέγα ὅ-
τι δὴ πού πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν αὐτὸν ἔχει τοῦ ζητουμένου.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὗ ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ
καὶ κατ' ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βίῳ τάγαθον
ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μικτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

15 ΣΩ. Ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μιχθέντι καλῶς τὸ
ζητούμενον ἔσσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μῇ ;

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὧ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραν-
νύομεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἡφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ὁ
20 ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

in his more scientific ethics. In thus basing his Political philosophy on theological or metaphysical considerations he differs from Aristotle. The latter makes conceptions of the end of practice and production the ultimate premisses of Practical and Productive sciences. The connection of the specific Goods proposed as ends by the practical and productive reason with the transcendent Good or with the general laws of Goodness he ex-

cludes from Art and Moral science and assigns to Speculative philosophy. One of his most tangible reasons for this is, that moral truths are more evident than truths of theology or philosophy, and therefore it would be illogical to base the former on the latter. Ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖ βουλόμενόν τι δεικνύναι τοῖς μὴ φανεροῖς παραδείγμασι χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ταῦτα γὰρ φανερώτατα. Magn. Mor. i. 1.

p. 61. ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρε-
στᾶσι κρῆναι, μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς
ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ αἰοῖνον
αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινὸς ὕδατος· ὥς προθυμητέον
ὥς κάλλιστα συμμινύναι. 5

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

d ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἄρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ
φρονήσει μινύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοι-
μεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως. 10

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές. ἥ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν
μινύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινὰ ἀποφῆνασθαι ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὥς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον
ἐτέρας ἄλλῃ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα; 15

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

e ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἥ μὲν
ἐπὶ τὰ γιννόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἥ
δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μῆτε γιννόμενα μῆτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ
ταῦτά δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα αἰεί. ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθές 20
ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τάληθέστατα τμήματα ἐκατέρας
ἴδοιμεν πρῶτον ξυμμίξαντες, ἄρα ἱκανὰ ταῦτα ξυγκε-
κραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέ- 25
χειν ἡμῖν, ἥ τινος ἔτι προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοι-
ούτων;

15. τέχνη] Here τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη are used in the Aristotelian sense, the one as ποιητικὴ ἐπιστήμη, the other as θεωρητικὴ. As ἡ ἐπὶ τὰ γιννόμενα κ.τ.λ. refers to applied mathematics and physical science, it seems that

these ought to be considered a third or third and fourth division of the theoretical science, and placed between the arts and the other theoretical sciences, so as to make five or six divisions in all.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δρᾶν οὕτως.

p. 62.

These alone are not Sufficient; we must therefore superadd the Mixed or Impure Sciences.

XXXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐστω δὴ τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὃ τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
5 πάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐστω γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει κύκλου μὲν καὶ σφαίρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τού-
10 τοὺς ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλ- b
λοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις;

5. διανοούμενος in the Republic is an epithet appropriated to the Mathematician. It appears used designedly here to express with φρονῶν the two first divisions of Science.

9. ταύτην] Ταῦτα and τάδε are used in Plato like τὰ δεῦρο in Aristotle, to express the present, sensible world.

10. καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κύκλοις] "Who uses when he builds a house the other rules to the same extent that he uses the circles:" i. e. who, instead of material instruments and measures, has only the ideal or conceptional line, angle, square, &c. to guide his handiwork.

By the divine sphere and divine circle we must apparently understand, not ideas, but the intermediate world (τὰ μετὰξύ) whose existence, as we learn from Aristotle, was maintained by Plato. As the Mathematical sciences intervene in his arrangement between Natural science and Philosophy, so

he makes a corresponding set of objects, the Mathematical world (τὰ μαθηματικά) intervene between Nature and the world of Ideas. We learn this from Aristotle, for we should hardly have discovered it from the writings of Plato, though it harmonises with the following passage of the Republic: Ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπεὶ περ ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποικιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγείσθαι δεῖ καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολλὴ ἐνδεῖν ὥς τὸ ἐν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὐσα βραδύτης ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθεσι σχήμασι φορὰς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόητα φέρει. ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτὰ, ὅψει δ' οὐ. Z. p. 529. "This celestial mechanism, as after all its material is visible, is doubtless most beautiful and most exact of its kind, but falls far short of the true motions which real velocity and real slowness in true numbers and true configurations perform in due correspondence as they whirl round the veritable spheres: all which things

p.62. ΠΡΩ. Γελοΐαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὖσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμας λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φής; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ κύκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγκρατέον; 5

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκάστοτε ἐξευρῆσειν οἴκαδε.

c ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μουσικὴν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν στοχάσεώς τε καὶ μιμήσεως μεστὴν οὖσαν καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν; 10

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, ἔπερ γε ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὅπως οὖν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν; 15

d ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὖν ἔγωγε οἶδα, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὃ τί τις

are an object of ratiocination and reflexion, but not of sight." These true motions, &c. are διανοητά, not νοητά, i. e. mathematical, not ideal.

Aristotle himself admits the objective reality (ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπλῶς) of the subjects of pure mathematics, but identifies them with the material world, abstraction being made (ἐξ ἀφαρέσεως) of its other physical properties (τὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως). Δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεγεθῶν εἶναι καὶ λόγους καὶ ἀποδείξεις, μὴ ἢ δὲ αἰσθητὰ ἀλλ' ἢ τοιαδί... ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἀπλῶς λέγειν ἀληθὲς μὴ μόνον τὰ χωριστὰ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ...καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοιαῦτά γε οἷα λέγουσιν...ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο ὁρθῶς οἱ γεωμέτραι λέγουσι

καὶ περὶ ὄντων διαλέγονται καὶ ὄντα ἔστί. Arist. Met. M. p. 1077 B. "Sensible quantities then may be subjects of reasoning and demonstration, not as sensible but as quantities...and as objective reality is truly ascribed not only to substances, but also to their attributes, the subjects of mathematics have objective reality and yet satisfy the scientific definitions...So that the language of geometers is correct, and the subjects they reason about are existent realities."

9. μιμήσεως] This seems to be an oversight of Plato's, for there has been no mention of μίμησις, unless, indeed, it is a synonym of στοχασμός. See p. 56, a.

ἀν βλάβοιτο πασας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, p. 62.
ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθιώ δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας ρεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς
'Ομήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχὴν;

5 ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

We must also admit the Necessary and the Virtuous Pleasures; but the Greatest Pleasures must be excluded.

XXXIX. ΣΩ. Μεθῖνται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν
τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἰτέον. ὥς γὰρ διανοήθημεν αὐτὰς
μιγνύναι, τὰ τῶν ἀληθῶν μόρια πρῶτον, οὐκ ἐξεγένεθ'
ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταύ-
10 τὸν μεθῖμεν ἀθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὡρα δὴ βουλευέσθαι νῦν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡδο-
νῶν, πότερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ
τούτων πρώτας μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσαι ἀληθεῖς.

15 ΠΡΩ. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γε ἀσφάλειαν πρώ-
τας τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείσθων δὴ. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἄρ' οὐκ
εἰ μὲν τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ξυμμικτέον καὶ
ταύτας;

20 ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ; τὰς γε ἀναγκαίας δῆπουθεν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε καὶ καθάπερ τὰς τέχνας πάσας p. 63.
ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι διὰ βίου,
καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτα λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, εἴπερ

2. ἔχων τὰς πρώτας] This expresses a condition. Socrates is made to say in the Republic: 'Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθαι, οὐ γάρ μου κατερέετε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς, λῶβῃ ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα (τῆς μουσικῆς ὅση μιμητικὴ) τῆς τῶν ἀκονόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. I. p. 595. "Between

you and me, as you will not betray me to the tragic poets and other professors of the mimetic arts, serious injury is inflicted by all these imitations on the hearers' souls, unless they possess an antidote in the knowledge of the reality."

4. μισγαγκείας.] ὥς ὅτε χεῖμαρ-
ροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεσφι ρέοντες ἐς
μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὕβριμον
ὑδωρ. Iliad. 4, 452.

p. 63. πάσας ἡδονὰς ἡδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν
ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασιν, πάσας ξυγκρατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων λέγωμεν ;
καὶ πῶς ποιῶμεν ;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρή, τὰς ἡδονὰς δὲ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπυνθανο-
b μένους τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλήλων πέρει.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΣΩ. ὦ φίλοι, εἴτε ἡδονὰς ὑμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύ-
ειν εἴτε ἄλλῳ ὀφροῦν ὀνόματι, μὴν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε 10
οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν ;
Οἶμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον
εἶναι λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον 15
καὶ ἔρημον εἰλικρινὲς εἶναί τι γένος οὔτε πάνν τι
c δυνατόν οὔτ' ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγούμεθα
γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ
γινώσκειν τὰλλὰ τε πάντα καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῶν ἡμῶν
τελέως εἰς δύναμιν ἐκάστην. 20

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γε εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. πάλιν τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν φρό-
νησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον. Ἄρ' ἡδονῶν τι
προσδεῖσθε ἐν τῇ ξυγκράσει ; φαῖμεν ἂν αὖ τὸν νοῦν
τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. Ποίῳν, φαῖεν ἂν 25
ἴσως, ἡδονῶν ;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός.

d ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν
ὅδε. Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσομεν,
ἄρ' ἔτι προσδεῖσθ' ὑμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ξυνοί- 30

19. καὶ αὐτὴν αὐτῶν] Construct ἐκάστην with αὐτήν. The MSS.
read αὖ τὴν αὐτήν.

κους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδροτάτας ; Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώ- p. 63.
 κρατες ; φαῖεν ἄν, αἷ γ' ἐμποδίσματά τε μυρία ἡμῖν
 ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι διὰ
 μανικὰς ἡδονάς, καὶ γίνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ
 15 ἐῷσι τὰ τε γιγνόμενα ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, δι' ε
 ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθεί-
 ρουσιν ; ἄλλας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἅς
 εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις
 τὰς μεθ' ὑγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμ-
 10 πάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὁπαδοὶ γιγνό-
 μεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντη, ταύτας μίγνυ-
 τὰς δ' αἰεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπο-
 μένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μίγνυναι τὸν βουλό-
 μενον ὅ τι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην
 15 μίξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι, τί ποτε p. 64.
 ἔν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα
 ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐμφρό-
 νως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν
 ὑπὲρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρί-
 20 νασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα ;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ
 ἄλλως ἂν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν ἐν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

25 ΣΩ. Ὡς μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦτο
 ἀληθῶς γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἶη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ;

4. ἡδονάς] For this Stallbaum
 proposes ἐπιθυμίας, and some
 such correction seems necessary.

8. οἰκείας seems equivalent to
 συγγενεῖς or ὁμοειδεῖς : φανερὴ δ'
 ἂν τοῦτο (τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν τὰς
 ἡδονάς) καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνεκείωσθαι

τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν
 τελειοῖ... τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ εἶδει καὶ τὰ
 οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. Eth. Nic.
 10. 5.

18. ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν] for νου-
 χόντως : "characteristically," i. e.
 "rationally," "intelligently."

b

p. 64. XL. ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἴ τις οὗτος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σύ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμφύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.

c ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις καὶ τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφειστάναί τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου λέγοντες ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἂν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν ; 10

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστα αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγο-

If we now inquire what is the element of Goodness in this Mixture, we shall find that Goodness always manifests itself in three great characters, Beauty, Symmetry, and Truth

2. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ — φαίνεται] “An ordering law, unembodied, but fit to govern an embodied soul, seems to be traced in the outline we have drawn.” Κόσμος and ἄρξων are both originally political terms, i. e. express a kind of efficient cause, but are here applied by a natural metaphor to the final cause, i. e. the End we propose and which governs our actions. Ἄρχῃ, however, was applied without a metaphor to signify the End, as soon as it came to mean properly a logical principle or first premiss. Οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, οὗτιδῆποτε ὄν. Eth. Nic. 6. 12. “Practical reasonings have for their ultimate premiss some conception or definition of the End, whatever it may be.” The λόγος of which Socrates speaks is the definition of the τέλειον ἀγαθόν.

13. αἴτιον] This word was

before used in reference to this point : Τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιώμεθ' ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον ὁ δ' ἡδονὴν εἶναι. § 11. We must not confuse αἰτία in this sense with the αἰτία mentioned in chap. 14, as one of the four principles. There αἰτία signified the Efficient cause, here, to use Aristotelian terms, the Formal cause ; i. e. the definition of an attribute, by which as a middle term its inherence in a given subject may be proved. These ideas are quite as distinct in Plato's Philosophy as in Aristotle's. Αἰτία as the Formal cause is identical with the πέρας of this dialogue. It is curious that in the Phædo the same transition is made from the Efficient to the Formal cause ; only there it is made avowedly, here tacitly. After mentioning that Anaxagoras had disappointed him by promising to explain the Efficient and Final

νέναι προσφιλή τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ p. 64. ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴθ' ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφύεστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ξυνέστηκεν.

5 ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν δ ἐστὶ ξυμφορώτατον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἡ παντὸς ἀξία γίνεταί ἥτισ- οὖν ἡ τὸ παραπάνω οὐδενός.

10 ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶς που τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχούσα ἥτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ
15 ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τὰ τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις, ἀλλὰ τις ἄκρατος, ξυμπεφο- ρημένη ἀληθῶς, ἡ τοιαύτη γίνεταί ἐκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμφορά.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

20 ΣΩ. Νῦν δὲ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τάγαθου δύνα- μίς εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμ-

causes of things, and then only indicating Material causes, Socrates is made to say that he then betook himself to the investigation of the Ideas or Formal causes. He then applies the word αἰτία to the Idea or Form: e. g. οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πῶς ἐκάστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετασχῇ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάμεως μετέσχευιν. p. 101.

3. ἐν τῷ παντὶ] = ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει.

16. οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις—ξυμφορά]
“for it is no composition, but a

discordant jumble of elements in truly disastrous confusion.” Ἄκρατος has a double meaning: as connected with ξυμφορά in its etymological sense of putting together, it means the negation of κρᾶσις, and as connected with ξυμφορά in its ordinary sense of calamity, it means unmitigated.

21. μετριότης γὰρ κ. τ. λ.] Beauty and Measure are identified in the Timæus: πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν οὐκ ἄμετρον καὶ ζῶον οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐσόμενον ξύμμετρον θεῶν. p. 132. “The good is always beautiful, and

p. 64. μετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμίσθαι.

5

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέα τὸ ἀγαθὸν
p. 65. θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ
καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὥς τοῦτο οἶον ἐν ὀρθότατ' ἂν
αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὥς
ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

XLI. ΣΩ. Ἡδὴ τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς
ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὅστις οὖν κριτῆς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ
b φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου ξυγγε- 15
νέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ
θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον μὲν, ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελ-
θεῖν βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἑκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν 20
ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ
μᾶλλον ξυγγενὲς ἑκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμούμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετρίότητος
πέρι λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Naί. πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώ- 25
ταρχε· καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ
c ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, ἀπό-

These are easily seen to be more akin to Reason than to Pleasure ; and we are now in a position to establish a scale of the different gradations of Goodness. The first place belongs to the Eternal Archetype: the second to Derivative Perfection : the third to Reason and Wisdom : the fourth to Science

the beautiful has measure : therefore an animal to be good and beautiful must have symmetry." So in the Sophista : ἀλλ' αἰσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνόν

γένος ; p. 228 a, "want of beauty is nothing but want of measure, which is unsightly wherever it is found." So in Aristotle moral beauty is τὸ μέσον, which is synonymous with τὸ μέτριον.

and True
Opinion :
the fifth to
Pleasures
Unmixed
with Pain :
the sixth to
Pleasures
in the train
of Virtue.

κρῖναι σαυτῷ πότερον ἡδονὴν ἑυγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς p. 65.
ἀληθεία.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, δια-
φέρετον. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον,
§ ὥς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὰ φροδίσια,
αἱ δὲ μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγ-
γνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὥς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν
ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων· νοῦς δὲ ἄ
ἥτοι ταῦτόν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν
ιοτε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύ-
τως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις
ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται.

ΠΡΩ. Εὐσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέ-
15 βληκας. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδέν

4. ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ] It must be confessed that at this point of the dialogue the argument drops a little of its severity. Violent Pleasures of sense were excluded from the best life, and ought to have been from the comparison with Knowledge : and yet it is to these kinds of Pleasure that the answer of Protarchus refers.

When Reason is said to be identical or nearly identical with Truth, we verge very closely upon a fallacy of equivocation. When Truth was adopted as one of the tests of the Highest Good, the word must have been taken in a general sense, including genuineness, reality, substantiality, attributes capable of application to Pleasure. At least if it was taken in the more limited sense in which it is a quality of propositions and

thoughts and nearly identical with right Reason, a Cyrenaic might fairly contend that it was a *petitio principii* to make it one of the distinctive marks of the Good.

15. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.] The same may be said about the criterions of Measure and Beauty that we observed about the criterion of Truth. Protarchus in his comparison only refers to the Pleasures that ought to have been excluded from the competition : and it was allowed, chapter 32, that the Pure Pleasures possess the attribute of Measure. Aristotle alludes to this distinction : λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὀρίσθαι τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον... μὴ ποτε δ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἐάν ᾧσι. αἱ μὲν ἀμειγείαι αἱ δὲ μικταί. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. "The Plato-

p. 65. τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὐρεῖν ἂν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδ' ἂν εἴν ποτε.

nists argue that the Good is determinate (measured) and Pleasure indeterminate, because susceptible of gradation. But do they not lay the want of determination (measure) at the wrong door, if (as they own) some Pleasures are mingled with Pain (which may account for the gradation)?” He also denies the tacit assumption of the Philebus that the Mean is a point, and that therefore whatever has extension or intension, even if it has a point of coincidence, must necessarily be excessive or defective in its other gradations. He regards the Mean or normal state as having a certain breadth of range. As the abnormal state is not infinite, but the abnormal variations from the mean have their limits or bounds of possibility; so the normal state is not a point, but there are normal variations within certain maxima and minima. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἔστω, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός. *ib.* “The proportion of opposite vital forces that constitutes health varies in different persons and in the same individual, and is not destroyed by diminution or augmentation within certain limits.” Καὶ πρῶτόν γε εἰς ἀλλήλα τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὅσα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον. *De Gen. et Cor.* 2. 6. “Nature’s first process is the tempering of the elementary ex-

tremes by admixture: next the formation of the animal and other tissues, when the elements have been reduced to a mean; and the mean has a wide range, and is not an indivisible point.” From Plato’s own definition of Pleasure we see that it is intimately related to the limit (πέρας) or normal state (φύσις), synonyms of Measure or the law of goodness. In Aristotle’s definition: *ἔστι τὸ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ τοιαῦτα. De An.* 3. 7. “Pleasure and Pain are the action of the Sentient Mean towards what is good or evil in reference to its goodness or evil:” Pleasure is regarded as the subjective emotion corresponding to objective Measure or beauty, just as the sensation of colour corresponds to its material conditions, or the perception of figure to the configurations of external nature. So far, then, from being intrinsically void of Measure, it is Measure passing into consciousness.

It is true that Reason is exclusively related to the most important, dominant, or architectonic Measure (we may call it the moral law), whereas Pleasure, though related to this, is equally related to partial and subordinate laws. In virtue of this supremacy of a certain measure, wherever the inferior measures are in collision with it they cease to be measures.—Pain, the violation of some physical law, may be demanded to restore the balance

ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὁμῶς δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. p. 65.
 νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλείον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς^e
 γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοῦναντίον ;

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὃ Σώ-
 5 κρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὐθ' ὕπαρ οὐτ' ὄναρ αἰσχροὺν
 οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνό-
 μενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον ;

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονὰς δέ γε πού, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς
 10 μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὄντινόν, ἢ τὸ γε-
 λοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἰσχιστον ἐπόμενον
 ὁρῶντες αὐτοὶ τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπ- p. 66.
 τομεν ὅ τι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες,
 ὥς φῶς οὐ δέον ὀρᾶν αὐτά.

15 ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τε
 ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὥς ἡδονὴ
 κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον
 μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ

of the moral scales; and Pleasure, the indication of the Senses that an object presents the due proportions when tried by sensuous weights and standards, may be condemned on a moral mensuration, as violating a more imperative proportion. Reason, then, in virtue of its exclusive relation to the absolute and overruling law, may be said to have a greater affinity to law or Measure than any other faculty or element of the soul.

17. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ κ. τ. λ.]
 Κτῆμα appears to be understood. Aristotle, indeed, says that the transcendent and eternal Good cannot be *πρακτὸν* or *κτητόν*, i. e. created or called into existence by the act of man. But the

reason for not applying these epithets ceases as soon as we exclude from them the notion of production.

It may seem strange to apply a word like Measure, which essentially implies relation, to the Absolute Being. But Plato connects the idea of Measure with Perfection. Ἄλλὰ μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολείπον καὶ ὀτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐδὲν μέτριον γίγνεται ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδένος μέτρον. Rep. 6. p. 504. "A measure of such inquiries that wants an iota of the truth is not a true measure: for imperfection is inconsistent with measure." And we must remember that in the Ideal theory the being and goodness of the phenome-

p. 66. πάντα ὅποσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν αἰδιον ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

b ΣΩ. Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν

nal and dependent world consist in an approximation and assimilation to the eternal prototype of being and goodness, which thus acquires the relative character of a Standard or Measure. What is implied in our text is stated explicitly in the Laws. 'Ο δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις ὥς φασιν ἄνθρωπος. 4. p. 716. "The Divinity is everywhere the Measure, not, as some imagine, Man." Πλάτων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι μακρὰν τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἐπιμμεῖσθαι δὲ γε θέλουν ἅπαντα. Theoph. Met. "Plato and the Pythagoreans said that though there is a vast interval between the Divinity and the universe, it is an exemplar which all things strive to imitate."

It is difficult to distinguish καίριον from μέτριον. It can here express no relation of time. In Hesiod *καιρὸς* is coupled with μέτρον, and seems to express what was afterwards called the Golden Mean. Μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι *καιρὸς δ' ἐν πᾶσι ἄριστος*. In the *Politics* it is associated with τὸ μέτριον and τὸ μέσον. Δῆλον ὅτι διαίρομεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικὴν ταύτη δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπίσας τέχνας ὅποσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ παχύτητας πρὸς τοῦναντίον μετροῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ὅποσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρόπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀποκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων. p. 384. It was after-

wards limited to expressing the auspicious moment, the mean between too soon and too late, missed alike by precipitation and procrastination.

1. ὅποσα...φύσιν] It is hard to say whether ὅποσα or φύσιν is the subject of ἡρῆσθαι. Perhaps it is better to consider ὅποσα governed by ἡρῆσθαι, and translate: "whatever similar attributes the eternal essence must be deemed to combine."

4. Δεύτερον μὴν κ.τ.λ.] We must not suppose from this that τὸ καλὸν and τὸ τέλειον differ from τὸ μέτριον, in that they are confined to the phenomenal manifestation of the Good. We have just seen that they are attributes of the transcendent Good. This if necessary might be further proved from other passages: e. g. περὶ δὲ κάλλους ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μετ' ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ἰὼν δευρὸ τε ἐλθόντες κατελήφμεν αὐτό. Phædrus, p. 250. "We saw Beauty resplendent in the Ideal world, and have found it again when we came into this." 'Ἄλλ' ἐάν τις μοι λέγῃ διότι καλὸν ἐστὶν οἷον...τὰ μὲν ἅλλα χαίρειν ἐῷ...τοῦτο δ'...ἔχω παρ' ἑμαυτῷ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἶτε παρουσία εἶτε κοινωνία. Phæd. p. 100. "In any discussions on the cause why any object is beautiful, I disregard all other explanations, and feel sure that nothing makes it beautiful but the presence or communication of that Ideal Beauty."

So in the *Timeus* τὸ τέλειον is

καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἰκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς p. 66.
αὐτῆς ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐοικε γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖνυν τρίτον, ὥς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν
καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεῖς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας
παρεξέλθοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς
ἐθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς
λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, ο
ἐπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῇ;

ΠΡΩ. Τάχ' ἂν.

repeatedly applied, not only to the created universe, but to its ideal archetype. e. g. τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τέλει μάλιστα αὐτὸν ὁ θεὸς ὁμοιωσαί βουληθεῖς, ζῶν ἐν ὁρατῶν, πάνθ' ὅσα αὐτοῦ κατὰ φύσιν συγγενῇ ζῶα ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ, ξυνέστησε. p. 30. "As that of the objects of reason which is most beautiful and all perfect (himself) was proposed by the Divinity as a pattern for his work, he formed the world a living being, single and visible, comprehending within it all living beings of a kindred nature." Of course the natural universe bears the same relation as the perfect human life to the Ideal Good: except that nature is an actual perfection, while the perfect life has to be actualized by the human will, allied in this respect to the divine Cause.

Ἀλήθεια is passed over in this enumeration. Of course like τὸ μέτριον, τὸ καλόν, and τὸ τέλεον, it has its place originally in the first rank, and derivatively in the second and

others. In the Republic Truth is imparted by the Good to the other ideal existences. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γινωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν τὴν τἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι...οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ καλλίον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσει. Rep. 6. p. 508. "The source of truth to the objects of knowledge, and of knowledge to the soul, may be identified with the Ideal Good...and beautiful as both of these, truth and knowledge are, it is distinct from both, and still more beautiful."

4. Τὸ τοῖνυν τρίτον] The Reason here mentioned is the human Reason. We have seen before that it is akin to the divine Reason, as being creator or efficient Cause. The divine Reason is identical with the Ideal Good, and is not only the Efficient or transcendent, but the Essential or Formal, i. e. immanent, cause of being and goodness.

p. 66. ΣΩ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ὥς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, ἀλύπους
ὀρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες, τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς,
ἐπιστήμας τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἰσως.

ΣΩ. Ἐκτη δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαύ-
σατε κόσμον αἰοδῆς. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος
λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὲ
d μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν
ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

XLII. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν
αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.

Recapitu-
lation.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Φίληβος τὰγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι
πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῇ.

15

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἔοικας, ἔλεγε
ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

e ΣΩ. Naί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν. ἐγὼ
γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα, καὶ δυσ-
χεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ 20
ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὥς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς
εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ 25

3. ἐπιστήμας τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν
ἐπομένας] This is obviously the
true reading. The MSS. give,
ἐπιστήμας ταῖς δέ. It refers to
chapter 31, where some pure
Pleasures are said to be sensa-
tional, others intellectual.

25. Ὑποπτεύων δέ γε κ.τ.λ.] In
the Eudemian Ethics we have a

recapitulation of the proposi-
tions discussed in the Philebus,
and also an indication of the
point which prevents it from
being regarded as a systematic
or exhaustive ethical treatise,
viz. the omission of the claims
of the active life (πρᾶξις, ἀρετή.)
τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακα-

εἶπον, ὥς εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ p. 66.
τῶν δευτερείων νῶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυνδιαμαχοίμην,
ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.

p. 67.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατον τού-
τον οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μὴ τοι τάγαθόν γε αὐτὸ
10 μῆδ' ἕτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι, στερόμενον αὐταρκείας καὶ
τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος
τούτοις ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον
15 καὶ προσφύεστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος b
ιδέα.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ
λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.

ρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μά-
λιστα τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἰρετω-
τάτοις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν
μέγιστον εἶναι φασὶν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ
τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ
πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ
μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι,
συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον
θατέρον μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν· οἱ μὲν
ὥς οὖσαν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνη-
σιν, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετὴν, οἱ δ'
ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ
τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων,
τοῖς δ' ἐκ δύοιν, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἐνὶ τινι
τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως. I. I.
"Happiness and a blest and
beautiful life will depend on
three things, which are held to
be the highest objects of de-

sire. For Wisdom, Virtuous
Action, and Pleasure, are each
maintained by different per-
sons to be the greatest Good.
And viewed as merely ingre-
dients of happiness, their com-
parative importance is some-
times disputed, what they con-
tribute to it being variously
estimated; some attributing a
superiority to Wisdom over
Virtue, others to Virtue over
Wisdom, others to Pleasure
over both. For some think
that all of them in conjunction,
others that two of them, others
that one alone constitutes a
happy life."

p. 67. ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικεν.


ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βοες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τᾶλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν. οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ⁵ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρήσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμέν ἅπαντες.

10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πού σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν. ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.



APPENDIX A.

Ἐν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν
λεχθέν.

§ 1. The paradox that the One is Many and the Many are One was very celebrated in early Greek philosophy, and is often mentioned in the works of Plato, who indeed in a modified sense adopted it as a principle. It was first expressed by Zeno the Eleatic in defence of the tenet of his school, that Being is One and immutable. Kant, in modern times, to demonstrate that the human intellect is only capable of reducing phænomena to their laws, and is utterly unable to comprehend real or spiritual existence, attempted to establish the Antinomies of reason; that is, to shew that whenever we attempt to reason on any thing but phænomena we are driven by an equal logical necessity to contradictory conclusions, which should be regarded as a symptom that we are attempting a problem beyond the reach of our understandings. Long before this, Zeno had employed a similar *reductio ad impossibile* to establish the opposite doctrine. He attempted to shew that if we believe in the reality of the changing world of nature we must admit that contradictory propositions can be true together: e. g. that what is One is Many and what is Many is One. But as it is the most deep-seated conviction of reason that contradictories cannot be true, he argued that the assumption we started from must have been erroneous, and that the phænomenal world must be an illusion. These seeming existences that involve us in so absurd conclusions are nothing; only the One and immutable is. In the words of Parmenides

Paradoxes about Unity and Multiplicity: The Eleatics, who maintained the Unity of Being and unreality of phænomena, endeavoured to prove that, if we believe in the reality of phænomena, we must admit that Unity is Multiplicity, and thus contradict the most self-evident truth.

τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἐστίν
ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκί,
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροῶ φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

“Wherefore all are but a name

That mortals deem to be realities,
Birth and decay, to be and not to be,
And change of place and loss of brilliant hue.”

The sort of coexistence of opposites that he succeeds in establishing is that which Plato here puts into the mouth of Protarchus. In the language of Platonism it arises from the "participation" of individuals of the sensible world in the ideas. *Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοία τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ᾦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφοτέρα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι· οὐδέ γε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὐ μετέχειν· ἀλλ' εἰ, ὃ ἔστιν ἐν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει, τοῦτο ἥδη θαυμάσομαι.* Parm. 129 b. "If a man proved likeness was unlikeness or unlikeness likeness, he would astonish me: but if he only proved that what participates in each of these Ideas has each of these attributes, I should not be astonished, Zeno. Nor should I, if he proved all things One by participation in Unity, and at the same time Many by participation in Multiplicity. But he would surprise me if he could prove Unity to be Multiplicity, or Multiplicity to be Unity."

The Megarian school who maintained, not the reality of phenomena, but, the Multiplicity of Being, avoided the Eleatic conclusions by supposing the various Ideas, or elements of Being, to exist in complete isolation.

§ 2. The Megarian school, who differed from the Eleatics so far as to allow a multiplicity of Beings or Ideas, seem to have been so far convinced by Zeno's arguments as to deny the power of distinct Ideas to be combined in propositions. They recognised identical propositions such as man is man, but not synthetical propositions, such as man is white. They seem to have thought that the latter would involve the Zenonian absurdity that the Same is One and Many. They accordingly argued against their admissibility by deducing various contradictions from them in the manner of Zeno. They are alluded to in the Sophista.

Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὃν τινά ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν...λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δήπου πόλλ' ἅττα ἐπονομάζοντες, τάτε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετάς· ἐν οἷς πᾶσι καὶ ἑτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν εἶναι φαμέν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερα ἁπειρα. καὶ τᾶλλα δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἑκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγομεν...ὅθεν γε οἶμαι τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι θοίνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον, ὥς ἀδύνατον τά τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι.

καὶ δῆπου χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἔωτες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον— ἐντυγχάνεις γὰρ ὡς ἐγῶμαι πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔσπουδακόσιν, ἐνιοτέ πρεσβυτέροις ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσσοφον οἰομένοις τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀνευρηκέναι. 251 A. “Let us indicate in what way this Same has Many names given it. When we speak of man we apply many epithets to him, attributing to him colours, and shapes, and sizes, and virtues, and vices. Whereby, and by ten thousand other words, we call him not only man, but an infinite variety of other things. And other objects in a similar manner we first suppose One, and afterwards call a Multitude of things by a Multitude of names. Whereby no doubt we have prepared a banquet for young philosophers and old men behindhand in their studies. For it is at once easy for any one to object that it is impossible for a Unit to be a Multitude, or a Multitude a Unit. And they rejoice in requiring us not to say a man is good, but a man is a man, and good is good. I have no doubt you often meet with persons devoted to these dogmas, old men sometimes, who from intellectual poverty think these very valuable and profound discoveries.” From the contempt expressed in the last words we must suppose they apply not to Plato’s friend, Euclid of Megara, but to an assailant of Plato, Antisthenes the founder of Cynicism, who seems to have nearly agreed with the Megarian school. In the same dialogue Socrates asserts that this identity of the One and Many, so far from being impossible, is the necessary condition of thought and reasoning. Τὸ δὲ ταῦτὸν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμῇ γέ πη καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταῦτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τὰναντία αἰεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐτέ τις ἐλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινὸς, ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενὴς ὢν...καὶ γὰρ τό γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελὲς, καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου. τί δῆ; τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων, διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. 259 E. “To prove the Identical to be in some respect Diverse, and the Diverse in some respect Identical, the great to be little, and the like to be unlike, and to delight in thus

reducing an opponent to maintain the union of contraries, is no true refutation, and is clearly the birth of the immature mind of one beginning to philosophize. Such isolation of every idea from every other is not only false, but particularly unphilosophic and a sin against the Muses. For the isolation of the ideas is a complete annihilation of reasoning, as it is the combination of ideas that constitutes reasoning."

Aristotle alludes to the two Eleatic or Megaric arguments indicated in the Philebus, and informs us that the first was by some considered so formidable as to make it necessary to alter the form of synthetical propositions. The second argument, that from the Whole and its Parts, was considered to be unanswerable, and the paradox, that contradictories can be true, to be so far established. Ἐθορβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστερον καθάπερ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, μήποτε συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν εἶναι καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφείλον ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετεβύθιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελευκνύται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει· ἵνα μὴ τὸ ἔστιν προσάπτοντες πολλά εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν, ὥς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος. πολλά δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο, τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἄμφω, πολλά ἄρα τὸ ἐν) ἢ διαιρέσει, ὥσπερ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὰ μέρη. ἐνταῦθα δὴ διηπόρουν καὶ ὁμολόγουν τὸ ἐν πολλά εἶναι· ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά εἶναι, μὴ τὰ ἀντικειμένα δέ· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ. Physic. Ausc. 1. 2. "The later as well as the earlier opponents of the Eleatics were in fear of being reduced to the conclusion that the Same thing could be One and Many: so that some, as Lycophron, omitted the copula of propositions; others altered the form of predication, and said a man walks or has whiteness, instead of is walking or is white, lest the word *is* should prove One Being to Be Many. As if Unity and Being had not various meanings. However, as not only One Subject is Many in respect of the definitions of its Attributes (as to be white and to be musical are, when defined, two different things, and the same man is both, One thing therefore is two), but also One Whole is Many, by division into its Parts; the second consideration perplexed them, and they confessed that Unity was Multiplicity, without seeing that these terms were not contra-

dictory, as the Multiplicity of the Parts is potential, the Unity of the Whole actual."

It is not clear in what way Lycophron and his contemporaries thought they mended the matter by the alterations they proposed. Perhaps they only refused to use *εἶναι* as the copula in synthetical propositions. In Zeno's argument there is obviously an equivocation or rather the logician's fallacia *Secundum Quid*. Unity in respect of the Subject is confused with Unity in respect of the Predicate. Unity in respect of the Subject and Multiplicity in respect of the Subject, or Unity in respect of the Predicate and Multiplicity in respect of the Predicate, are contradictory and cannot co-exist: but there is no contradiction between Unity in respect of the Subject, and Multiplicity in respect of the Predicate, and no reason why they should not co-exist. However, in consequence apparently of this class of fallacy, the principle of Contradiction and definition of Refutation (*ἐλεγχος*) were fenced about with various limitations and provisos. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου...καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι δῆλον...τίς δ' ἐστὶν αὕτη μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ' ἂν ἔστω προσδιορισμένα πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας. αὕτη δ' ἀπασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιότης τῶν ἀρχῶν...διὸ πάντες ἀποδεικνύοντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν. φύσει γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωματῶν αὕτη πάντων. Met. 3.3. "It belongs to Philosophy to investigate the canons of syllogism. Such is the principle that the same predicate cannot be true and not true of the same subject, in the same respect, and with all the other limitations required to meet sophistical objections. This is the most evident principle there is, and is that to which all demonstration ultimately appeals, and is the natural foundation of all the other axioms." Plato seems to have been the author of these distinctions, for he says, describing the *Elenchus*: καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τὰς δόξας τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταῦτόν τιθέασιν παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὐταῖς ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἐναντίας. Soph. p. 230.

§ 3. The Unity of the Many and Multiplicity of the One was afterwards proposed by Plato, not as an absurd conclusion

Plato, who maintained the

Multiplicity of Being and its Unity by means of Participation, pointed out the coexistence of Unity and Multiplicity in every Species or realized Idea.

to which he reduced his opponents, but as the principle of his own Dialectics. The point of view, however, from which this Unity and Multiplicity are regarded differs from that of his predecessors. Their One that is Many was the One individual Subject with a Multiplicity of Predicates; Plato's is the One Species comprehending a Multiplicity of Individuals. Of course the Platonic point of view is the more important, as it involves Generalization and Specification, that is, Classification or scientific arrangement. Its meaning is sufficiently developed in the *Philebus*.

Participation here as before expresses the relation of the One and the Many. There the One Subject participated in the Many Predicates; here the Many Individuals participate in the One Species. Indeed in the *Sophista* all affirmative propositions are regarded as expressing a Participation of Ideas, so that as Aristotle defined them to be *συνθέσις νοήματων* Plato might have defined them to be *μετοχή νοήματων*. As therefore the reference of an Individual to its Species is a particular kind of proposition, of course it expresses a particular kind of Participation.

Plato's identity of One and Many, though paradoxical in expression, does not pretend to contradict the canon of syllogism. He only considered paradoxes and apparent contradictions as stimulants to inquiry, as when the sensuous faculties are perplexed, we are obliged to appeal to reason. Ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δ' οὐ· ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπέπτει παρακλητικὰ ὀριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. *Rep.* 2. p. 344. "I meant to say that some sensations stimulate the intellect to inquiry, and others do not; pronouncing those that are attended with contradictory sensations to be stimulant, and those that are unattended to have no aptitude for awakening the reason."

Hegel, to reconcile the Multiplicity of Being with its Unity, bases his method on their coincidence in

§ 4. In modern times, however, Hegel has put forward as the motto of his philosophy the sameness of One and Many, or rather, in more general terms, the truth of contradictories, in the sense in which it contradicts the axiom that underlies syllogism. The principle of contradiction applied in the syllogism, and used as the organ of science, had developed the diversities of Being, and marked very

distinctly the limits between the different spheres of thought. In order to reestablish, as has ever been the aspiration of Philosophy, the Unity of thought and homogeneity of Being, Hegel boldly proposes to adopt as a regulative maxim, the opposite of the principle that had broken up Being and produced the divergence of the sciences: an antinomistic canon belonging to the Reason as the opposite principle belongs to the Understanding. He accordingly professes for his motto: Whatever is is not, or: Only contradictories are true. The function of this principle is to break down the barriers fixed by the Understanding. It is to become an antinomian Dialectic, or method of developing every elementary force or conception into its direct contrary, and of afterwards rising with them out of their hostile, onesided, chaotic condition, to a higher stage in the hierarchy of Being, where they conspire to form a balanced and beautiful Whole. No doubt, if there were such an axiom, and the intellect could use it as a canon of reasoning, as it uses the principle of contradiction, it would be very easy to obliterate the divisions traced by the latter and recognise a Unity of Being. As soon as the latter pronounced A is not B, the former would contradict it and pronounce A is B, and all Being would be seen to be homogeneous. The only wonder would be, if such a principle were within the reach of the human intellect, that there should seem to be such an impassable chasm between Spirit and Matter, the Ego and the Non Ego, Freedom and Necessity, and other opposites whose homogeneity is so difficult to recognise, and whose coexistence even is so difficult to adjust. The spear of Achilles could alone heal the wounds it caused, and probably, if the scattered members of truth and Being can ever be united, it must be by means of the ordinary principles of reasoning which caused their dispersion. This task belongs to Philosophy; and the Hegelian motto is not inaptly chosen, if it is only intended as a paradoxical indication of the end to be realized.

The paradox connected with classification introduced by Plato, the Unity of the Species in the Multiplicity of Individuals, furnished for centuries a topic of speculation to the Nominalists and Realists. The paradoxes that

have been supposed to interfere with the principle of contradiction in modern times have a greater resemblance to those which were agitated before the time of Plato, and which depend on the relation of a Whole to its Parts. The Whole is a Unity and the Parts a Plurality, and yet the Whole and Parts are identical. Nay more: the Parts are not only different from one another, but perhaps essentially contraries (*ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν γενέσθαι εἶδει διαφέρει*. Arist. Pol. 2. 2. "The elements of an organic unity must be contraries,"), and yet they not only unite in the Whole, but have some bond of identity in their own conceptions. The centre and circumference are Parts of a circle: it is One, they are Plural; they are contraries and yet are mutually implied. Kant had collected similar difficulties, or what he represented as difficulties, under the name of Amphibolies in the sphere of Judgment, and under the name of Paralogisms and Antinomies in the sphere of Reason. Hegel finds them in all the categories of Relation, such as Cause and Effect, Substance and Accident, but removes them from the sphere of Reason, and confines them to the sphere of Judgment or Reflexion. They are contradictions, he would have us believe, which violate the narrow canons of the Understanding, but, like discords in music, may be harmoniously resolved by the more powerful methods employed by Reason. They, however, seem to turn on principles frequently recognised by the Greek speculators who adopted the axioms of the Understanding and reduced them to formulas: e. g. *ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ τοῖς ἐναντίοις*. Met. 10. 4. "The same material is indifferently receptive of contrary forms."—*Ἀδύνατον τῷ ὕλῃν ἔχοντι μὴ ὑπάρχειν πῶς τὸ ἐναντίον*. De Long. et Brev. Vitæ. "Wherever matter is governed by a form there must be a presence to a certain extent of the contrary form (i. e. merely potentially, or, in partial actuality)." *Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφή ταυτό*. Met. 8. 6. "The proximate matter and the form are identical." *Τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐν πῶς ἐστίν*. ib. "The power and the realisation are in a sense but one." It is impossible, if we distinguish contradictories from contraries, and attend to the purport of the principle of contradiction, to find any thing here that really violates it, or that requires the admission of an antinomistic canon.

APPENDIX B.

Τὸ Πέρας and τὸ Ἄπειρον.

§ 1. The Antithesis of Limit and Infinity was borrowed by Plato from the Pythagoreans. We read in a fragment of Philolaus, Ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὃ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συννηρόχθη. "Of Limitants and the Unlimited the world and all its parts are compacted." They considered these to be the elements of Number: Τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα πάντων εἶναι ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ στοιχεῖα τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττὸν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον τὸ δὲ πεπερασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τούτων, καὶ γὰρ ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν. Met. I. 5. "They made the elements of Number the elements of all things else, and supposed the elements of Number were evenness and oddness, the first Unlimited, the second Limited, and Unity both even and odd." Instead of identifying the Infinite with the even, Plato made it a Duality, and called it the Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small. Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ Ἄπειρον εἶναι τὸ Ἄρτιόν φασι, Πλάτων δὲ δύο τὰ Ἄπειρα, τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν. Arist. Physic. Ause. 3. 4. "The Pythagoreans make the Infinite the even, but Plato makes two Infinities, the Great and the Little." Again, while the Pythagoreans identified the world of Numbers and the world of sense, Plato supposed two worlds, a Natural and an Ideal, each resolvable into two elements, a Limit and an Unlimited, the Limiting element of the Natural world being the Ideas. Πλὴν οἱ μὲν Πυθαγόρειοι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τιθέασιν τὸ Ἄπειρον· οὐ γὰρ χωριστὸν ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἀριθμόν· Πλάτων δὲ τὸ Ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ιδέαις εἶναι. Physic. Ause. 3. 4. "The Pythagoreans confine the Infinite to the world of sense as they give no transcendent existence to Numbers, while Plato makes it an element both of the world of sense and of the Ideal world." Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαν ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος, τῇ τε τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· τὰ

Vestiges of the theory of the Limit and the Infinite.

The inorganic world is composed of contrary elements, determinate in quality but indeterminate in quantity: i. e. measurable out into multitudinous dimensions and gradations.

Chaos becomes order when these qualities receive a quantitative determination, restraining them from excess and defect, and impressing on their qualitative diversity and quantitative multiplicity an organic or systematic Unity.

γὰρ εἶδη τοῦ τί ἐστὶν αἷτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἶδεσι τὸ "Εν" καὶ τίς (for τίς read ὡς) ἡ ὕλη ἡ ὑποκειμένη καθ' ἧς τὰ εἶδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ δ' Ἄεν ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι λέγεται ὅτι αὕτη (for ὅτι αὕτη read ἡ) Δυνὰς ἐστὶ τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν. Metaph. 1. 6. "It is plain from the preceding that Plato has only operated with two causes, the formal and the material; for the Ideas are the formal cause to other things, and the One to the Ideas; and the subject matter, which in the sensible world is informed by the Ideas and in the Ideal world by the One, is the Dyad, the Great and the Little."

The Platonic school were not agreed as to the precise denomination of the triad of principles. Plato himself designated them the One and the Dyad of the Infinitely Great and Infinitely Little. He called this the indeterminate Dyad to distinguish it from the determinate Dyad, one of the ideal numbers which it generated. 'Ο γὰρ ἀριθμός ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ Ἐνὸς καὶ τῆς Δυνάδος τῆς Ἀορίστου. Met. 13. 8. He also identified the One with the Equal, and accordingly named the Infinite the Inequality, or the Unequal Duality. Others headed by Speusippus or Xenocrates made two principles, Unity and Plurality: a third section preferred Unity and Diversity, or Unity and Difference; a fourth in the place of the Great and the Little substituted the Many and the Few, as more akin to Number; a fifth employed the more comprehensive terms Excess and Defect. All these varieties are noticed in the following passages: Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ποιοῦσιν ὕλην, οἱ μὲν τῷ Ἐνὶ τῷ Ἴσῳ τὸ Ἀνισον, οἱ δὲ τῷ Ἐνὶ τὸ Πλήθος· γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Ἀνίσου δυνάδος τοῦ Μεγάλου καὶ Μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ Πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ Ἐνὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῖν...ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἃ στοιχεῖα καλοῦσιν οὐ καλῶς ἀποδιδόασιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν λέγοντες μετὰ τοῦ Ἐνὸς, τρία ταῦτα, στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀριθμῶν, τὰ μὲν δύο ὕλην τὸ δὲ Ἄεν τὴν μορφήν, οἱ δὲ τὸ Πολὺν καὶ Ὀλίγον, ὅτι τὸ Μέγα καὶ τὸ Μικρόν μεγέθους οἰκείωτερα τὴν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ Ὑπερέχον καὶ τὸ Ὑπερεχόμενον...οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ Ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ Ἄεν ἀντιτιθέασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ Πλήθος καὶ τὸ Ἐν. Met. 14. 1. "The Platonists (not perceiving the distinction between matter and privation, the opposite of form) suppose one of the contraries to be the material to the other,

making either Inequality or Plurality the material of Unity; and thus generating Numbers either from the Unequal Duality, the Great and Little, or from Plurality; in both cases by the active agency of Unity... They are not successful in stating the elementary principles, some associating with Unity the Great and Little, so as to make three elements of number, the two latter material, the Unity formal; others the Many and the Few, because the Great and Little are more allied to dimension than to number; others the broader genera of Excess and Defect; others making Diversity and Difference the antithesis of Unity; and others Plurality."

Aristotle considers the last antithesis the most accurate. Εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ βούλονται, τὰ ὄντα ἐξ ἐναντίων τῷ δὲ Ἐνὶ ἢ οὐθὲν ἐναντίον ἢ, εἰ ἄρα μέλλει, τὸ πλῆθος, τὸ δ' ἄνισον τῷ ἴσῳ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταύτῳ καὶ τὸ ἀλλὸ ταύτῳ, μάλιστα μὲν οἷ τὸ Ἐν τῷ Πλήθει ἀντιτιθέντες ἔχονταί τινος δόξης, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' οὗτοι ἱκανῶς. *ib.* 14. 1. "Now if, as they all agree, the world is composed of contraries, and Inequality is the contrary of Equality, Diversity of Sameness and Identity, those who make Plurality the antithesis of Unity hold the most tenable position, though even they hardly make it good." Unity and Plurality are contraries and opposed as Positive and Privative. Ἀντίκειται δὲ τὸ ἔν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διαιρετόν... ἐπεὶ γοῦν, αἱ ἀντιθέσεις τετραχῶς καὶ τούτων κατὰ στέρησιν λέγεται θάτερον, ἐναντίον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὔτε ὡς ἀντίφασις οὔτε ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι λεγόμενα. *Met.* 9. 3. "The opposition of Unity and Plurality is that of Indivisible and Divisible. Thus of the four kinds of Opposition they fall under the two of Privation and Contrariety, not of contradiction or Relation." Again, the Plurality itself can be divided into two contrary extremes, the Many and the Few. Ὅσα διαιρετά, ἐν τούτοις λέγεται τὰ πολλὰ ἐὰν ἢ πλῆθος ἔχον ὑπεροχήν, καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως πλῆθος ἔχον ἔλλειψιν. *ib.* 9. 6. "In Plurality Many denotes a Plurality that exceeds, Few a Plurality that is exceeded." Τῷ δὲ ὀλίγῳ ἐναντίον τὸ πολὺ ὡς ὑπερέχον πλῆθος ὑπερεχομένῳ πλήθει. *ib.* "Many and Few are contraries and express excess and defect of number." In the other categories the Infinite was composed of analogous extremes, but

there was a diversity of opinion both as to this and the formal principle. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ποιοῦσι τὰ ὑστέρα γένη τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἶον ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν καὶ βραχέος τὰ μήκη, πλατέος δὲ καὶ στενοῦ τὰ ἐπίπεδα, ἐκ βαθέος δὲ καὶ ταπεινοῦ τοὺς ὄγκους· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν εἶδη τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ· τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἄλλοι ἄλλως τιθέασι τῶν τοιούτων. Met. 12. 9. "Some employ the species of the Great and Little to construct the categories subsequent to Number, making Length of Long and Short, Breadth of Wide and Narrow, Solidity of Thick and Thin, all subdivisions of Great and Little. As to the principle corresponding to Unity in these categories they are at variance."

Aristotelian analysis of the Infinite into Matter and Privation. The contrary of the quantitative law or organic Unity is, not the qualities which it limits (Matter) but, their excessive or defective quantity (Privation). So, if we exclude quantity from our view and confine ourselves to the category of quality, the contrary of the positive quality or elementary Unity is not its recipient, the

§ 2. We have seen that Plato constructs the natural world of two principles, the Idea and the Infinite. The main difference of Aristotle's view is that he analyses the Infinite into two elements, Privation (στέρησις) the opposite of the Idea, and Matter (ὕλη) equally receptive of the Privation or the Idea. Ὅντος γὰρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ, τὸ μὲν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὃ πέφυκεν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν. Phys. Ausc. 1, 9. "One element is divine and good and an object of desire, another is contrary to this, and the nature of a third is to love and desire the first." Μία μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλη, μία δὲ ὁ λόγος, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τούτῳ ἡ στέρησις. ib. 17. "One principle is the Matter, a second the Spirit (Form), a third its contrary, Privation." Γίγνεται ἅπαν ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς... ἔστι δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἶδει δὲ δύο... ἐν δὲ τὸ εἶδος. διὸ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἔστι δ' ὡς τρεῖς. Phys. Ausc. 1, 7. "The principles of the natural world are Matter and Form, the Matter though numerically one having a twofold character, while the Form is simply one. So that in one sense there are two principles, and in another three." ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος καὶ κείνος. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκείσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσι. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις Δυνάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων Μέγα καὶ Μικρόν, οὐθὲν ἦττον ταυτόν ποιεῖ τὴν γὰρ ἐτέραν παρῑδε, τὴν στέρησιν. Physic. Ausc. 1, 9. "So that ours is a very different triad of principles from that of the Plato-

nists. For they reached the point of perceiving the necessity of a material element, but made it simple in character: since though Plato makes it a Dyad, and calls it the Great and Little, he labours under the same error, for he overlooks the other principle, the Privation." The antithesis of *στέρησις*, which we have seen called *εἶδος*, *λόγος*, and *μορφή*, appears to be properly called *ἐξίς*. *πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις ἐξίς καὶ στέρησις ἐστίν*. Met. 10. 4.

The reality of the distinction between the Material and the Privation in the Unlimited, is most important and manifest in the moral world. Here Aristotle adopts the Platonic doctrine in making a Balance of opposite principles, a Due Measure between an Excess and a Defect constitute moral goodness. The will and the affections are the material (*ὑλη*) of virtue. Unless we distinguished this element from the Privation (*στέρησις*) we should have to say that the vices are constituent elements of virtue.

It may be observed that in contrasting his own principles with those of Plato in the passages quoted above, Aristotle has made the difference appear to be greater than it really was by the incompleteness of his list. If, instead of comparing two triads of principles, he had compared two tetrads; if, that is, he had added to Plato's Idea, Excess and Defect, the Recipient (*τὸ δεκτικόν*) of the Timæus, and to his own Matter, Positive determination, and Negative, the Mean or Form (*εἶδος*) which occupies such a prominent position in his philosophy, it would have appeared that the two lists are substantially identical. He elsewhere contrasts Plato's list with that of the old Physiologists. They agreed in constructing the world of a Unity and two antagonistic extremes, but differed inasmuch as in the physiological scheme the One was the passive material and the extremes the active and formative principles, in Plato's system the One was active and the extremes passive. In truth, however, Plato as well as Aristotle employed the One in both of these relations; both as the primary Matter or passive substratum of the qualitative extremes, and as the Formative principle or active origin of motion and law. Aristotle seems to have justified himself in omitting this principle from his list,

primary Matter, but its negation, the Privative quality. Both the quantitative law or organic Unity and the positive quality or elementary Unity, from the analogy of their relations to Privation and Matter, are denominated by the same appellation, Form.

because as an affirmative determination (*ἐξίς*) it is analogous to the positive extreme of the elementary qualities, being a Form of a higher order, or, in the language of Schelling, of a higher power. *Τὰ δ' εἶδη καὶ τὰ τέλη ἐξείς τινές.* De gen. et cor. I. 7. "The formal and final causes are certain positive determinations."

A common feature of all these schemes is indicated by Aristotle: *ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰναντία πως πάντες ποιούσι τὰς ἀρχὰς δῆλον...πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχὰς καίπερ ἄνευ λόγου τιθέντες ὅμως τὰναντία λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες.* Physic. Ausc. I, 5. "All make Contraries first principles...though they assume their elements without proof, they agree as if constrained by the force of truth in making them opposites." This holds true if we extend our view to modern Philosophies. Schelling finds in the whole universe of matter and spirit the perpetual recurrence of opposite Polar forces with a centre of Indifference, and resumes these phenomena in a formula by proclaiming the universe and every portion of it to be a Magnet. Thus the Limit and the double Infinite of the Platonists are transformed in his system into the Centre of Equilibrium, with the Positive and Negative Poles. Hegel similarly finds the law of the universe to be the existence of opposite forces, first in isolation, then at war, and afterwards in reconciliation as positive and negative factors of a higher and more spiritual life.

What was meant by Infinity? (a) Quantity without end.

§ 3. We have collected a statement, vague unfortunately, and unfortunately not in the words of Plato, of the doctrine of the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*, and have indicated its relation to Aristotle's system, with which the student is probably more familiar. We have still to inquire what was the precise meaning that Plato attached to these words.

The obvious meaning of *ἄπειρον* is Infinite, and this is unquestionably the meaning that Plato intended the word should first suggest. The successive Greek philosophies absorbed into their system their predecessors, and Plato's forerunners, the Physiologists, had adopted Infinity as a first principle and groundwork of Being. If we need any further proof that this is the *prima facie* meaning of the

word, we have a sufficient one in the fact that it is against τὸ ἄπειρον in this sense that Aristotle directs his polemic. Ἄλλ' ἴσως αὕτη μὲν ἐστι καθόλου ἡ ζήτησις μᾶλλον, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς μηδὲν ἔχουσι μέγεθος. ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ περὶ ὧν ποιούμεθα τὴν μέθοδον, ἅρ' ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἄπειρον ἐπὶ τὴν αὐξησιν. Phys. Aus. 3, 5. "It is a wider question than we have now to discuss, whether there is Infinity in the mathematical field, or in thought, or in the spiritual world. We are now inquiring whether any mass is infinitely great in the sensuous and physical world." He then distinguishes Plato's two kinds of Infinity, and admits the existence of the infinitely Small: τὸ ἄπειρον ἔστι μὲν προσθέσει ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀφαιρέσει... ἄλλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω δ' ἔστι τὸ ἄπειρον· δυνάμει γὰρ, καὶ ἐπὶ καθαίρεσιν. ib. 3, 6. "Infinity is conceivable either in the line of augmentation or in that of diminution; but the only Infinity that exists is a potential Infinity in the line of diminution:" and potential in the sense of never being actualized, but only perpetually approached. Finite magnitudes, he proceeds to say, may be regarded as infinite, if we adopt a mode of measuring them by which they can never be exhausted: e. g. by first taking half, then half the remainder, and so on; whereby the increment at last becomes infinitely small. This infinite subdivision can be presented in the form of an infinite addition: and this is the only sense in which he allows even a potential infinite in the line of augmentation. But the sum of this infinite series is finite, and this is really only another way of presenting the infinite in the line of diminution; καὶ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν δὴ οὕτως ἄπειρον δυνάμει ἔστιν ὃ ταὐτὸ λέγομεν τρόπον τινὰ εἶναι τῷ κατὰ διαίρεσιν· αἰὲ μὲν γὰρ τι αὐτοῦ ἔξω ἔσται λαμβάνειν, οὐ μέντοι ὑπερβάλλει παντὸς ὀρισμένου μεγέθους, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν ὑπερβάλλει παντὸς ὀρισμένου καὶ ἔσται ἔλαττον. ὥστε δὴ παντὸς ὑπερβάλλειν κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν... οὐδὲ δυνάμει ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἢ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀντεστραμμένως τῇ διαίρεσει. ib. "The infinite of augmentation exists potentially so far as it is identical with the infinite of diminution, for there is perpetually something to be added: but it will not exceed all finite magnitude, as the

infinite of diminution exceeded every finite degree of smallness. So there is no infinite of augmentation even potential except as the converse of infinite diminution."

He accordingly proposes, if we assume the existence of τὸ ἀπειρον, to alter its definition, so that it shall only signify the Unfinished, Incomplete, or Indeterminate. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦναντίον εἶναι ἀπειρον ἢ ὡς λέγουσιν...οὐ γὰρ οὐ μὴθὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ' οὐ αἰεὶ τι ἔξω ἐστὶ, τοῦτο ἀπειρόν ἐστιν...οὐ δὲ μὴθὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ' ἐστι Τέλειον καὶ Ὀλον...Τέλειον δ' οὐθὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος τὸ δὲ τέλος πέρας...ἐπεὶ ἐντεῦθεν γε λαμβάνουσι τὴν σεμνότητα κατὰ τοῦ ἀπείρου, τὸ πάντα περιέχον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχον, διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τινα ὁμοιότητα τῷ Ὀλῳ· ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀπειρον τῇ στοῦ μεγέθους τελειότητος ὕλη, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει Ὀλον ἐντελεχεία δὲ οὐ. *ib.* "It results that the contrary to what they say is the ἀπειρον, and it is not that which is never transcended by any other magnitude, but that which is always transcended; that which is not transcended being the Perfect or Whole; and that is Perfect which has reached the Limit. And the majesty ascribed to the indeterminate (unterminated), "the all comprehending," "the all containing," is due to its proximity to the Perfect; for the indeterminate is the material of Perfect magnitude, or that which approaches, without ever reaching, Totality."

The last sentiments are very Platonic, and when we consider that in the *Timæus* the material universe is circumscribed and finite, Plato entertaining the grand conception, with which we are now hardly so familiar, that all that is forms a single perfect whole, [ἵνα ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῶον τέλειον ἐκ τελῶν τῶν μερῶν εἴη...ἐν ὅλον ὅλων ἐξ ἀπάντων τέλειον αὐτὸν ἐτεκμήνατο] we are justified in assuming that they coincide with Plato's views, and that the infinity, or quantity without end, of the material element is no essential part of his philosophy. Indeed, Aristotle himself informs us, that it did not reappear in the details of his doctrine: Ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων διὰ τοῦτο ἀπειρα δύο ἐποίησεν ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν αὔξησιν δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν παντὸς ὀρισμένου μεγέθους καὶ εἰς ἀπειρον ἵεναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν· ποιήσας μέντοι δύο οὐ χρήται. *Phys. Ausc.* 3. 7. "Plato assumed a double Infinity, because the elements seem to overpass all finite quantity, and to be infinite both in the line of augmenta-

tion and in that of diminution. But after asserting its existence, we do not find him making any use of it as a principle."

§ 4. We come to the same conclusion if we examine the other terms, τὸ μᾶλλον and τὸ ἥττον, which Plato proposes as equivalent to ἄπειρον. Here again unfortunately we cannot quote from Plato himself, but must have recourse to Aristotle. He uses the words in his Ethical treatise (Eth. Nic. 10. 2.), referring to the doctrine of the Philebus; and he uses them again in the treatise on the Categories in reference to the same question that he discussed in the Ethics. In the Categories the words simply imply Gradation or Intensive quantity. "Substance," he says, "does not admit of a gradation: (δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον) One man is not more or less a man either compared with himself at different times or with a different individual. Quantity does not admit of gradation: three is as much three as five is five; one minute is just as much time as another minute; one cubit length is just as much space as another cubit length. Some Relations admit of no gradation; equality and duplicity for instance; others do, as similarity and inequality. Some Qualities admit no gradation; figure, for instance. One circle is just as much a circle as another; and one triangle just as much a triangle as another. The majority of Qualities admit of gradation: white, hot, cold, &c. have different degrees of comparison. Whether abstract states, intellectual, moral, or corporeal, e. g. science, virtue, health, admit of degrees, is controverted: it is certain that the concrete qualities do; one man is more scientific, more virtuous, more healthy than another. Actions and passions, e. g. to heat, to cool, to please, to pain, admit of gradations." The question about the abstract states is in the Ethics answered in the affirmative, at least with respect to one of them, health. It is evident from the whole of this discussion that by things which admit of the More and the Less are denoted those that vary in degree or possess what is sometimes called quantity of intension. Intension, like extension, does not imply Infinity, except so far as even finite quan-

b. Finite extension or intension: or quality existing in variable quantity.

tity involves infinite divisibility. But in respect of the Multiplicity of gradations thus arising, whatever has intension or extension may be called indefinite or indeterminate. In this view the *ἄπειρον* of Plato amounts to the *συνεχὲς καὶ διαιρετόν* of the Nicomachean Ethics. *Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.* Eth. Nic. 2. 6. "Whatever is continuous or divisible presents a greater, a less, and an equal, the equal being a mean between excess and defect." Compare: *Τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀριζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρῆσθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὥς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς ὄν.* Phys. Ausc. 3. 1. "Infinity appears first in the continuous. Hence the definitions of continuity are made to contain Infinity, continuity being defined by infinite divisibility."

(c) The elements regarded as susceptible, but not inherently possessed, of a Mean or quantitative Law.

§ 5. Assuming, then, that τὸ ἄπειρον means only the variable or Indeterminate, we still have to inquire in what point of view the More and Less involve Evil or Imperfection, as they do in the Pythagorean and Platonic systems: (*ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν.* Met. 1. 6.) Plato himself will furnish the answer to this. Perfection always consists in a mean (τὸ μέτριον): the mean is a single determinate quantity: whatever therefore has a plurality of gradations, may happen in one of them to present the normal quantity, but in all the rest will be excessive or defective. It can only enter into the good and beautiful as a material which requires to have its law imposed from without. It cannot itself be an absolute good, or supply a law for action. In the Politicus we are told that the More and Less are all-important in philosophy and art, when the standard to which they are referred is the golden mean. *Διττὰς ἄρα ταύτας οὐσῶς καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ θετέον. τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν δ' αὖ πρὸς τὸ μέτριον...ἡγητέον ἄρα ὁμοίως τὰς τέχνας πάσας εἶναι καὶ μεῖζόν τι ἅμα καὶ ἔλαττον μετρεῖσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἄλληλα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν...δῆλον ὅτι διαιροῦμεν ἂν τὴν μετρητικὴν ταύτην δίχα τέμνοντες, ἐν μὲν τιθέντες αὐτῆς μόριον συμπάσας τέχνας ὁπόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ μήκη καὶ βάθη καὶ πλάτη καὶ παχύτητας*

πρὸς τοῦναντίον μετραῦσι, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ὀπόσαι πρὸς τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ πρόπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον καὶ πάνθ' ὀπόσα εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπφκίσθη τῶν ἐσχάτων...μετρήσεως γὰρ δὴ τινα τρόπον πάνθ' ὀπόσα ἔντεχνα μετείληφε. p. 306. "There are two kinds of More and Less, and two modes of appreciating them; one when we compare any greater with any lesser quantity, the other when we compare any quantity with Due Measure...We must consider that the existence of Art depends on the reality of a More and Less, referred not to each other, but to an absolute Right quantity. We must accordingly divide Mensuration into two branches, one embracing the sciences that refer the More or Less in number, length, breadth, depth, and thickness, to one another; the other those that refer them to Due Measure, the Seemly, the Proportionate, the Right, and whatever dwells in the Mean remote from extremes; for a kind of Mensuration is the essence of Art."

If we wave the question whether infinite quantities exist, and substitute for infinity excess over a certain mean, we may state the theory of Unity and Plurality in the terms of Aristotle: καὶ ἔοικε παλαὰ εἶναι καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα ὅτι τὸ ἐν καὶ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶ. Phys. Aus. 1. 6.

In the Philebus, besides the antithesis of Greater and Less, we are presented with a qualitative antithesis of positive and negative extremes, (θερμότερον, ψυχρότερον, ξηρότερον, ὑγρότερον.) While these are in isolation they are but material elements, and belong to the first stage of Being. They must be gathered together in a certain proportion and measure before they can become the seat of the higher manifestations of nature and life. "Ἀπαντα δεῖται τῆς ἐναντίας ροπῆς ἵνα τυγχάνῃ τοῦ μετρίου καὶ μέσου· τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ τὸν λόγον, τῶν δ' ἄκρων ἐκάτερον οὐκ ἔχει χωρὶς. De Part. An. 2, 7. "Every force needs to be balanced by its opposite, in order to attain to the Moderate and the Mean; for these have the Form (Life) and Spirit, which do not dwell in the isolated extremes." Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν οὕτω (εἰς ἄλληλα) τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γιγνομένου ψυχροῦ τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ,

ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιῶσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. De Gen. et Cor. 2. 7. "Nature's first process is to subdue the elementary extremes by this partial transformation; the formation of flesh and bone, and other living tissues follows as soon as hot and cold have been tempered and reduced to a mean....Similarly, liquid and solid, and all other opposite conditions, must be reduced to a mean before they can compose the nobler realms of nature." Thus in the relations of Limit and Infinity, or Unity and Plurality, we have two antitheses: one between Unity and Plurality, and a second between the elements of the Plurality; whether we regard the quantitative antithesis of Excess and Defect, or the qualitative antithesis of the positive and negative extremes. Τρίων δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν, μιᾶς δὲ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαι ἀντίκεινται πῶς. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις. Eth. Nic. 2, 8.

Examples of Measure as the quantitative Limit. It must be distinguished from Measure as the unit of mensuration: to which it is related as the Final cause to the Material.

§ 6. In the Philebus the Limit is always quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination. Just, however, as quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the Timæus calls the Vehicle, or Receptacle, (τὸ δεκτικόν,) and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter, (πρώτη ὕλη.) Quality is just as much a limitation or determination of the formless Matter, as specific quantity is of quality; and accordingly Aristotle gives it the same name (εἶδος) that he applies to the quantitative law or dominant Form.

The Philebus, however, does not carry the analysis of Being so far. It regards quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due proportions by the quantitative limit. As existing in indeterminate quantity, i. e. as measurable but not yet measured, it is called Infinity: a name open to misconception, for, when subjected to mensuration, its possible maximum is found to be finite. The quantitative Limit is its Measure.

The following illustrations of the conception of Measure

in some of its aspects are taken from Whewell's *Astronomy and General Physics*.

The solar system might have been so adjusted, that the year should have been longer or shorter than it actually is. The earth might revolve round the sun at a distance greater or less than that which it actually has: the size or density of the central mass, the sun, might be increased or diminished in any proportion: and thus the time of the earth's revolution might have been increased or diminished in any degree. By any such change the working of the botanical world would be thrown into utter disorder. Most of our fruit trees, for example, require the year to be of its present length. If the summer and the autumn were much shorter, the fruit would not ripen: if these seasons were much longer, the tree would put forth a fresh suit of blossoms to be cut down by the winter. Our forest trees need all the seasons of the present year for their perfection; the spring, summer, and autumn for the development of their leaves, and formation of their proper juice, and of wood from this, and the winter for hardening and solidifying the substance thus formed. The processes of the rising of the sap, of the formation of proper juices, of the unfolding of leaves, the opening of flowers, the fecundation of the fruit, the ripening of the seed, its proper deposition in order for the reproduction of a new plant; all these operations require a certain portion of time, and could not be compressed into a space less than a year, or at least could not be abbreviated in any very great degree.

Again: the force of gravity depends upon the mass of the earth, and is not determined by any cosmical necessity of which we are aware. If the intensity of gravity were to be much increased or much diminished, if every object were to become twice as heavy or only half as heavy as it now is, all the forces both of voluntary and involuntary motion, which produce the present orderly and suitable results by being properly proportioned to the resistance which they experience, would be thrown off their balance, and produce motions too quick or too slow, wrong posi-

tions, jerks and stops, instead of steady well-conducted movements. The force in plants which propels the sap, is part of the economy of the vegetable world, and it is clear that the due operation of this force depends upon its being rightly proportioned to the force of gravity. The weight of the fluid must be counterbalanced, and an excess of force must exist to produce the motion upwards. In the common course of vegetable life, the rate of ascent is regulated on the one hand by the upward pressure of the vegetable power, and on the other by the amount of the gravity of the fluid, along with the other resistances which are to be overcome. If, therefore, we suppose gravity to increase, the rapidity of the vegetable circulation will diminish, and the rate at which this function proceeds, will not correspond either to the course of the seasons, or to the other physiological processes with which this has to cooperate. We might conceive such an increase of gravity as would stop the vital movements of the plant in a short time. In like manner a diminution of the gravity of the vegetable juices would accelerate the rising of the sap, and would probably hurry and overload the leaves and other organs, so as to interfere with their due operation. There is no apparent connexion between the quantity of matter of the earth, and the force of imbibition of the roots of the vine, or the force of propulsion of the vessels of its branches. Yet these things have such a proportion as the well-being of the vine requires.

These are rather instances of symmetry than of Measure. The latter word seems more properly used when the related terms are direct contraries in a single organisation. In all the nobler forms of existence we find antagonistic forces coexisting in harmony. Simplicity of composition, the preponderance of single principles, mark the lower forms of nature and society. The ascending scale of excellence is an ascending scale of complication, the coordination of more and more numerous rival tendencies. The due bounds and limits which are set to the predominance of each force, which restrain it from destroying the rest by which it is checked and counterbalanced, and so far

becoming boundless and infinite, these limits to which the beauty, richness, and grandeur of the Whole are due, are in Plato's language its Measure.

It is necessary to distinguish this from a different meaning of the same word.

Measure is defined by Aristotle as the unit of measurement; as a moment may be made the unit of time, a span the unit of length, a pound the unit of weight: and, generalizing this conception, he says, Measure is the unit of cognition, i. e. any elementary premiss or atom of thought. *Μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἐν εἶναι τὸ μέτρον ἐστὶν εἶναι πρῶτον ἐκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται μέτρον ὃ πρῶτῳ ἑκάστου γινώσκεται...ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις μέτρον καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν τι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον...τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἢ τῷ ποῶ ἢ τῷ ποσῷ...οὕτω δὴ πάντων μέτρον τὸ ἐν ὅτι γνωρίζομεν ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία διαιροῦντες ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος.* Met. 10. p. 1053. "To be One is properly to be the ultimate Measure of any genus, and principally of quantity...secondarily to be the ultimate instrument of cognition in other categories...In every instance the Measure and origin of knowledge is something One and indivisible...that is to say, simple in quantity or quality...The universal Measure, then, is Unity, because we know things by dividing their substances into their Units of quantity and quality." It varies, he observes, with the object to be measured: in solid dimension it is a solid dimension, in musical sounds a quartertone, in articulate sounds a letter, in velocity a standard velocity. Measure or Unity in this sense is an ingredient or element of the Whole to be measured, and therefore falls under the conception of material cause. Accordingly Aristotle seems to identify it with the elementary extremes of Plato's Infinite, or rather, as he attributes a priority to position over privation, with the positive factor alone. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε χρώμασιν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν χρῶμα, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτου καὶ τοῦ μέλανος φαίνεται γινόμενα, τὸ δὲ μέλαν στέρησις λευκοῦ...ὥστ' εἰ τὰ ὄντα ἦν χρώματα, ἦν ἂν ἀριθμὸς τις τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ τίνων; δῆλον δὴ ὅτι χρωμάτων καὶ τὸ ἐν ἦν ἂν τι ἐν, οἷον τὸ λευκόν...ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φθόγγων στοιχείων ἂν ἦν τὰ ὄντα ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ ἐν στοιχείον φωνῆεν.* ib. p. 1054. "In colours the

Unit is a colour, namely white, assuming that white and black are the elementary colours, and that black is the privation of white. So that if Being was colour, it would be a Number of something, namely of colours, and the Unit would be something specific, namely white. So if Being were articulate sound, it would be a Number of letters, and Unity a vowel." In the same manner, speaking of the theory that the cognizant subject must be of the same substance as the objects of cognition, he says it need only be composed of the positive *συστοιχία*, without the privative. *Τούτο δὲ λέληθε τοὺς οὕτως ὑπειληφότας, εἶπερ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖν ἐξ ἀπάντων· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτοῦ τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκουμεν· κριτῆς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανὼν· τὸ δὲ καμπύλον οὐθ' ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος.* De An. 1. 5. "They overlook the fact that, if the soul is to be composed of the elements of Being, it need not be of all, as the positive series reveals both itself and the negative. Straight, for instance, is a criterion or measure of its negative, as well as of itself, as both are equally ascertained by the ruler, though the crooked indicates neither itself nor its opposite." (Straight and crooked are here given as the elementary antithesis in the category of figure: *conf. εἰ δέ τι σχήματι ἢ λειότῃ καὶ τραχύτῃ διαφέρει, πάντα εὐθεῖ καὶ καμπύλῳ.* Met. 8. 2. "Differences of figure or smoothness and roughness are all reducible to the antithesis of straight and crooked.") Even in Plato we find Unity used in this sense of Material ingredient or element, instead of totality of Form. For it seems to be such elementary Unities, not the systematic or organic Unity, that we are directed to search for in the commencement of the *Philebus*. So, too, some of the expressions in Aristotle's own *Logic* seem only to contemplate deduction from the Material cause. *Χρὴ δὲ, ὅταν ὅλον τι πραγματεύηται τις, διελεῖν τὸ γένος εἰς τὰ ἅτομα τῷ εἶδει τὰ πρῶτα...μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ἴδια πάθη θεωρεῖν...τοῖς γὰρ συντιθεμένοις ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν ὀρισμῶν ἔσται δῆλα, διὰ τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι πάντων...τὸ ἀπλοῦν, καὶ τοῖς ἀπλοῖς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ὑπάρχειν καθ' αὐτὰ μόνοις, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις κατ' ἐκείνα.* An. Post. 2. 12. "In scientific investi-

gation we should divide the subject matter into its ultimate elementary species, and then trace their properties. And the laws of the Wholes composed of these atoms will be thus ascertained, because they originate in the simple elements, which are the primary subjects of the laws, whereas the compound Wholes are so only secondarily." There is no mention here of the Whole, as a Whole, having any attributes. It is true, that, as contrasted with the ultimate matter, these elementary qualities must be considered as belonging to the Form; still they will only be portions or ingredients of the Form, and, therefore, stand in the relation of materials to the total Form. It is obvious that Measure in this sense is almost the antithesis of the Measure we hear of in the Philebus, and that the two senses are not to be confounded. The method of reasoning from the elementary Measure, incapable of ever arriving at the most organic and dominant laws, seems to be what Hegel intends to designate, when he speaks of the method of Understanding as opposed to the Method of Reason.

If, however, we examine Aristotle's definition either of Measure (ϕ γὰρ πρῶτῳ γνωρίζομεν τοῦτο πρῶτον μέτρον ἐκάστου γένους. Met. 4. 6.) or of Unity, (ἀρχὴ οὖν τοῦ γνωριστοῦ περὶ ἑκάστου γένους τὸ εἶν. ib.) we find they justify the Platonic acceptation of Measure, and that there is no reason for confining it to signify the Material cause. He himself recognises Form (εἶδος) and Totality as a species of Unity, namely, a systematic or organic Unity (ὡς οὔσης τῆς ὁλότητος ἐνότητός τινος. ib. 26), and it is a leading idea of his Philosophy, that the Formal and Final cause is more truly the basis of cognition than the Material (η γὰρ κατὰ τὴν μορφήν φύσις κυριωτέρα τῆς ὑλικῆς φύσεως. De Part. An. i. 1.) The plan of the Whole furnishes the scale of the Parts in every work of nature or art: the End or ideal to be realized impresses a quantitative as well as qualitative law on the elements or means of its realization, and as determining their quantities and proportions may be said to be their Measure. And although the subjective or perceptive Measure of the objective antitheses, it was intimated above, might consist of the positive extreme or elementary Unity, yet beauty and excellence involve a syste-

matic Unity, positive, indeed, in character as opposed to its own negation, but combining both the elementary opposites, the negative as well as the positive. Accordingly Aristotle makes the sentient Measure of the ordered world itself a Mean or systematic Unity. Ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὅλον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς ἐναντιώσεως· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίγνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν θάτερον τῶν ἀκρῶν. De An. 2. 11.

While, however, illustrating the Platonic Measure by the conception of End, we must bear in mind that, whereas the Whole is immanent in its Parts, and the End is realized in the completed circle of means, Plato does not stop here; his ultimate Measure is transcendent, and placed beyond the sphere of the Measurable world.

From Aristotle's criticisms we may gather that the three kinds of Unity or Measure, elementary Unity (στοιχείον), systematic Unity (τὸ μέσον, τὸ ὅλον), transcendent Unity (τὸ ἄϋλον), were not always sufficiently distinguished in the Platonic theory of the One and the Infinite.

APPENDIX C.

Memory and Reminiscence.

§ 1. The theory of Memory and Reminiscence is more fully developed in Aristotle than in Plato. In every act of Memory an image presents itself to the consciousness. What distinguishes Memory from mere Fancy or Imagination is the accompanying belief of the previous existence of a corresponding perception; the recognition of the image as representing the object of former attention. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἰσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἢ ἕξις ἢ πάθος ὅταν γένηται χρόνος...ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε, προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον, τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστί... ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἢ τε τοῦ πράγματος γένηται κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. *ib.* "Memory is not the original sensation or intellection, but the retention or excitation of either after a lapse of time...In every act of remembering that we saw, heard, or learnt a thing, there is a concomitant sensation of priority. . Now priority and posteriority are relations of time...There must therefore be a joint impression of the object and of time in an act of Memory." Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν εἴρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκονος οὐ φάντασμα, ἕξις, καὶ τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα. *Arist. De Memorîâ.* "We have intimated that Memory and Remembrance are the retention of an image as the copy of an original sensation of which it is the vestige, and that it is seated in the Primary Sense or the faculty whereby we have a sensation of Time." What is here called the Primary Sense is said to be the same as the Common Sense and the Imagination. All thought is the joint work of Intellect and Imagination, the latter supplying definite dimension, shape, and locality

to all our conceptions. These Imaginative or Sensuous elements are the direct object of Memory, and they all belong to the same faculty as the Temporal sensation. Νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐδὲν προσχρῶμενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὠρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ τριγώνου ὅμως γράφομεν ὠρισμένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως καὶ μὴ νοῇ ποσόν, τίθεται πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἢ ποσόν...διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχοῦς οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου τὰ μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντα, ἄλλος λόγος· μέγεθος δ' ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν καὶ κίνησιν, ᾧ καὶ χρόνον, καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν· ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτων ἡ γνώσις ἐστι· ἡ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματός ἐστι· ὥστε τοῦ νοουμένου κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ...τίλος μὲν οὖν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη, φανέρον, ὅτι οὐπερ καὶ ἡ φαντασία, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας. *ib.* “There is no Intellection without Imagination, for the internal process of thought resembles geometrical demonstration by diagrams. For though we ground nothing on the definite dimension of a triangle, yet our diagram gives it a definite dimension; so in thought when the object of conception has no dimension, the Imagination gives it one which the Reason disregards. Why it is that nothing can be thought out of Space and Time, even though it may have no relation to them, we have not now to inquire. Magnitude and Change, however, are objects of the same faculty as Time, namely the Common or the Primary Sense. As the remembrance of objects of reason is always attended with images, the direct object of Memory is not the intellectual element, but the Images of the Primary Sense...Memory then is the same faculty as Imagination, and its direct objects are images, its indirect the concomitants of the images.”

§ 2. Aristotle rejects the definition of Reminiscence given in the *Philebus*, μνήμης ἀνάληψις, but his own hardly differs. “Ὅταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ ἡν πρότερον εἶχεν ἐπιστήμην ἢ αἴσθησιν ἢ οὐ ποτε τὴν ἔξω ἐλέγομεν μνήμην...ἐνούσης πλείονος ἀρχῆς ἢ ἔξ ἧς μαθάνουσιν, τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀναμνήσκεσθαι. τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει καὶ μνήμη ἀκολουθεῖ.

ib. 2. "The recovery of previously possessed knowledge, or sensation, or whatever it is of which Memory was said to be retentive, when the mind has more materials than it had at the period of original acquisition, is Reminiscence, and Memory and Remembrance are the result." Reminiscence depends on the association of ideas or the law that regulates the train or succession of thoughts and fancies in the mind. Συμβαίνουνσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις ἐπεὶ πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γίνεσθαι μετὰ τήνδε... ὅταν οὖν ἀναμνησκώμεθα κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινὰ κινήσεων ἕως ἂν κινηθῶμεν μεθ' ἣν ἐκείνη εἴωθε, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς, καὶ ἀφ' ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς. ib. "Reminiscence is produced by the natural sequence of mental impressions... In reminiscence we pass through a series of impressions till we come to the one which is usually followed by the image to be recollected, (for which purpose we try to link on our recollections without a gap from the present moment or any other starting point) the causes of transition being Resemblance, Contrast, and Vicinity."

APPENDIX D.

Imagination.

Imagination contrasted with Opinion in the Sophista and Republic. Each is a kind of Judgment.

§ 1. The relations of λόγος, διάνοια, δόξα, and φαντασία, terms which we find in juxtaposition in the Philebus, are touched upon by Plato in the Sophista.

Λόγος, Speech, is a Proposition, that is, a spoken Opinion, or a combination of Propositions forming a syllogism or a chain of syllogisms. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ὀνομάτων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ' αὖ ῥημάτων χωρὶς ὀνομάτων λεχθέντων... οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὔτε οὕτως οὐτ' ἐκείνως πρᾶξιν οὐδ' ἀπραξίαν οὐδ' οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δηλοῖ τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἂν τις τοῖς ὀνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ' ἡρμοσέ τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἢ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτος καὶ σμικρότατος—πῶς ἄρ' ὧδε λέγεις;—ὅταν εἴπῃ τις, ἄνθρωπος μαυθάνει, λόγον εἶναι φῆς τοῦτον ἐλαχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον;—ἔγωγε.—δηλοῖ γὰρ ἤδη που τότε περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὀνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ μόνον ὀνομάζειν εἵπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον. p. 262, A. “ Nouns alone spoken in succession form no Speech, nor verbs without nouns. No act or inaction or existence of any reality or unreality is indicated by the words in either case; nor till we combine nouns and verbs; then they fit; and their primary combination at once forms a Speech—what we may call a primary or elementary Speech.—Give me an instance.—If anybody says, A man is learning, do you not call this a primary and elementary Speech?—Yes.—For he then indicates that something exists, or is doing, or was done, or will be; and besides naming, he operates on what he names, as soon as

he combines verbs and nouns; and we speak of him as saying and not as merely naming; and call such combination a Speech." A Proposition or elementary Speech is related to Opinion (δόξα) as a complex of Propositions is to Reflexion or Reasoning (διάνοια).

Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταυτόν· πλὴν ὃ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια. τὸ δέ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ρεύμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὼν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος.—ἀληθῆ.—καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἴσμεν ὄν.—τὸ ποῖον;—φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.—ἴσμεν.—ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπης αὐτό;—καὶ πῶς;—τί δ' ὅταν μὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ δι' αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ πάθος, ἂρ' οἶόν τε ὁρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;—οὐδέν.—οὐκοῦν ἐπέπερ λόγος ἀληθείης ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς, τούτων δ' ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεούσης, φαίνεται δὲ ὃ λέγομεν σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνιότε εἶναι. p. 263. E. " Reflexion and Speech are the same; except that the mere internal dialogue of the soul with herself without voice is called Reflexion.—True.—And the sound that proceeds from her in a stream through the lips is called Speech.—True.—And these, too, are involved in Speech.—What? Affirmation and negation.—They are.—When they are internal and the result of silent Reflexion, what would you call them but Opinion?—Nothing else.—And when they are not produced by the soul alone but by Sensation, what else can we call them but Imagination?—Nothing.—Well, as we have agreed that Speech is susceptible of truth and falsehood, and that Reflexion is the soul's interchange of Speech with herself, Opinion the conclusion of Reflexion, and what we denominate Imagination a synthesis of Sensation and Opinion, it follows that all of these, being kindred to Speech, are susceptible of falsehood."

The existence of Imagination as a separate critical faculty distinct from Intellect is insisted upon in the Republic. "Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἑλαττον ἢ πλεόν ἢ βαρύτερον ἀλλὰ τὸ λογιζόμενον καὶ

μετρήσαν ἢ καὶ στήσαν ;—πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;—ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ ἔργον.—τούτου γὰρ οὐν.—τούτῳ δὲ πολλάκις, μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἅττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα, τὰναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά.—ναί.—οὐκοῦν ἔφαιμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ;—καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἔφαιμεν.—τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταυτόν.—οὐ γὰρ οὐν ; p. 602. “Are not measuring and counting and weighing used as excellent protections against these sensuous illusions, whereby we are not guided by sensuous appearances of size, or number, or weight, but by a faculty that counts, measures, or weighs?—They are.—And it is Intellect that performs this function.—It is.—Sometimes when this has measured an object and pronounced it greater, less, or equal to another, it is contradicted by a simultaneous appearance about the same object.—It is.—Did we not say that to the same faculty contradictory judgments at the same time on the same object were impossible?—We did, and rightly.—That, then, which judges contrary to the measures cannot be identical with that which judges in accordance with the measures.—It cannot.”

The working of the Imagination is disguised by the idiom of the English language : it enters into all sensuous judgments.

§ 2. We see that *φαντασία* is spoken of as a judgment, susceptible of truth and falsehood. It would not be in accordance with English idioms to call the judgments spontaneously inspired by sensible appearances, Imaginations. When we immerse a straight stick in water, we say that, although we are convinced it is straight, it “seems,” “appears,” to be bent. We cannot say we “Fancy” or “Imagine” it bent, or use any term cognate to Imagination, as *φαίνεται* is to *φαντασία*. In this respect the Greek language is more philosophic. Dreams and the illusions of a disordered mind are attributed in the English language to the Imagination. But though all optical illusions, and even the soberest operations of the waking senses, are the works of the same faculty, they are expressed in English by terms that give no hint of their kindred to the other phænomena.

All judgments by sensation, whether illusory or well founded, are the work of the Imagination. Since Berkeley

wrote his Theory of Vision, they have been treated of by psychologists as the Secondary perceptions of Sense, though they refer to what are generally called the Primary properties of matter. The sensations received by one organ are regarded by the mind as signs of sensations that will presently be received by the same or another. When we were acquiring the use of our faculties, perhaps something in the nature of syllogism took place in these anticipations: but, after frequent verification of our reasonings, the law of suggestion now acts instantaneously and without our conscious reflexion. For instance, I see a mass of extended colour, which "seems" to me to be a globe: that is, from the visual sensation that I receive, I believe that, if I approach and handle the object, I shall receive certain other sensations of sight and touch and the Common Sense. In common language I am said to see the globular figure, solidity, &c., but in truth I only imagine them; they are only mediately and indirectly objects of sight. They are suggested by the immediate visual sensations, because experience has taught me the connexion of certain visual and tactual sensations. They are really images of the Fancy, awakened by sight, once, perhaps, by the intervention of syllogism, now according to the law of association. Hence we see there is a true instinctive psychology in the Greek idiom which applies the term *φαίvera* to such perceptions. The English terms, "Seem," "Appear," give no such intimation of the mental process which takes place.

Dugald Stewart has expressed himself so well on this matter, that we cannot do better than quote his words. After defining Conception (by which he means what we have called Imagination) as "that power of the mind which enables it to form a notion of an absent object of perception, or of a sensation which it has formerly felt:" he thus proceeds:

"From these principles it is an obvious consequence that the knowledge we obtain by the eye of the tangible qualities of bodies involves the exercise of Conception according to the definition of that power which has already been given. In ordinary discourse, indeed, we ascribe this knowledge, on account of the instantaneousness with which

it is obtained, to the power of Perception; but if the common doctrine on the subject be just, it is the result of a complex operation of the mind; comprehending, first, the Perception of those qualities which are the proper and original objects of sight; and, secondly, the Conception of those tangible qualities of which the original Perceptions of sight are found from experience to be the signs. The notions therefore we form by means of the eye of the tangible qualities of bodies and of the distances of these objects from the organ are mere Conceptions; strongly, and indeed indissolubly, associated by early and constant habit with the original Perceptions of sight.

“When we open our eyes on a magnificent prospect, the various distances at which all its different parts are placed from the eye, and the immense extent of the whole scene before us, seem to be perceived as immediately and as instantaneously by the mind as the coloured surface which is painted on the retina. The truth, however, unquestionably is, that this variety of distance and this immensity of extent are not objects of Sense, but of Conception; and the notions we form of them when our eyes are open differ from those we should form of them with our eyes shut only in this, that they are kept steadily in the view of the mind by being strongly associated with the sensations of colour, and with the original Perceptions of sight. This observation will be the more readily admitted if it is considered, that by a skilful imitation of a natural landscape in a common show-box the mind may be led to form the same notions of variety, of distance, and even of immense extent, as if the original scene were presented to our senses: and that, although in this case we have a speculative conviction that the sphere of our vision only extends to a few inches; yet so strong is the association between the original Perceptions of sight and the Conceptions which they habitually produce, that it is not possible for us by any effort of our will to prevent these Conceptions from taking place.”—*Elements of the Philosophy of the human mind*, chap. 3.

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§ 3. We have made this digression to explain and justify the Greek idiom which uses *φαίvera* where in English

by an imperfection of language we are obliged to use the words "seem" "appear" to express acts of the Imagination with Opinion. The distinction between Imagination and Opinion, judgment being common to both, is well traced by Aristotle. It is clear that, after Plato's contradistinction of Imagination and Opinion, his definition of Imagination, as a synthesis of Sensation and Opinion, must be inaccurate. It accordingly is objected to by Aristotle. *Φανερόν τοιούτων ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασία ἂν εἴη.* De Anima, 3. 3. "Neither Opinion and Sensation, nor Opinion from Sensation, nor a synthesis of Opinion and Sensation, are Imagination." His reasons are, that Opinion implies a capacity of Persuasion (*πίστις*) and the faculty of Speech (*λόγος*), neither of which are necessary to Imagination. He then adds that Opinion and Imagination are often in direct antagonism. *Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῇ περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πέπειστα δὲ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης.* "Imagination (Appearance) is sometimes false where intellectual apprehension (Opinion) is true; for instance, the apparent diameter of the sun is a foot in length, though we are convinced it is larger than the earth." From this he infers, as Plato had done in the Republic, that there is in the mind a tribunal superior to the Imagination. *Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν ταῦτα τὸ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν κρίνειν τό τε κύριον καὶ ἐν ᾧ τὰ φαντάσματα γίνεται· τούτου δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, ἀντίφησι δὲ πολλάκις ἕτερόν τι πρὸς τὴν φαντασίαν. καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ φάμεν δύο· κυριωτέρα γὰρ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡ ὄψις. εἰ δ' ἦν ἡ ἀφῆ μόνη, καὶ ἐκρίνομεν τὸ ἐν δύο.* De Somniis 2. "The reason of our sometimes rejecting appearances is that the ultimate judgment does not belong to the faculty moved by sensuous appearances. For instance, the sun appears only a foot in diameter, but something else contradicts the appearance. And when we cross our fingers one object of touch seems two; yet we do not believe it is two, because sight is a better authority than touch. If the sense of touch was our only informant we should have believed that the object was two." Every sensation induces the Imagination to

form a judgment, but the Imagination is often overruled by the Opinion. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐγρηγορῶς ὄρᾱν δοκεῖ καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἐνίοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν οὐ κινουμένην ὡς (for ὡς read ὅμως) ὄρᾱν φαμέν, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἀφὴν δύο κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἐν δύο δοκεῖ. ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως φησὶν ἡ ἀρχή, ἔαν μὴ ἑτέρα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῇ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἔαν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχεται ἢ μὴ κινῆται τὴν οἰκίαν κίνησιν. *ib.* 3. "The arrival of an impression from a particular organ to the central organ of sensation (the organ of the Primary Sense and Consciousness) is the cause that makes us when awake think we see, or hear, or have any other perception. And if we suppose the sight to be impressed when it is not, we believe we see when we do not; or if the touch informs us of two impulses we believè one object of touch to be two. For in general the information of every sense is accepted in the central sensation (Primary Sense, or Imagination) unless some other more credible witness contradicts. Or rather, it is always accepted by the Imagination, but not always by the Opinion, unless the higher tribunal is prevented from speaking, or does not perform its appropriate function." The distinction between Imagination and Opinion appears in dreams, when the Intellect is not entirely inactive. Ὡσπερ οὖν εἴ τινα λανθάνει ὑποβαλλόμενος ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ οὐ μόνον φανέται ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἐν, ἂν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανέται μὲν, οὐ δόξει δέ· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἂν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει καὶ τοῦ παθοῦς ἐν ᾧ ἡ αἰσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φανέται μὲν, λέγει δέ τι ἐν αὐτῷ, ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κόρισκος οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ὁ Κόρισκος. πολλάκις γὰρ καθεύδων τις λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ φαινόμενον, ἔαν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντίφῃσι τῇ φαντασίᾳ. *ib.* "If a person is unconscious that a finger is pressing against his eyeball, a single object will not only "appear" to be two, but will be so judged by the intellect; if he is conscious, it will "seem" two, but not be pronounced two by Opinion. So in sleep, if a man is conscious of being asleep and of the general oppression of his faculties, an appearance may affect his Imagination, but something in him says, "It looks like Coriscus,

but is not really Coriscus. For often in sleep something in the soul pronounces an appearance to be a dream; but if one is unconscious of being asleep the appearance is uncontradicted."

§ 4. The imagined form (*τὸ φαινόμενον*) is always the predicate of a proposition of which the subject is an immediate sensation, whether of a particular sense or of the common sense. When I see an object at a distance it has a certain visible magnitude and figure, which vary as I approach or recede. That is, the common sense (for magnitude and figure are objects of the common sense) acting through the organ of sight receives a varying impression. If I speak of the "apparent" height and figure of the object, and say it "seems" to be square and twenty foot high, I do not refer to its visible magnitude and shape, for these are perpetually varying, and I mean something invariable. Excited by sight and the common sense, Fancy has produced from her storehouse an imaginary height and figure, which she judges really and permanently belong to the object. So when Aristotle says the sun seems to be a foot broad, he means that the immediate sensation it produces excites the imaginative estimate, that if we approached and handled, or otherwise measured it, we should find it a foot in diameter. Berkeley supposes that the predicates in such visual judgments are always sensations of touch, because he considers that what we have called the common sense (the perception of magnitude, number, figure, &c.) resides mainly in the organ of touch. He says truly that the tangible properties of bodies are the most important to sentient beings, as capable of hurting or benefiting them, and causing them pleasure or pain: and that, therefore, in vision we hardly notice the visible qualities, colour, visible magnitude, and visible figure, but at once imagine the more interesting tangible magnitude and figure, power of resistance, &c. of which the visible qualities are the signs. The fact, however, seems to be, that touch, like the other senses, does not immediately reveal, but only indirectly suggests to the imagination, the qualities that form the predicates of our sensuous judgments: that tangible magnitude and figure, like the visible, are only regarded as

The predicates of Sensuous judgments are supplied by Imagination.

signs of the real magnitude and figure attributed by Imagination to the objects we touch.

Aristotle's definition of Imagination is contained in the following sentence; ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ' ἐνύπνιον φάντασμα τι φαίνεται εἶναι...φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μὲν ἔστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου δὲ ἡ τὸ φανταστικόν. De Somniis I. "Since Imagination and Sensation are different acts of the same faculty, Imagination being the Sensuous movement propagated from an actual Sensation; as dreams (which we said above belonged to the Sensuous faculty) are a kind of Imagination, it is clear that they belong to the Sensuous faculty so far as it is identical with the Imaginative." The word κίνησις is probably used to show the homogeneousness of Imagination and Sensation; possibly also to exclude reflexion or ratiocination. The drift of the definition in other words appears to be: Imagination is the spontaneous interpretative movement of the soul occasioned by an actual immediate Sensation.

Is the Moral Imagination affected by Volition? Can Pleasure be Imaginary or False?

§ 5. The general state of the will, that is, its virtuous or vicious disposition and characteristic tone, it is generally allowed, affects the moral Sensations, or, as we have identified the faculty, the moral Imaginations. They are also tinged by the transient sway of any powerful passion, or even the predominance of the more tranquil moods of feeling. It is not so clear whether, besides these influences, the moral perceptions are ever affected by individual acts of rational volition, or whether they are entirely exempt from its control, and necessarily determined by the state of the will and feelings. It is the established doctrine that they are necessary and beyond our control: τῆς φαντασίας ἡμεῖς οὐ κύριοι. Eth. Nic. 3. 5: and there is no doubt that this is very near the truth. On the other hand, though teaching and advice have very little influence to change the character and moral perceptions, it is hardly true that they have none at all. Optical experiments have established that the geometrical Imagination, as we may call the sensuous estimate of figure, position, and dimen-

sion, under certain circumstances, where the faculty itself is in a state of indifference, may be determined by an act of volition. Under certain circumstances, for instance, it depends on an act of the will whether we shall seem to ourselves to be beholding the convex or concave side of a mask, and whether we shall seem to be looking obliquely at a regular cube in perspective, or directly at a solid of some different position and figure. So perhaps, occasionally, when the moral Imagination is in a state of indifference or oscillation between baser and nobler interpretations, it may depend on an act of the will prompted by the reason whether some action or course of conduct shall be regarded by it in its true moral colours.

But to return to the *Philebus*. We have seen that what the Imagination supplies in a judgment of sense is the predicate, the subject being some immediate sensation. Apparently Pleasure can never be such an imaginary predicate, but is always an immediate sensation. We can speak of τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, or τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, but no one, unless led to use such expressions in defence of a thesis, would speak of τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδύ. If so, in spite of the arguments of Socrates in this dialogue, Pleasures are not susceptible of distinction as true and false, real and imaginary.

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